Author: Asani SarkarPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 60
Book Description
Joint Provision of Public Goods with Incomplete Information about Costs
Author: Asani SarkarNeutrality and the Private Provision of Public Goods with Incomplete Information
Author: Mark GradsteinTime Dynamics and Incomplete Information in the Private Provision of Public Goods
Author: Mark GradsteinDiscrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information
Author: Flavio M. MenezesPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Public faciliities
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Book Description
Provision of Public Goods with Incomplete Information
Author: Mark GradsteinPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Public goods
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information
Author: Flavio M. MenezesPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29
Book Description
We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in the latter they are. For the special case where provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equilibrium in both contribution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself, we show that there exist equilibria of the subscription game where each participant pays the same amount. Moreover, we resort to the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (Myerson, 1981) to show that neither the subscription nor the contribution games admit ex-post efficient equilibria. In addition, we provide a sufficient condition for “contributing zero” to be the unique equilibrium of the contribution game with players.
The Private Provision of Public Goods Via Dominant Assurance Contracts
Author: Alexander T. TabarrokPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Many types of public goods can be produced privately by profit-seeking entrepreneurs using a modified form of assurance contract, called a dominant assurance contract. I model the dominant assurance contract as a game and show that the pure strategy equilibrium has agents contributing to the public good as a dominant strategy. The game is also modeled under incomplete information as a Bayesian-Nash game.
Public Goods for Economic Development
Author: Olga MemedovićPublisher: UN
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 198
Book Description
This publication addresses factors that promote or inhibit successful provision of the four key international public goods: financial stability, international trade regime, international diffusion of technological knowledge and global environment. Without these goods, developing countries are unable to compete, prosper or attract capital from abroad. The need for public goods provision is also recognized by the Millennium Development Goals, internationally agreed goals and targets for knowledge, health, governance and environmental public goods. The Report addresses the nature of required policies and institutions using the modern principles of collective action.
Voluntary Provision of Public Goods Under Complete and Incomplete Information
Author: Mikael ForssPublisher:
ISBN: 9789529616398
Category : Public goods
Languages : en
Pages : 118
Book Description
The Handbook of Experimental Economics
Author: John H. KagelPublisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691213259
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 742
Book Description
This book, which comprises eight chapters, presents a comprehensive critical survey of the results and methods of laboratory experiments in economics. The first chapter provides an introduction to experimental economics as a whole, with the remaining chapters providing surveys by leading practitioners in areas of economics that have seen a concentration of experiments: public goods, coordination problems, bargaining, industrial organization, asset markets, auctions, and individual decision making. The work aims both to help specialists set an agenda for future research and to provide nonspecialists with a critical review of work completed to date. Its focus is on elucidating the role of experimental studies as a progressive research tool so that wherever possible, emphasis is on series of experiments that build on one another. The contributors to the volume--Colin Camerer, Charles A. Holt, John H. Kagel, John O. Ledyard, Jack Ochs, Alvin E. Roth, and Shyam Sunder--adopt a particular methodological point of view: the way to learn how to design and conduct experiments is to consider how good experiments grow organically out of the issues and hypotheses they are designed to investigate.