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Author: Ki-Eun Rhee Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 35
Book Description
When firms competitively price discriminate, best-response functions may exhibit either best-response symmetry (firms' ranking of strong and weak markets coincide) or best-response asymmetry (one firm's strong market is another firm's weak market). It has been shown in Corts (1998) and many models of behavior-based price discrimination that prices of all firms may decrease in all markets with best-response asymmetry. While one may presume that total consumption will increase upon low prices by all firms in all markets, such output effect has not been explicitly shown. We provide conditions on demands that are necessary for an output to increase as a result of competitive price discrimination. In particular, we link the condition to cross-price elasticity between the firms and the industry-level elasticity to average market price.
Author: Ki-Eun Rhee Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 35
Book Description
When firms competitively price discriminate, best-response functions may exhibit either best-response symmetry (firms' ranking of strong and weak markets coincide) or best-response asymmetry (one firm's strong market is another firm's weak market). It has been shown in Corts (1998) and many models of behavior-based price discrimination that prices of all firms may decrease in all markets with best-response asymmetry. While one may presume that total consumption will increase upon low prices by all firms in all markets, such output effect has not been explicitly shown. We provide conditions on demands that are necessary for an output to increase as a result of competitive price discrimination. In particular, we link the condition to cross-price elasticity between the firms and the industry-level elasticity to average market price.
Author: Malgorzata Knauff Publisher: Presses univ. de Louvain ISBN: 9782874630118 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 168
Book Description
The thesis consists of five chapters. The first of them contains introduction. Chapter 2 considers a broad class of two player symmetric games, which display a fundamental non-concavity when actions of both players are about to be the same. This implies that no symmetric equilibrium is possible. We distinguish different properties of the payoff functions, like strategic substitutes, complements and quasi-concavity, which are not necessarily imposed globally on the joint action space. A number of applications from industrial organization and applied microeconomics literature are provided. In Chapter 3 we generalize to the extent possible the known results for the case of games with one-dimensional action sets to the general case of games with action spaces that are complete lattices. We find that in the general case the scope for asymmetric equilibrium behavior is definitely broader than in the one-dimensional case, though still quite limited. Moreover, we investigate under which sufficient conditions asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria are always Pareto dominated by symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria. In Chapter 4 we deal with the effects of market transparency on prices in the Bertrand duopoly model. We consider two types of strategic interaction between firms in an industry - strategic complementarities and substitutabilities. In the first case, the results are close to conventional wisdom, especially, when in the same time products are substitutes. Namely, equilibrium prices and profits are always decreasing in transparency level, while the consumer’s surplus is increasing. Considering price competition with strategic substitutes, an ambiguity in the direction of change of prices appears. This leads to ambiguity concerning equilibrium profits and surplus changes caused by increasing transparency. In Chapter 5 we provide general conditions for Cournot oligopoly with product differentiation to have monotonic reaction correspondences. We give a proof for the conditions stated by Vives (1999). Moreover we elaborate more general requirements. They allow for identifying increasing best responses even in case inverse demand is submodular, and similarly, decreasing best responses in case of supermodular inverse demand. Examples illustrating the scope of applicability of these results are provided.
Author: Iñaki Aguirre Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This paper extends the traditional analysis of the output effect under monopoly (third-degree) price discrimination to a multimarket oligopoly. The author shows that under oligopoly price discrimination, differences in competitive pressure, measured by the number of firms, across markets are more important than the relative demand curvature when determining the effect on total output.
Author: Jonathan B. Baker Publisher: Harvard University Press ISBN: 0674238958 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 369
Book Description
A new and urgently needed guide to making the American economy more competitive at a time when tech giants have amassed vast market power. The U.S. economy is growing less competitive. Large businesses increasingly profit by taking advantage of their customers and suppliers. These firms can also use sophisticated pricing algorithms and customer data to secure substantial and persistent advantages over smaller players. In our new Gilded Age, the likes of Google and Amazon fill the roles of Standard Oil and U.S. Steel. Jonathan Baker shows how business practices harming competition manage to go unchecked. The law has fallen behind technology, but that is not the only problem. Inspired by Robert Bork, Richard Posner, and the “Chicago school,” the Supreme Court has, since the Reagan years, steadily eroded the protections of antitrust. The Antitrust Paradigm demonstrates that Chicago-style reforms intended to unleash competitive enterprise have instead inflated market power, harming the welfare of workers and consumers, squelching innovation, and reducing overall economic growth. Baker identifies the errors in economic arguments for staying the course and advocates for a middle path between laissez-faire and forced deconcentration: the revival of pro-competitive economic regulation, of which antitrust has long been the backbone. Drawing on the latest in empirical and theoretical economics to defend the benefits of antitrust, Baker shows how enforcement and jurisprudence can be updated for the high-tech economy. His prescription is straightforward. The sooner courts and the antitrust enforcement agencies stop listening to the Chicago school and start paying attention to modern economics, the sooner Americans will reap the benefits of competition.
Author: Stefan Grundmann Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0192608274 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 353
Book Description
Choice is a key concept of our time. It is a foundational mechanism for every legal order in societies that are, politically, constituted as democracies and, economically, built on the market mechanism. Thus, choice can be understood as an atomic structure that grounds core societal processes. In recent years, however, the debate over the right way to theorize choice - for example, as a rational or a behavioral type of decision making - has intensified. This collection provides an in-depth discussion of the promises and perils of specific types of theories of choice. It shows how the selection of a specific theory of choice can make a difference for concrete legal questions, in particular in the regulation of the digital economy or in choosing between market, firm, or network. In its first part, the volume provides an accessible overview of the current debates about rational versus behavioral approaches to theories of choice. The remainder of the book structures the vast landscape of theories of choice along with three main types: individual, collective, and organizational decision making. As theories of choice proliferate and become ever more sophisticated, however, the process of choosing an adequate theory of choice becomes increasingly intricate. This volume addresses this selection problem for the various legal arenas in which individual, organizational, and collective decisions matter. By drawing on economic, technological, political, and legal points of view, the volume shows which theories of choice are at the disposal of the legally relevant decision-maker, and how they can be operationalized for the solution of concrete legal problems. The editors acknowledge the kind support of the Fritz Thyssen Foundation for an exploratory conference on the subject of the book.
Author: Richard Schmalensee Publisher: North Holland ISBN: Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 1002
Book Description
Determinants of firm and market organization; Analysis of market behavior; Empirical methods and results; International issues and comparision; government intervention in the Marketplace.
Author: Xavier Vives Publisher: MIT Press (MA) ISBN: 9780262220606 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 446
Book Description
Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.
Author: Ki-Eun Rhee
Author: Ki-Eun Rhee
Author: Malgorzata Knauff
Author: Arijit Mukherjee
Author: Thomas Joseph Holmes
Author: Iñaki Aguirre
Author: Jonathan B. Baker
Author: Patrick M. Emerson
Author: Stefan Grundmann
Author: Richard Schmalensee
Author: Xavier Vives