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Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 59
Book Description
The United States has responded to recent changes in the international political scene by beginning to reduce military forces. As forces are reduced, questions arise about their structure, particularly the balance between reserve and active forces. Active Component (AC) forces can respond on short notice but are expensive; reserve forces are more economical but tend to be less ready and would take more time to deploy. Vigorous debate has ensued about the share of the future Army force structure that should be accorded to each type of force. That debate frequently centers on the responsiveness of the reserve forces and on the time required to train reserve combat elements before deployment. This report estimates how long it takes Reserve Component (RC) combat forces to prepare for deployment to a wartime theater. It draws on four main sources of information: (1) Information on the train-up process of the three National Guard round-out brigades that were activated for service in Operation Desert Shield/Storm; (2) Analyses and projections of RC training times made by the Department of the Army Inspector General; (3) Training plans followed by AC units during peacetime to sustain readiness; and (4) An extensive series of interviews with both AC and RC personnel and observations of the 1992 summer Annual Training cycle for National Guard brigades. The analysis first defines 12 post-mobilization activities that RC combat units must complete following mobilization. It then estimates the time needed for the 12 activities under three scenarios (optimistic, intermediate, and pessimistic) that vary in assumptions about future RC peacetime training proficiency. The report finds that the optimistic case will require 79 days, the intermediate case 104 days, and the pessimistic case 128 days. These estimates assume that leadership can complete its training in parallel with troop training and that adequate training support from the AC will be available. (11 tables, 17 refs.).
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 59
Book Description
The United States has responded to recent changes in the international political scene by beginning to reduce military forces. As forces are reduced, questions arise about their structure, particularly the balance between reserve and active forces. Active Component (AC) forces can respond on short notice but are expensive; reserve forces are more economical but tend to be less ready and would take more time to deploy. Vigorous debate has ensued about the share of the future Army force structure that should be accorded to each type of force. That debate frequently centers on the responsiveness of the reserve forces and on the time required to train reserve combat elements before deployment. This report estimates how long it takes Reserve Component (RC) combat forces to prepare for deployment to a wartime theater. It draws on four main sources of information: (1) Information on the train-up process of the three National Guard round-out brigades that were activated for service in Operation Desert Shield/Storm; (2) Analyses and projections of RC training times made by the Department of the Army Inspector General; (3) Training plans followed by AC units during peacetime to sustain readiness; and (4) An extensive series of interviews with both AC and RC personnel and observations of the 1992 summer Annual Training cycle for National Guard brigades. The analysis first defines 12 post-mobilization activities that RC combat units must complete following mobilization. It then estimates the time needed for the 12 activities under three scenarios (optimistic, intermediate, and pessimistic) that vary in assumptions about future RC peacetime training proficiency. The report finds that the optimistic case will require 79 days, the intermediate case 104 days, and the pessimistic case 128 days. These estimates assume that leadership can complete its training in parallel with troop training and that adequate training support from the AC will be available. (11 tables, 17 refs.).
Author: Thomas F. Lippiatt Publisher: ISBN: Category : Military readiness Languages : en Pages : 66
Book Description
The United States has responded to recent changes in the international political scene by beginning to reduce military forces. As forces are reduced, questions arise about their structure, particularly the balance between reserve and active forces. Active Component (AC) forces can respond on short notice but are expensive; reserve forces are more economical but tend to be less ready and would take more time to deploy. Vigorous debate has ensued about the share of the future Army force structure that should be accorded to each type of force.
Author: Thomas F. Lippiatt Publisher: ISBN: Category : Military art and science Languages : en Pages : 66
Book Description
This report documents RAND research into the time it takes Reserve Component (RC) Support units (e.g., transportation personnel, engineers, military police, artillery personnel) to mobilize and prepare for deployment. The analyses are based on empirical data from 606 units that were called to duty during the Persian Gulf War in Operation Desert Shield (ODS). They provide a systematic method for estimating the post-mobilization preparation times of diverse types of support units. The analysis shows that the times depend on the unit's branch, size (weight of equipment), and mode of transportation (air or sea). Units deploying by air can be ready very quickly (8 to 25 days from call-up to the point when they are ready to load equipment for overseas shipment). Units deploying by sea take longer to prepare (typically 30 days, but up to 10 days more for heavy artillery units), but have more flexibility because they can continue some training while their equipment is in transit to the theater. The report illustrates how the results can make large differences in Active Reserve allocation decisions. The methodology, which was applied here to a notional Southwest Asia scenario, will allow defense planners to determine whether particular types of RC units can be available in time to respond to future contingencies. Section 2 provides an overview of ODS from the perspective of this study and describes the mobilization process followed by a typical RC unit in preparing for that operation. Section 3 describes the database used to support the quantitative analysis of the preparation times. Section 4 presents that analysis for units deploying by air and sea. Section 5 offers an example illustrating how the approach used here can help determine the division of support units between the Active and Reserve Components. The final section offers conclusions. (10 tables, 6 figures, 5 refs.).
Author: Wesley A. Beal Publisher: ISBN: Category : United States Languages : en Pages : 19
Book Description
Although there are many management systems supporting planning data for post-mobilization requirements, the installations designated to receive the Reserve Component forces do not have a common system to identify the training status and needs of the units upon arrival. Further, the Installation Commander has the responsibility for validating the combat readiness of these units prior to deployment. The guidance and policy in this critical area is not consistent among the various commands involved. The growing interest in mobilization results from the increased US reliance on the Reserve Components (RC) for the execution of any major war plan. Although the USAR and the ARNG may be able to perform their wartime mission, these forces must be able to get to the theater, on schedule, with the proper training; and the CINC must know the combat status of the units. Crossleveling, existing systems to identify the numbers of equipment and personnel; increases the combat readiness of the deploying units. However, a subjective evaluation is required in order to determine the training status and validate the units. This paper reviews post-mobilization planning systems at the installation level and proposes that the US Army develop a comprehensive system for determining the post-mobilization training requirements of a Reserve Component unit, and for validating combat readiness prior to deployment.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This report documents RAND research into the time it takes Reserve Component (RC) Support units (e.g., transportation personnel, engineers, military police, artillery personnel) to mobilize and prepare for deployment. The analyses are based on empirical data from 606 units that were called to duty during the Persian Gulf War in Operation Desert Shield (ODS). They provide a systematic method for estimating the post-mobilization preparation times of diverse types of support units. The analysis shows that the times depend on the unit's branch, size (weight of equipment), and mode of transportation (air or sea). Units deploying by air can be ready very quickly (8 to 25 days from call-up to the point when they are ready to load equipment for overseas shipment). Units deploying by sea take longer to prepare (typically 30 days, but up to 10 days more for heavy artillery units), but have more flexibility because they can continue some training while their equipment is in transit to the theater. The report illustrates how the results can make large differences in Active Reserve allocation decisions. The methodology, which was applied here to a notional Southwest Asia scenario, will allow defense planners to determine whether particular types of RC units can be available in time to respond to future contingencies. Section 2 provides an overview of ODS from the perspective of this study and describes the mobilization process followed by a typical RC unit in preparing for that operation. Section 3 describes the database used to support the quantitative analysis of the preparation times. Section 4 presents that analysis for units deploying by air and sea. Section 5 offers an example illustrating how the approach used here can help determine the division of support units between the Active and Reserve Components. The final section offers conclusions. (10 tables, 6 figures, 5 refs.).
Author: Publisher: DIANE Publishing ISBN: 1568065353 Category : Languages : en Pages : 69
Book Description
Reviews the Army's planned force reduction and the roles that will be assigned to Army Reserve and National Guard forces. Addresses the factors influencing the Army's decisions on future reserve roles, rationale behind its planned reserve force reductionsk, and opportunities to more effectively use the reserves in the downsized force. Charts and tables.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Government publications Languages : en Pages : 480
Book Description
In the continuing effort to maintain a ready force and honor the United States commitments throughout the world, in 1993 the Chief of Staff of the Army directed a test of the use of Reserve Component forces for the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping mission in the Sinai. A battalion composed of 80% RC individual volunteers and 20% Active Component soldiers was activated, trained and deployed as the 28th MFO rotation to the Sinai (Jan-Jul 95). ARI conducted an assessment of personnel and training issues using performance, interview and survey data. The four research questions and their findings are as follows. (1) Personnel: Who volunteered and why? What, if any, changes should be made to the volunteer screening process? (2) Family Support: How well did the family support system work? What was the impact of Sinai service on the family and civilian lives of volunteers? (3) Training/Performance: What are the unique and minimal training requirements? Did the training process produce a cohesive unit that could perform the mission? (4) Impact on the 29th ID(L): What is the impact on the ARYG units that sent volunteers, both during the deployment and post-deployment? Recommendations for future deployments are discussed in the text. ARI will continue to assess the impact of the deployment and post-redeployment re-entry on National Guard soldier commitment/retention, marital stability and financial well-being through October 1997. Cost analyses are not included in the ARI portion of the MFO assessment.
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Author: 
Author: Thomas F. Lippiatt
Author: Thomas F. Lippiatt
Author: Wesley A. Beal
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Author: United States. Department of the Army
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Author: United States. General Accounting Office
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Author: Dallas D. Owens