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Author: Yasunori Ouchida Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper presents an examination of whether an antitrust authority should prohibit a quantity-setting duopolists' semi-collusive production cartel after noncooperative quality-improving R&D. Results show that values of the technological spillover and product differentiation parameters exist such that both consumers and firms prefer a semi-collusive production cartel to full competition. It is particularly interesting that, in stark contrast to results of previous works, even though there exist circumstances under which the output level under semi-collusive production cartel is strictly greater than that under full competition, the market price under semi-collusive production cartel is invariably higher than under the case of full competition. Furthermore, a surprising key result is that if the degree of product differentiation is fairly small, and if technological spillover effects are fairly large, then a semi-collusive production cartel has social superiority compared to the case of full competition.
Author: Yasunori Ouchida Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper presents an examination of whether an antitrust authority should prohibit a quantity-setting duopolists' semi-collusive production cartel after noncooperative quality-improving R&D. Results show that values of the technological spillover and product differentiation parameters exist such that both consumers and firms prefer a semi-collusive production cartel to full competition. It is particularly interesting that, in stark contrast to results of previous works, even though there exist circumstances under which the output level under semi-collusive production cartel is strictly greater than that under full competition, the market price under semi-collusive production cartel is invariably higher than under the case of full competition. Furthermore, a surprising key result is that if the degree of product differentiation is fairly small, and if technological spillover effects are fairly large, then a semi-collusive production cartel has social superiority compared to the case of full competition.
Author: Iacopo Grassi Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 23
Book Description
In recent years economic literature has deeply analyzed piracy and copyright violation. Nevertheless most of the contributions focus on the study of digital markets and monopoly. In this paper we concentrate on the effect the entry of a pirate may have in a vertically differentiated duopoly where originally two firms compete producing a high quality and a low quality good. We show that, under general conditions payoffs of firms might increase with piracy, since piracy may support collusion between the two firms producing the original goods and the collusive profits of the firms in presence of piracy may be bigger than the profits of Nash without piracy. This result may explain the reason why in some markets, like the fashion market, where the producers of the original brands basically control the supply chain of the sector, piracy and production of high quality fakes is huge.
Author: Leonard Treuren Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 28
Book Description
Cartels may be exempted from competition law if they sufficiently promote sustainability objectives. To qualify, the collusive agreement should not fully eliminate competition. We study how remaining and fringe competition affect incentives to produce more sustainably under semi-collusion in an n-firm extension of the duopoly model in Schinkel and Spiegel (2017). We find that more residual competition makes the policy less effective. Coordination of sustainability investments always reduces sustainability and harms consumers, both in complete and partial collusion. A production cartel can no longer increase sustainability to the benefit of consumers for n>2, nor by maintaining fringe competition beyond 2 out of 3 firms colluding. The paradox in the policy is that sustainability only increases through a cartel regime that subsequently pockets the social gains. Residual competition discourages investment incentives more than it tempers the (partial) cartel's restriction of output. Requiring the cartel to compensate consumers decreases sustainability investments below competitive levels.
Author: Marco A. Marini Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 30
Book Description
Research on collusion in vertically differentiated markets is conducted under one or two potentially restrictive assumptions. Either there is a single industry-wide cartel or costs are assumed to be independent of quality or quantity. We explore the extent to which these assumptions are indeed restrictive by relaxing both. For a wide range of coalition structures, profit-maximizing cartels of any size price most of their lower quality products out of the market as long as production costs do not increase too much with quality. If these costs rise sufficiently, however, then market share is maintained for all product variants. All cartel sizes may emerge in equilibrium when exclusively considering individual deviations, but the industry-wide cartel is the only one immune to deviations by coalitions of members. Overall, our findings suggest that firms have a strong incentive to coordinate prices when the products involved are vertically differentiated.
Author: Yasusuke Murakami Publisher: Stanford University Press ISBN: 0804735190 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 509
Book Description
In his final work, Murakami confronts three crucial questions: How and in what form can a harmonious and stable post-cold-war world order be created? How can the world maintain the necessary economic performance while minimizing conflicts and environmental deterioration? What must be done to safeguard the freedoms of all peoples?
Author: William John 1905- Fellner Publisher: Hassell Street Press ISBN: 9781015210752 Category : Languages : en Pages : 360
Book Description
This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Author: Katherine M. Gehl Publisher: Harvard Business Press ISBN: 1633699242 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 316
Book Description
Leading political innovation activist Katherine Gehl and world-renowned business strategist Michael Porter bring fresh perspective, deep scholarship, and a real and actionable solution, Final Five Voting, to the grand challenge of our broken political and democratic system. Final Five Voting has already been adopted in Alaska and is being advanced in states across the country. The truth is, the American political system is working exactly how it is designed to work, and it isn't designed or optimized today to work for us—for ordinary citizens. Most people believe that our political system is a public institution with high-minded principles and impartial rules derived from the Constitution. In reality, it has become a private industry dominated by a textbook duopoly—the Democrats and the Republicans—and plagued and perverted by unhealthy competition between the players. Tragically, it has therefore become incapable of delivering solutions to America's key economic and social challenges. In fact, there's virtually no connection between our political leaders solving problems and getting reelected. In The Politics Industry, business leader and path-breaking political innovator Katherine Gehl and world-renowned business strategist Michael Porter take a radical new approach. They ingeniously apply the tools of business analysis—and Porter's distinctive Five Forces framework—to show how the political system functions just as every other competitive industry does, and how the duopoly has led to the devastating outcomes we see today. Using this competition lens, Gehl and Porter identify the most powerful lever for change—a strategy comprised of a clear set of choices in two key areas: how our elections work and how we make our laws. Their bracing assessment and practical recommendations cut through the endless debate about various proposed fixes, such as term limits and campaign finance reform. The result: true political innovation. The Politics Industry is an original and completely nonpartisan guide that will open your eyes to the true dynamics and profound challenges of the American political system and provide real solutions for reshaping the system for the benefit of all. THE INSTITUTE FOR POLITICAL INNOVATION The authors will donate all royalties from the sale of this book to the Institute for Political Innovation.
Author: Frode Steen Publisher: Now Publishers Inc ISBN: 1601983344 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 89
Book Description
Semicollusion provides a framework for understanding the mechanism at work with semicollusion and reviews the different approaches in the literature to this topic.
Author: Michael Dennis Whinston Publisher: ISBN: Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 272
Book Description
Antitrust law regulates economic activity but differs in its operation from what is traditionally considered "regulation." Where regulation is often industry-specific and involves the direct setting of prices, product characteristics, or entry, antitrust law focuses more broadly on maintaining certain basic rules of competition. In these lectures Michael Whinston offers an accessible and lucid account of the economics behind antitrust law, looking at some of the most recent developments in antitrust economics and highlighting areas that require further research. He focuses on three areas: price fixing, in which competitors agree to restrict output or raise price; horizontal mergers, in which competitors agree to merge their operations; and exclusionary vertical contracts, in which a competitor seeks to exclude a rival. Antitrust commentators widely regard the prohibition on price fixing as the most settled and economically sound area of antitrust. Whinston's discussion seeks to unsettle this view, suggesting that some fundamental issues in this area are, in fact, not well understood. In his discussion of horizontal mergers, Whinston describes the substantial advances in recent theoretical and empirical work and suggests fruitful directions for further research. The complex area of exclusionary vertical contracts is perhaps the most controversial in antitrust. The influential "Chicago School" cast doubt on arguments that vertical contracts could be profitably used to exclude rivals. Recent theoretical work, to which Whinston has made important contributions, instead shows that such contracts can be profitable tools for exclusion. Whinston's discussion sheds light on the controversy in this area and the nature of those recent theoretical contributions. Sponsored by the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Author: Yasunori Ouchida
Author: Yasunori Ouchida
Author: Iacopo Grassi
Author: Leonard Treuren
Author: Marco A. Marini
Author: Yasusuke Murakami
Author: William John 1905- Fellner
Author: Katherine M. Gehl
Author: Frode Steen
Author: Patrick M. Emerson
Author: Michael Dennis Whinston