Author: Terence C. BrennanPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Coalition governments
Languages : en
Pages : 480
Book Description
Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-electoral Payoffs
Author: Terence C. BrennanPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Coalition governments
Languages : en
Pages : 480
Book Description
The Logic of Pre-electoral Coalition Formation
Author: Sona Nadenichek GolderPublisher: Ohio State University Press
ISBN: 0814210295
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Why do some parties coordinate their electoral strategies as part of a pre-electoral coalition, while others choose to compete independently at election time? Scholars have long ignored pre-electoral coalitions in favor of focusing on the government coalitions that form after parliamentary elections. Yet electoral coalitions are common, they affect electoral outcomes, and they have important implications for democratic policy-making itself. The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation by Sona Nadenichek Golder includes a combination of methodological approaches (game theoretic, statistical, and historical) to explain why pre-electoral coalitions form in some instances but not in others. The results indicate that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties. They are also more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large) and when the potential coalition partners are similar in size. Ideologically polarized party systems and disproportional electoral rules in combination also increase the likelihood of electoral coalition formation. Golder links the analysis of pre-electoral coalition formation to the larger government coalition literature by showing that pre-electoral agreements increase (a) the likelihood that a party will enter government, (b) the ideological compatibility of governments, and (c) the speed with which governments take office. In addition, pre-electoral coalitions provide an opportunity for combining the best elements of the majoritarian vision of democracy with the best elements of the proportional vision of democracy.
The Political Economy of Pre-electoral Coalitions
Author: Miguel Garza CasadoPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electoral coalitions
Languages : en
Pages : 166
Book Description
Pre-electoral coalitions have been largely ignored in Presidential systems. In this dissertation I study the case of Mexico where since 1991 a pre-electoral coalition has been formed by two non-contiguous parties; the far-right party (PAN) and the far-left party (PRD). Despite dramatic differences in policy agendas, they have won important elections at the state and municipal level. The creation of this coalition creates a puzzle that is not addressed by existing theories such as spatial models, party alignment, incumbency advantage, federalism, electoral budget cycles and ideological expenditures. The first chapter of this dissertation answers the following questions: Will voters support their preferred party despite the non-contiguous coalition? Will voters punish coalition members if it breaks while in office? Will coalitions stay together through multiple electoral cycles? This chapter develops a Game Theoretical Bayesian model to analyze voters' electoral behavior. The main finding is a separating equilibrium in the multiple-period game. Reputation effects will lead to a long-term collaboration while in the short-term the coalition will break. Voters support these coalitions if they stay together once in office and implement a policy platform that maximizes their payoffs. The second chapter introduces the concept of "Partial Alignment'', created by a pre-electoral coalition in power, and its effects on resource allocation. Do municipalities where pre-electoral coalition governments win an election receive significantly more or fewer resources from the federal and state level governments than those where the coalition loses? The theoretical answer is ambiguous: Partial alignment could lead to more resources in an effort to keep the party in power - even as part of a coalition - or fewer resource due to the desire to stop sharing power in order to govern alone. Analysis uses a Regression Discontinuity Design with a matched dataset that combines data on municipality level income with municipal election results between 1989 and 2016. Results show that municipalities where the pre-electoral coalition barely won received fewer federal resources in the year of the election and the year before. The third chapter looks at how the pre-electoral coalition spend their resources. Do pre-electoral coalitions spend differently than single party governments? Will pre-electoral coalition governments increase expenditure after the election or wait until the next electoral cycle? Will they strategically pick between short and long-term expenditures to signal voters their competence? Analysis uses a Regression Discontinuity Design and a Fixed Effects Panel Model with a matched dataset that combines data on municipality level expenditures with municipal election results between 1989 and 2016. Results show that municipalities where the pre-electoral coalition barely won create a new electoral budget cycle by increasing expenditures during their first year in office. It is also shown that these governments are not strategic when selecting between short and long-term expenditures to signal voters their competence in office.
Logic of Preelectoral Coalition Formation
Author: Sona Nadenichek GolderPublisher:
ISBN: 9780814257210
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Why do some parties coordinate their electoral strategies as part of a pre-electoral coalition, while others choose to compete independently at election time? Scholars have long ignored pre-electoral coalitions in favor of focusing on the government coalitions that form after parliamentary elections. Yet electoral coalitions are common, they affect electoral outcomes, and they have important implications for democratic policy-making itself. The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation by Sona Nadenichek Golder includes a combination of methodological approaches (game theoretic, statistical, and historical) to explain why pre-electoral coalitions form in some instances but not in others. The results indicate that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties. They are also more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large) and when the potential coalition partners are similar in size. Ideologically polarized party systems and disproportional electoral rules in combination also increase the likelihood of electoral coalition formation. Golder links the analysis of pre-electoral coalition formation to the larger government coalition literature by showing that pre-electoral agreements increase (a) the likelihood that a party will enter government, (b) the ideological compatibility of governments, and (c) the speed with which governments take office. In addition, pre-electoral coalitions provide an opportunity for combining the best elements of the majoritarian vision of democracy with the best elements of the proportional vision of democracy.
Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining
Author: Siddhartha BandyopadhyayPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Coalition governments
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Pre-electoral Coalitions
Author: Rafael Hortala VallveThe Electoral Origins of Governing Coalitions
Author: Royce Alexander CarrollPublisher:
ISBN: 9781109976861
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 196
Book Description
In this dissertation, I investigate a key distinction in the electoral origins of governing coalitions: whether bargaining among parties to form the government is primarily pre-electoral or post-electoral. Post-electoral bargaining refers to competing parties negotiating to form a governing coalition after an election. Pre-electoral bargaining involves parties committing before an election to govern together as a unit. In the first part of the dissertation, I argue that parties form pre-electoral pacts with an eye to gain portfolios, conditional on electoral costs. These costs vary in predictable ways tied to variations in the structure of the world's electoral systems. In the second part, I present two main findings on the consequences of the electoral origins of governing coalitions. First, pre-electoral coalitions are more proportional in their internal allocation of offices. I argue that this distribution of spoils is designed to encourage contributions to winning elections rather than purely legislative contributions to majorities. Second, I argue that the more pre-electoral a coalition, the more it is likely to take a majoritarian 'bonus' in the distribution of offices in the legislature. Cross-national empirical analyses are conducted on samples of coalitions from developing and advanced democracies since the 1990s.
Pre-Electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections, and Multiparty Governments
Author: Marc DebusPublisher:
ISBN: 9783845203898
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Elections as Instruments of Democracy
Author: G. Bingham PowellPublisher: Yale University Press
ISBN: 9780300080162
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 320
Book Description
This text explores elections as instruments of democracy. Focusing on elections in 20 democracies over the last 25 years, it examines the differences between two visions of democracy - the majoritarian vision and the proportional influence vision.
Electoral System Design
Author: Andrew ReynoldsPublisher: Stockholm : International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 258
Book Description
Publisher Description