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Pre-Announcement of Insiders' Trades

Pre-Announcement of Insiders' Trades PDF Author: Steven J. Huddart
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 33

Book Description
Among the reactions to recent corporate scandals are calls for greater transparency of insiders' trades. The Securities and Exchange Commission's recent rule on fair disclosure is accompanied by a safe harbor from prosecution under insider trading laws for insiders who pre-commit to trades. A blue-ribbon commission convened to address recent financial scandals and subsequent decline in investor confidence recommended that insiders be required to preannounce sales of stock in their companies. The commission's call for insiders to preannounce their sales echoes proposals made over a decade ago in the legal press, law reviews, and the U.S. Congress that would require pre-announcement of all trades. We consider the effects of insiders pre-announcing their trades on their preferences for public disclosure that would pre-empt their private information when other motives for insiders to trade are present. Two principal forces emerge. With pre-announcement, insiders cannot expect to profit on their private information, but cannot ignore the incentive to do so when market makers are unable to disentangle insiders' motives. Pre-emptive public disclosure allows insiders to avoid the dysfunctional consequences of this incentive. However, such disclosure before insiders have an opportunity to trade exposes them to greater price risk than would otherwise be the case. Our analysis demonstrates these effects.

Pre-Announcement of Insiders' Trades

Pre-Announcement of Insiders' Trades PDF Author: Steven J. Huddart
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 33

Book Description
Among the reactions to recent corporate scandals are calls for greater transparency of insiders' trades. The Securities and Exchange Commission's recent rule on fair disclosure is accompanied by a safe harbor from prosecution under insider trading laws for insiders who pre-commit to trades. A blue-ribbon commission convened to address recent financial scandals and subsequent decline in investor confidence recommended that insiders be required to preannounce sales of stock in their companies. The commission's call for insiders to preannounce their sales echoes proposals made over a decade ago in the legal press, law reviews, and the U.S. Congress that would require pre-announcement of all trades. We consider the effects of insiders pre-announcing their trades on their preferences for public disclosure that would pre-empt their private information when other motives for insiders to trade are present. Two principal forces emerge. With pre-announcement, insiders cannot expect to profit on their private information, but cannot ignore the incentive to do so when market makers are unable to disentangle insiders' motives. Pre-emptive public disclosure allows insiders to avoid the dysfunctional consequences of this incentive. However, such disclosure before insiders have an opportunity to trade exposes them to greater price risk than would otherwise be the case. Our analysis demonstrates these effects.

Stock Trading Before the Announcement of Tender Offers

Stock Trading Before the Announcement of Tender Offers PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Insider trading in securities
Languages : en
Pages : 58

Book Description


Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading

Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading PDF Author: H. Nejat Seyhun
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262692341
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 443

Book Description
Learn how to profit from information about insider trading. The term insider trading refers to the stock transactions of the officers, directors, and large shareholders of a firm. Many investors believe that corporate insiders, informed about their firms' prospects, buy and sell their own firm's stock at favorable times, reaping significant profits. Given the extra costs and risks of an active trading strategy, the key question for stock market investors is whether the publicly available insider-trading information can help them to outperform a simple passive index fund. Basing his insights on an exhaustive data set that captures information on all reported insider trading in all publicly held firms over the past twenty-one years—over one million transactions!—H. Nejat Seyhun shows how investors can use insider information to their advantage. He documents the magnitude and duration of the stock price movements following insider trading, determinants of insiders' profits, and the risks associated with imitating insider trading. He looks at the likely performance of individual firms and of the overall stock market, and compares the value of what one can learn from insider trading with commonly used measures of value such as price-earnings ratio, book-to-market ratio, and dividend yield.

The Effects of SEC Insider Trading Enforcement on Pre-announcement Leakage

The Effects of SEC Insider Trading Enforcement on Pre-announcement Leakage PDF Author: Allen Michel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Insider trading in securities
Languages : en
Pages : 24

Book Description


Financial Restatement Announcements and Insider Trading

Financial Restatement Announcements and Insider Trading PDF Author: Oliver Zhen Li
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 47

Book Description
We examine insider trading activities around financial restatement announcements and find strong evidence of informed trading by insiders. Focusing on the association between net insider selling and restatement announcement abnormal returns, we provide evidence of net insider selling before the restatement announcements, little net insider selling immediately around the announcements, and net insider buying after the announcements. The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act constrains informed insider selling before the restatement announcements. Trading before the restatement announcements enables insiders to make a significant profit, especially pre-Sarbanes-Oxley. Overall, our results suggest that insiders trade on privileged knowledge about the forthcoming restatement announcements to their advantage and that they trade in a pattern that minimizes the possibility of insider trading allegations or violating internal corporate insider trading policies.

Insider Trading

Insider Trading PDF Author: Paul U. Ali
Publisher: CRC Press
ISBN: 1420074032
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 452

Book Description
Insider trading has long been considered an endemic feature of the world's financial markets. It is unsurprising that the recent growth in mergers and acquisitions worldwide has been accompanied by a growth in insider trading, on a scale not witnessed since the 1980's takeovers boom. Insider Trading: Global Developments and Analysis brings together the latest law and finance research on insider trading. It provides expert coverage on the established US, European, and Asia-Pacific securities markets, as well as the key emerging markets of Brazil and the greater China region. Providing high interest and up-to-date content, the book features several recent cases, including that of Martha Stewart.

Insider Trading and Mergers

Insider Trading and Mergers PDF Author: Stephen Jerome O'Brien
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Insider trading in securities
Languages : en
Pages : 50

Book Description


Digital Insiders and Informed Trading Before Earnings Announcements

Digital Insiders and Informed Trading Before Earnings Announcements PDF Author: Henk Berkman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 45

Book Description
While it is widely acknowledged that companies face increasing cybersecurity risk stemming from hackers stealing customer information, a relatively unknown cybersecurity risk is from information leakage and subsequent trading by digital insiders - hackers who target corporations to obtain non-public corporate information for illegal trading. We use a firm-specific measure of cybersecurity risk mitigation based on textual analysis of 10-Ks to proxy for the organization's ability to reduce the probability of digital insider trading. We find that a larger share of new earnings information is incorporated into prices prior to earnings announcements for firms with low cybersecurity risk mitigation scores. We also find that pre-announcement trading by short sellers is more predictive of earnings surprises for firms with low cybersecurity risk mitigation. Further, on days closer to earnings announcements, firms with relatively low cybersecurity risk mitigation scores experience a larger increase in bid-ask spreads, particularly the adverse selection component. These results suggest that weak cybersecurity risk mitigation provides opportunities for acquisition of private information and that trading by privately informed traders is more likely in stocks of firms with higher exposure to cybercrimes.

Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (Itsfea).

Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (Itsfea). PDF Author: Jon A. Garfinkel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description
This paper finds new evidence that the threat of legal sanctions significantly affects the trading behavior of insiders. Specifically, I examine the effects of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA) on insider trading around earnings announcements. Given ITSFEA's stated concern with trading on private information prior to its release, I argue that insiders may respond to the Act by shifting their trading to the post-announcement period. The evidence presented below is consistent with the argument that insiders responded to Congress' clear disdain for trading on private information prior to its release. Following the Act, insiders focus more of their trading after an earnings announcement than before one. Moreover, insiders trade less frequently and earn smaller profits on their trades around earnings announcements after the Act. Finally, the observed shift in trade timing after the Act is accompanied by a change in insider trading strategies. Specifically, insiders' pre-announcement trading was uncorrelated with earnings surprise prior to the Act, while subsequent to the Act, pre-announcement insider trading was decreasing in earnings surprise.

The Law and Finance of Corporate Insider Trading: Theory and Evidence

The Law and Finance of Corporate Insider Trading: Theory and Evidence PDF Author: Hamid Arshadi
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461532442
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 171

Book Description
A thorough analysis of insider trading requires the integration of law and finance, and this book presents a theoretical and empirical examination of insider trading by incorporating a synthesis of securities law with that of financial theory. The book begins with a conceptual framework that explores the theoretical roles of markets, firms and publicly held corporations, including a discussion of corporate governance to determine both who may have access to nonpublic information, and their legal rights and responsibilities. The book then examines different aspects of the securities laws, including the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and a critique of the SEC disclosure rules and their ramifications for market efficiency. This is followed by a detailed chronology of insider trading regulations enacted in the U.S. since 1934 and an overview of the existing empirical literature on insider trading. Empirical evidence is presented on insider trading activities and the merit of anti-insider trading laws is evaluated on theoretical arguments and recent empirical developments. The authors conclude by arguing that insider trading laws and enforcement activities have failed and propose the decriminalization of insider trading.