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Author: Connor N. Raso Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The bureaucracy literature has long analyzed political control of administrative agencies. Such studies typically ask to what extent the president, the Congress, the courts, and interest groups influence the regulatory process? This dissertation analyzes an important but overlooked element of political control: statutory constraints on the rulemaking process such as the Administrative Procedures Act's notice and comment requirement. Almost all existing studies assume that such constraints are effective, or achieve the goals of their supporters. This assumption neglects the influence of politics, however. This dissertation challenges the conventional wisdom by analyzing the impact of politics on the likelihood that a rulemaking process constraint will be effective. Chapter 1 explains the problem and reviews the literature, showing that many studies have incorrectly assumed that all rulemaking process constraints are effective. Chapter 2 argues that opponents of proposed constraints can win concessions that undermine the odds that a constraint will be effective. Chapter 3 tests this theory with case studies of the full universe of generally applicable statutory rulemaking constraints. The chapter also analyzes whether constraints increase the amount of time required to complete a rulemaking. Contrary to common expectations, some constraints are wildly ineffective. Chapter 4 discusses the implications. The results offer new evidence regarding the extent to which the administrative process responds to the Congress, president, and courts. The results also provide insight into the goals of Congress and the president with respect to administrative law. In concluding, Chapter 5 discusses future research directions.
Author: Connor N. Raso Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The bureaucracy literature has long analyzed political control of administrative agencies. Such studies typically ask to what extent the president, the Congress, the courts, and interest groups influence the regulatory process? This dissertation analyzes an important but overlooked element of political control: statutory constraints on the rulemaking process such as the Administrative Procedures Act's notice and comment requirement. Almost all existing studies assume that such constraints are effective, or achieve the goals of their supporters. This assumption neglects the influence of politics, however. This dissertation challenges the conventional wisdom by analyzing the impact of politics on the likelihood that a rulemaking process constraint will be effective. Chapter 1 explains the problem and reviews the literature, showing that many studies have incorrectly assumed that all rulemaking process constraints are effective. Chapter 2 argues that opponents of proposed constraints can win concessions that undermine the odds that a constraint will be effective. Chapter 3 tests this theory with case studies of the full universe of generally applicable statutory rulemaking constraints. The chapter also analyzes whether constraints increase the amount of time required to complete a rulemaking. Contrary to common expectations, some constraints are wildly ineffective. Chapter 4 discusses the implications. The results offer new evidence regarding the extent to which the administrative process responds to the Congress, president, and courts. The results also provide insight into the goals of Congress and the president with respect to administrative law. In concluding, Chapter 5 discusses future research directions.
Author: Jeffrey S. Lubbers Publisher: ISBN: Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 476
Book Description
A publication of the American Bar Association's Government and Public Sector Lawyers Division and the Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice.
Author: Administrative Conference of the United States. Office of the Chairman Publisher: ISBN: Category : Administrative procedure Languages : en Pages : 338
Author: William F. West Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1315482436 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 243
Book Description
Controls on the bureaucracy through administrative due process and presidential and congressional prerogatives are the focus of this book. The author examines these controls and assesses the trade-offs among them.
Author: Rachel Augustine Potter Publisher: University of Chicago Press ISBN: 022662188X Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 259
Book Description
Who determines the fuel standards for our cars? What about whether Plan B, the morning-after pill, is sold at the local pharmacy? Many people assume such important and controversial policy decisions originate in the halls of Congress. But the choreographed actions of Congress and the president account for only a small portion of the laws created in the United States. By some estimates, more than ninety percent of law is created by administrative rules issued by federal agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Health and Human Services, where unelected bureaucrats with particular policy goals and preferences respond to the incentives created by a complex, procedure-bound rulemaking process. With Bending the Rules, Rachel Augustine Potter shows that rulemaking is not the rote administrative activity it is commonly imagined to be but rather an intensely political activity in its own right. Because rulemaking occurs in a separation of powers system, bureaucrats are not free to implement their preferred policies unimpeded: the president, Congress, and the courts can all get involved in the process, often at the bidding of affected interest groups. However, rather than capitulating to demands, bureaucrats routinely employ “procedural politicking,” using their deep knowledge of the process to strategically insulate their proposals from political scrutiny and interference. Tracing the rulemaking process from when an agency first begins working on a rule to when it completes that regulatory action, Potter shows how bureaucrats use procedures to resist interference from Congress, the President, and the courts at each stage of the process. This exercise reveals that unelected bureaucrats wield considerable influence over the direction of public policy in the United States.
Author: Dwight Waldo Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1351486330 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 384
Book Description
This classic text, originally published in 1948, is a study of the public administration movement from the viewpoint of political theory and the history of ideas. It seeks to review and analyze the theoretical element in administrative writings and to present the development of the public administration movement as a chapter in the history of American political thought.The objectives of The Administrative State are to assist students of administration to view their subject in historical perspective and to appraise the theoretical content of their literature. It is also hoped that this book may assist students of American culture by illuminating an important development of the first half of the twentieth century. It thus should serve political scientists whose interests lie in the field of public administration or in the study of bureaucracy as a political issue; the public administrator interested in the philosophic background of his service; and the historian who seeks an understanding of major governmental developments.This study, now with a new introduction by public policy and administration scholar Hugh Miller, is based upon the various books, articles, pamphlets, reports, and records that make up the literature of public administration, and documents the political response to the modern world that Graham Wallas named the Great Society. It will be of lasting interest to students of political science, government, and American history.
Author: Urja Mittal Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 58
Book Description
Agencies and courts have generally been understood to relate in two primary ways. First, judicial review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act is the cornerstone of the agency-court relationship. Second, and more recently, scholars have identified how agencies act as litigation gatekeepers, influencing which suits may proceed in federal court. But we have yet to recognize a third, critical and emerging relationship between agencies and courts: agencies acting as litigation rulemakers.As litigation rulemakers, agencies implicitly amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and shape how litigation proceeds in federal court. Agencies have engaged in notice-and-comment rulemaking restricting the availability of binding arbitration, adjudicated cases to require courts to grant class relief, and issued guidance limiting the confidentiality of settlement agreements. Whether through notice-and-comment rulemaking, adjudication, guidance, or other actions, agencies are directing judges as to how they should address cases that appear before them. In so doing, agencies are effectively modifying the default procedural regime set forth by the Federal Rules.Understanding litigation rulemaking deepens our awareness of how the Federal Rules are shaped and put into practice in the federal courts. A closer look at litigation rulemaking also illuminates the increasing complexity of the relationship between agencies and courts. This undocumented pathway for procedural reform complements the formal Rules Enabling Act process led by the federal courts' Rules Committee. Agencies acting as litigation rulemakers are also imposing additional constraints on the federal courts. When courts respond to these agency actions, typically through judicial review, a novel institutional dialectic arises. Moreover, by effectively amending the procedural regime that governs federal litigation, agencies are shaping substantive law.
Author: Connor N. Raso
Author: Connor N. Raso
Author: Jeffrey S. Lubbers
Author: Administrative Conference of the United States. Office of the Chairman
Author: William F. West
Author: Rachel Augustine Potter
Author: Dwight Waldo
Author: James T. O'Reilly
Author: United States. Department of Justice
Author: Todd Garvey
Author: Urja Mittal