Price Signaling in a Two-Market Duopoly PDF Download

Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Price Signaling in a Two-Market Duopoly PDF full book. Access full book title Price Signaling in a Two-Market Duopoly by Matthew Hughes (Donald). Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.

Price Signaling in a Two-Market Duopoly

Price Signaling in a Two-Market Duopoly PDF Author: Matthew Hughes (Donald)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Advertising
Languages : en
Pages : 86

Book Description
Within any industry, firms typically produce related products over multiple subsequent periods in an attempt to build consumer loyalty and achieve continued sales. Apple releases new iPhones and car companies produce new models every year, relying on consumers believing each new product is of high quality. Firms rely on the spillover effects from previous markets, where firms are able to more easily demonstrate their product's quality to the consumers before purchase. The goal is to find a range of prices which allows the high quality firm to distinguish its type to consumers via the price pH and if spillover effects in subsequent markets can occur. We look at a duopoly of two firms, of high and low qualities, where each firm produces a product in an initial market and a second, related product in a subsequent market. Using each firm's expected profits, based on Bayesian probabilities, we analyze a firm's mimicking strategy to find the range of pH that allows for a separating equilibrium and spillover effects. In a second market where firms are the same qualities as in the first market, the high quality firm experiences spillover effects and can signal its quality with a lower price than in the first market. When firms change qualities in the second market, no spillover effect occurs and the newly high quality firm must increase pH from the previous market in order to separate.

Price Signaling in a Two-Market Duopoly

Price Signaling in a Two-Market Duopoly PDF Author: Matthew Hughes (Donald)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Advertising
Languages : en
Pages : 86

Book Description
Within any industry, firms typically produce related products over multiple subsequent periods in an attempt to build consumer loyalty and achieve continued sales. Apple releases new iPhones and car companies produce new models every year, relying on consumers believing each new product is of high quality. Firms rely on the spillover effects from previous markets, where firms are able to more easily demonstrate their product's quality to the consumers before purchase. The goal is to find a range of prices which allows the high quality firm to distinguish its type to consumers via the price pH and if spillover effects in subsequent markets can occur. We look at a duopoly of two firms, of high and low qualities, where each firm produces a product in an initial market and a second, related product in a subsequent market. Using each firm's expected profits, based on Bayesian probabilities, we analyze a firm's mimicking strategy to find the range of pH that allows for a separating equilibrium and spillover effects. In a second market where firms are the same qualities as in the first market, the high quality firm experiences spillover effects and can signal its quality with a lower price than in the first market. When firms change qualities in the second market, no spillover effect occurs and the newly high quality firm must increase pH from the previous market in order to separate.

Oligopoly Pricing

Oligopoly Pricing PDF Author: Xavier Vives
Publisher: MIT Press (MA)
ISBN: 9780262220606
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 446

Book Description
Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.

Collusive Signalling in Experimental Duopoly Markets

Collusive Signalling in Experimental Duopoly Markets PDF Author: James Hamilton Holcomb
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Duopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 372

Book Description


Revenue Management and Pricing Analytics

Revenue Management and Pricing Analytics PDF Author: Guillermo Gallego
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1493996061
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 336

Book Description
“There is no strategic investment that has a higher return than investing in good pricing, and the text by Gallego and Topaloghu provides the best technical treatment of pricing strategy and tactics available.” Preston McAfee, the J. Stanley Johnson Professor, California Institute of Technology and Chief Economist and Corp VP, Microsoft. “The book by Gallego and Topaloglu provides a fresh, up-to-date and in depth treatment of revenue management and pricing. It fills an important gap as it covers not only traditional revenue management topics also new and important topics such as revenue management under customer choice as well as pricing under competition and online learning. The book can be used for different audiences that range from advanced undergraduate students to masters and PhD students. It provides an in-depth treatment covering recent state of the art topics in an interesting and innovative way. I highly recommend it." Professor Georgia Perakis, the William F. Pounds Professor of Operations Research and Operations Management at the Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts. “This book is an important and timely addition to the pricing analytics literature by two authors who have made major contributions to the field. It covers traditional revenue management as well as assortment optimization and dynamic pricing. The comprehensive treatment of choice models in each application is particularly welcome. It is mathematically rigorous but accessible to students at the advanced undergraduate or graduate levels with a rich set of exercises at the end of each chapter. This book is highly recommended for Masters or PhD level courses on the topic and is a necessity for researchers with an interest in the field.” Robert L. Phillips, Director of Pricing Research at Amazon “At last, a serious and comprehensive treatment of modern revenue management and assortment optimization integrated with choice modeling. In this book, Gallego and Topaloglu provide the underlying model derivations together with a wide range of applications and examples; all of these facets will better equip students for handling real-world problems. For mathematically inclined researchers and practitioners, it will doubtless prove to be thought-provoking and an invaluable reference.” Richard Ratliff, Research Scientist at Sabre “This book, written by two of the leading researchers in the area, brings together in one place most of the recent research on revenue management and pricing analytics. New industries (ride sharing, cloud computing, restaurants) and new developments in the airline and hotel industries make this book very timely and relevant, and will serve as a critical reference for researchers.” Professor Kalyan Talluri, the Munjal Chair in Global Business and Operations, Imperial College, London, UK.

Competition and Confidentiality

Competition and Confidentiality PDF Author: Andrew F. Daughety
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
How does the need to signal quality through price affect equilibrium pricing and profits, when a firm faces a similarly-situated rival? In this paper, we provide a model of non-cooperative signaling by two firms that compete over a continuum of consumers. We assume "universal incomplete information;" that is, each market participant has some private information: each consumer has private information about the intensity of her preferences for the firms' respective products and each firm has private information about its own product's quality. We characterize a symmetric separating equilibrium in which each firm's price reveals its respective product quality. We focus mainly on a model in which the quality attribute is safety (so that the legal system is brought into play) and quality is unobservable due to the use of confidential settlements; a particular specification of parameters yields a common model from the industrial organization literature in which quality is interpreted as the probability that a consumer will find the good satisfactory. We show that the equilibrium prices, the difference between those prices, the associated outputs, and profits are all increasing functions of the ex ante probability of high safety. When quality is interpreted as consumer satisfaction, unobservable quality causes all prices to be distorted upward, and lowers average quality and ex ante expected social welfare, but increases ex ante expected firm profits (when either the probability of high quality or the extent of horizontal product differentiation is sufficiently high). When quality is interpreted as product safety, the foregoing results are modified in that for some parameter values ex ante expected social welfare is higher under confidentiality because such legal secrecy lowers expected litigation costs.

Cournot Duopoly and Insider Trading with Two Insiders

Cournot Duopoly and Insider Trading with Two Insiders PDF Author: Wassim Daher
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description
In this paper, we study a version of the static Jain-Mirman (2002) model in which competition in the real sector is introduced. In this paper, we add competition in the stock sector to the Jain-Mirman (2002) paper. We show that the linear equilibrium structure is affected by this competition in the financial sector. Specifically, we show that the stock price set by the market maker reveals more information and that the behavior of the profits of the manager depends on the parameters of the model. Moreover, we prove that the level of output produced by the manager is less than in Jain-Mirman (2002). Finally, we also study the case in which the market maker receives only one signal and analyze the comparative statics of this model when the market maker receives either one or two signals.

Duopoly Price Competition with Reference Effects Under Logit Demand

Duopoly Price Competition with Reference Effects Under Logit Demand PDF Author: Mengzi Amy Guo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
We consider a duopoly price competition with each firm selling one substitute product to strategic consumers, who assess their willingness to pay based on the reference price and make purchase decisions through the MNL model. The influence of reference price on consumer demand, known as the reference effect, can be potentially asymmetric, which incurs the non-smoothness in revenue functions. In the one-shot game, we show the existence, uniqueness, and structure of Nash equilibrium (NE) in loss-neutral and loss-averse scenarios (our proof also extends to the oligopoly setting). By contrast, in the gain-seeking scenario, the NE exists but may not be unique, where we provide a sufficient condition for the occurrence of multiple equilibria. Additionally, our one-shot game can be naturally extended to a repeated game with consecutive periods linked by reference price updates. We derive theoretical insights on the long-run market dynamics in this multi-period competitive framework under two practical pricing policies. Notably, the market stability (i.e., convergence behavior) hinges on the presence of a gain-seeking product. In the absence of gain-seeking products, we prove the convergence of price and reference price paths to the stationary Nash equilibrium (SNE) when firms possess full rationality and adopt the equilibrium pricing policy. We further characterize the structure of SNE and show that it is unique if and only if both products are loss-neutral. Meanwhile, when firms only exhibit bounded rationality and adhere to the best-response pricing policy, we draw the same conclusion in a special case where consumers have short-term memories. Conversely, when any gain-seeking product is introduced, the SNE ceases to exist, implying that the market never stabilizes in the long run under either equilibrium or best-response pricing policy.

Handbook of Industrial Organization

Handbook of Industrial Organization PDF Author: Richard Schmalensee
Publisher: North Holland
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1002

Book Description
Determinants of firm and market organization; Analysis of market behavior; Empirical methods and results; International issues and comparision; government intervention in the Marketplace.

MICROECONOMICS

MICROECONOMICS PDF Author: S.P.S. CHAUHAN
Publisher: PHI Learning Pvt. Ltd.
ISBN: 8120336046
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 424

Book Description
This book presents a scientific and systematic development of the underlying concepts of microeconomics, with due emphasis on analytical and mathematical treatment of the discipline, so that the students develop skills to apply these concepts, in the light of current developments, to real-world problems. The book is organized into four units. The first unit is an introduction to the study of the science of economics. It defines the central problems of economics and outlines the tools to solve them. The students are introduced to the meaning and role of Production Possibility Curves to solve application-oriented problems in economics. The second unit gets students started on the study of microeconomics. It explains interaction of demand and supply curves and concept of equilibrium price. The factors affecting elasticity of demand and supply are discussed. This unit also looks at behaviour of consumers and explains several tools used to analyse demand. The third and fourth units elucidate the factors of production, the theory of costs and revenue, different forms of markets, and price-output determination in competitive markets. Though the book is primarily intended for undergraduate and postgraduate students of economics and commerce, it would be immensely useful to management students as well. KEY FEATURES  Over 250 neatly drawn figures to clarify the concepts. Chapter-end summaries as ‘Key Terms and Concepts’ to facilitate quick revision. Chapter-end short and long type questions of numerical and analytical nature with hints and answers as appropriate to probe the student’s understanding of the material covered. Numerous illustrative examples throughout the text to illustrate the application of concepts.  Two case studies to encourage application orientation among the students.

MICROECONOMICS: AN ADVANCED TREATISE

MICROECONOMICS: AN ADVANCED TREATISE PDF Author: CHAUHAN, S. P. S.
Publisher: PHI Learning Pvt. Ltd.
ISBN: 812035222X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 968

Book Description
Enriching contents of the book in the Second Edition, the author proffers a thoroughly revised and updated text with main focus on Game Theory, Linear Programming and Output–Input Analysis. Besides he gives due weightage to the topics on International Trade, Decision Theory, Pricing Policies in Practice and Basics of Econometrics for Estimation of Economic Functions—by introducing them as independent chapters in the present edition. The concepts have been introduced keeping decision-makers in mind, who may be associated with the corporate world or pursuing management courses offered by various institutes in India and abroad. The mathematical treatment of the topics, which is one of the distinguishing features of the book, is facilitated in a student-friendly approach. Primarily intended for the undergraduate and postgraduate students of commerce, economics and management, the book is a comprehensive text in accordance with the syllabi of B.Com, B.Sc (Economic Hons.), M.Com, M.A. (Economics) and Master of Business Economics (MBE) courses. Besides academic pursuits, the book will also be useful for the aspirants of competitive examinations such as Indian Administrative Services (IAS), Provincial Civil Services (PCS), and Indian Economic Services (IES).