Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth PDF Download

Author: Andrew Mumford
Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 40

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Book Description
This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force.

Author: Andrew Mumford
Publisher: War College Series
ISBN: 9781297046469
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42

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Book Description
This is a curated and comprehensive collection of the most important works covering matters related to national security, diplomacy, defense, war, strategy, and tactics. The collection spans centuries of thought and experience, and includes the latest analysis of international threats, both conventional and asymmetric. It also includes riveting first person accounts of historic battles and wars.Some of the books in this Series are reproductions of historical works preserved by some of the leading libraries in the world. As with any reproduction of a historical artifact, some of these books contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. We believe these books are essential to this collection and the study of war, and have therefore brought them back into print, despite these imperfections.We hope you enjoy the unmatched breadth and depth of this collection, from the historical to the just-published works.

Author: Andrew Mumford
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781466387270
Category : Counterinsurgency / Great Britain
Languages : en
Pages : 26

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Book Description
The British "way" of counterinsurgency warfight¬ing has often been held up by academics and military practitioners alike as a model worthy of replication by other national militaries, including the United States. In this insightful and provocative monograph, Dr. Andrew Mumford posits that the popular perception of British counterinsurgency efficacy from Malaya onwards has certainly not been supported by the his¬torical record of consistent tactical errors in the early phases of campaigns and long-term strategic obfusca¬tion. Mumford takes the body of experience accumu¬lated by the British in the past 60 years and uses it as a rich empirical base from which to rethink issues of immense strategic salience, such as the state of coun¬terinsurgency education in the British military sys¬tem; the utility of a "hearts and minds" strategy; and the nature of coalition-based irregular warfare. Slug¬gish British military lesson-learning, as seen through Mumford's "10 myths of British counterinsurgency," provides today's strategists the opportunity to under¬stand the value of lesson transferral and the problems of strategic inertia. From the standpoint of the questionable British performance in Iraq, this monograph fundamentally assesses the arguable myth that surrounds British competency at counterinsurgency warfare, hopefully sparking a debate about the "mythology" of recent British counterinsurgency warfighting.

Author: Andrew Mumford
Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 40

View

Book Description
This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force.

Author: Andrew Mumford
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 0415667453
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 218

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Book Description
This book examines the complex practice of counter-insurgency warfare through the prism of the British experiences of irregular war in the post-war era, from Malaya up to the current Iraq war.

Author: Andrew Mumford
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136649387
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 218

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Book Description
This book examines the complex practice of counter-insurgency warfare through the prism of British military experiences in the post-war era and endeavours to unpack their performance. During the twentieth century counter-insurgency assumed the status of one of the British military’s fortes. A wealth of asymmetric warfare experience was accumulated after the Second World War as the small wars of decolonisation offered the army of a fading imperial power many opportunities to deploy against an irregular enemy. However, this quantity of experience does not translate into quality. This book argues that the British, far from being exemplars of counter-insurgency, have in fact consistently proved to be slow learners in counter-insurgency warfare. This book presents an analysis of the most significant British counter-insurgency campaigns of the past 60 years: Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60), South Arabia (1962-67), the first decade of the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ (1969-79), and the recent British counter-insurgency campaign in southern Iraq (2003-09). Colonial history is used to contextualise the contemporary performance in Iraq and undermine the commonly held confidence in British counter-insurgency. Blending historical research with critical analysis, this book seeks to establish a new paradigm through which to interpret and analyse the British approach to counter-insurgency, as well as considering the mythology of inherent British competence in the realm of irregular warfare. It will be of interest to students of counter-insurgency, military history, strategic studies, security studies, and IR in general.

Author: Beatrice Heuser
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1316720845
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 400

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Book Description
This book is a major new study of the extent to which national mentalities, or 'ways of war', are responsible for 'national styles' of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Leading scholars examine the ways of war of particular insurgent movements, and the standard operational procedures of states and occupation forces to suppress them. Through case studies ranging from British, American and French counterinsurgency to the IRA and the Taliban, they show how 'national styles' evolve, influenced by transnational trends, ideas and practices. They examine whether we can identify a tendency to resort to a particular pattern of fighting and, if so, whether this is dictated by constants such as geography and climate, or by the available options, or else whether there exists a particular 'strategic culture' or 'national style'. Their findings show that 'national style' is not eternal but can undergo fundamental transformations.

Author: Spyridon Plakoudas
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 1786731495
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 256

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Book Description
The Greek Civil War (1946-1949) was one of the few instances in the post-World War II era of a clear-cut and permanent victory by right-wing government forces over an insurgent communist movement. Spyridon Plakoudas here explores the factors which ultimately caused the downfall of the communist insurgency in Greece which had, at some points, seemed undefeatable. He questions whether the guerrilla movement fell victim to the feud between Stalin and Tito or whether the significant British and, above all, American aid in fact rescued the Greek monarchist regime from collapse. Plakoudas explores the strategies adopted by government forces in order to counter the communist insurgency, how external and internal actors influenced these policies and when, how and why these policies achieved success. Featuring previously unseen sources and documents, this book reveals the strategy and tactics of the monarchist regime.

Author: Maria Hadjiathanasiou
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 1786726114
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 265

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Book Description
During the EOKA period of Greek Cypriot revolt against British colonial rule, the Greek Cypriots and the British deployed propaganda as a means of swaying allegiances, both within Cyprus and on the international scene. Propaganda and the Cyprus Revolt places new emphasis on the vital role propaganda played in turning the tide against British colonial control over Cyprus. Examining the increase of violence and coercion during this period of revolt, this book examines how the opposing sides' mobilization of propaganda offered two alternative visions for the future of Cyprus that divided opinion, to the ultimate detriment of British counterinsurgency efforts. Detailing the deployment of propaganda by both parties across radio, television and print channels, the book draws upon previously unpublished archival material in order to paint a detailed picture of how the British Empire lost control over the hearts and minds of the Greek Cypriot people. This study shines new light on a crucial period of Cypriot history and contributes to wider transnational debates around the use of propaganda and the end of empire. This will be an essential read for students of Cyprus history and British colonial history.

Author: Richard D. Newton
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
ISBN: 0700628711
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 264

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Book Description
In light of technological advances and multiplying irregular conflicts, conventional wisdom suggests airpower as the ideal, low-cost means of conducting modern warfare—and the air control method adopted by the British between the two world wars seems to back this up. Swift and precise targeting from above was considered more humane, after all, sparing civilians as well as British soldiers during punitive expeditions in unruly colonial regions. But what conventional wisdom misses, and this book makes clear, is how the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) innovative approach actually worked—relying on British airmen on the ground at least as much as on airborne technology to control restive tribes and villages. The RAF and Tribal Control tells the story of these forgotten airmen, the RAF special service officers who, embedded among local populations and indigenous tribes, collected vital intelligence, developed targets, directed air strikes when necessary, and, perhaps most important, provided personal assessments of airpower’s qualitative effects against primarily guerrilla forces. Airpower is a highly technological endeavor. But in wars where the human dimension takes primacy, Richard Newton reminds us that measuring the effectiveness of air actions requires a qualitative approach that is nearly impossible via overhead sensors. And this is where the RAF special service officers came in—airmen who understood the local cultures and peoples, they served as conduits for information and communication between the colonial administration and the tribes and villages. It was their ground-level contributions that made the integration of airpower into the civilian administration of colonies and mandates possible. This first in-depth account of the RAF special service officers’ role brings to light previously unpublished insights. The RAF and Tribal Control fills a significant gap in the history of air warfare. In doing so, the book dispels the notion that airpower alone is effective in small wars and irregular conflicts—and reveals the importance of the “boots-on-the-ground” human component in waging unconventional air warfare, both in the days of the RAF’s vaunted air control and in our own time.