Author: Arijit MukherjeePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Price Discrimination in Oligopoly with Asymmetric Firms
Author: Arijit MukherjeeCommitments Not to Price Discriminate
Author: Kenneth Stevens CortsPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
Book Description
Price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition, leading to lower prices for all consumers; the trade-off of consumer groups' welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise. This escalation of competition may make firms worse off, and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome. Under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise, unilateral commitments not to price discriminate - including the adoption of every day low-pricing or no-haggle policies - may raise firm profits by softening price competition.
Price and Output Effects of Oligopoly Price Discrimination Under Best-Response Asymmetry
Author: Ki-Eun RheePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 35
Book Description
When firms competitively price discriminate, best-response functions may exhibit either best-response symmetry (firms' ranking of strong and weak markets coincide) or best-response asymmetry (one firm's strong market is another firm's weak market). It has been shown in Corts (1998) and many models of behavior-based price discrimination that prices of all firms may decrease in all markets with best-response asymmetry. While one may presume that total consumption will increase upon low prices by all firms in all markets, such output effect has not been explicitly shown. We provide conditions on demands that are necessary for an output to increase as a result of competitive price discrimination. In particular, we link the condition to cross-price elasticity between the firms and the industry-level elasticity to average market price.
Dynamic Price Discrimination with Asymmetric Firms
Author: Yongmin ChenPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper considers variants of a dynamic duopoly model where one firm has a stronger market position than its competitor. Consumers' past purchases may reveal their different valuations for the two firms' products. Price discrimination based on purchase histories tends to benefit consumers if it does not cause the weaker firm to exit; otherwise it can harm consumers. The effect of price discrimination also depends on firms' cost differences, market competitiveness, and consumers' time horizon. The stronger firm may price below cost in the presence of consumer switching costs, with the purpose and effect of eliminating competition.
Competitive Behaviour-based Price Discrimination Among Asymmetric Firms
Author: Elias CarroniStrategic Complementarities and Endogenous Heterogeneity in Oligopolistic Markets
Author: Malgorzata KnauffPublisher: Presses univ. de Louvain
ISBN: 9782874630118
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 168
Book Description
The thesis consists of five chapters. The first of them contains introduction. Chapter 2 considers a broad class of two player symmetric games, which display a fundamental non-concavity when actions of both players are about to be the same. This implies that no symmetric equilibrium is possible. We distinguish different properties of the payoff functions, like strategic substitutes, complements and quasi-concavity, which are not necessarily imposed globally on the joint action space. A number of applications from industrial organization and applied microeconomics literature are provided. In Chapter 3 we generalize to the extent possible the known results for the case of games with one-dimensional action sets to the general case of games with action spaces that are complete lattices. We find that in the general case the scope for asymmetric equilibrium behavior is definitely broader than in the one-dimensional case, though still quite limited. Moreover, we investigate under which sufficient conditions asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria are always Pareto dominated by symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria. In Chapter 4 we deal with the effects of market transparency on prices in the Bertrand duopoly model. We consider two types of strategic interaction between firms in an industry - strategic complementarities and substitutabilities. In the first case, the results are close to conventional wisdom, especially, when in the same time products are substitutes. Namely, equilibrium prices and profits are always decreasing in transparency level, while the consumer’s surplus is increasing. Considering price competition with strategic substitutes, an ambiguity in the direction of change of prices appears. This leads to ambiguity concerning equilibrium profits and surplus changes caused by increasing transparency. In Chapter 5 we provide general conditions for Cournot oligopoly with product differentiation to have monotonic reaction correspondences. We give a proof for the conditions stated by Vives (1999). Moreover we elaborate more general requirements. They allow for identifying increasing best responses even in case inverse demand is submodular, and similarly, decreasing best responses in case of supermodular inverse demand. Examples illustrating the scope of applicability of these results are provided.
The Effects of Imperfect Price Discrimination in a Bertrand Oligopoly
Author: Thomas Joseph HolmesDynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information
Author: Andrew SweetingPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
We model differentiated product pricing by firms that possess private information about serially-correlated state variables, such as their marginal costs, and can use prices to signal information to rivals. In a dynamic game, signaling can raise prices significantly above static complete information Nash levels even when the privately observed state variables are restricted to lie in narrow ranges. We calibrate our model using data from the beer industry, and we show that our model can explain changes in price levels and price dynamics after the 2008 MillerCoors joint venture.
Price Discrimination in Asymmetric Industries
Author: Hinnerk GnutzmannPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 18
Book Description
Price discrimination by consumer's purchase history is widely used in regulated industries, such as communication or utilities, both by incumbents and entrants. I show that such discrimination can have surprisingly negative welfare effects -- even though prices and industry profits fall, so does consumer surplus. Earlier studies that did not allow entrants to discriminate or assumed symmetric firms yielded sharply different results, the pro-competitive effect of price discrimination are stronger in these settings. Imposing a pricing constraint on incumbent's discrimination leads the entrant to discriminate more heavily, but still improves both consumer and producer welfare.
Third-degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly when Markets are Covered
Author: Markus Dertwinkel-KaltPublisher:
ISBN: 9783863043353
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
We analyze oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination relative to uniform pricing, when markets are always covered. Pricing equilibria are critically determined by supply-side features such as the number of firms and their marginal cost differences. It follows that each firm's Lerner index under uniform pricing is equal to the weighted harmonic mean of the firm's relative margins under discriminatory pricing. Uniform pricing then decreases average prices and raises consumer surplus. We provide an intriguingly simple approach to calculate the consumer surplus gain from uniform pricing only based on market data of the discriminatory equilibrium (prices and quantities).