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Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The objective of this task is to analyze impure oxide materials exiting from front-end processing prior to storage for feed blending. There are three goals to be accomplished with this task: reduce reblending (currently projected at 7% with an optimized ordering of the incoming material streams), determine if impure feed prep operations are performing adequately, and reduce plant operating costs by replacing wet prep elemental analyses whether conducted in the immobilization facility or in existing laboratories. An additional potential application is the analysis of blended oxide prior to first-stage UO2 and precursor addition.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The objective of this task is to analyze impure oxide materials exiting from front-end processing prior to storage for feed blending. There are three goals to be accomplished with this task: reduce reblending (currently projected at 7% with an optimized ordering of the incoming material streams), determine if impure feed prep operations are performing adequately, and reduce plant operating costs by replacing wet prep elemental analyses whether conducted in the immobilization facility or in existing laboratories. An additional potential application is the analysis of blended oxide prior to first-stage UO2 and precursor addition.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 10
Book Description
Candidate immobilization forms for the disposal of surplus weapons-useable are being tested and characterized. The goal of the testing program was to provide sufficient data that, by August 1997, an informed selection of a single immobilization form could be made so that the form development and production R and D could be more narrowly focused. Two forms have been under consideration for the past two years: glass and ceramic. In August, 1997, the Department of Energy (DOE) selected ceramic for plutonium disposition, halting further work on the glass material. In this paper, we will briefly describe these two waste forms, then describe our characterization techniques and testing methods. The analytical methods used to characterize altered and unaltered samples are the same. A full suite of microscopic techniques is used. Techniques used include optical, scanning electron, and transmission electron microscopies. For both candidate immobilization forms, the analyses are used to characterize the material for the presence of crystalline phases and amorphous material. Crystalline materials, either in the untested immobilization form or in the alteration products from testing, are characterized with respect to morphology, crystal structure, and composition. The goal of these analyses is to provide data on critical issues such as Pu and neutron absorber volubility in the immobilization form, thermal stability, potential separation of absorber and Pu, and the long-term behavior of the materials. Results from these analyses will be discussed in the presentation. Testing methods include MCC-1 tests, product consistency tests (methods A and B), unsaturated ''drip'' tests, vapor hydration tests, single-pass flow-through tests, and pressurized unsaturated flow tests. Both candidate immobilization forms have very low dissolution rates; examples of typical test results will be reported.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 180
Book Description
This integrated plan for the DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) describes the technology development and major project activities necessary to support the deployment of the immobilization approach for disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium. The plan describes details of the development and testing (D & T) tasks needed to provide technical data for design and operation of a plutonium immobilization plant based on the ceramic can-in-canister technology (''Immobilization Fissile Material Disposition Program Final Immobilization Form Assessment and Recommendation'', UCRL-ID-128705, October 3, 1997). The plan also presents tasks for characterization and performance testing of the immobilization form to support a repository licensing application and to develop the basis for repository acceptance of the plutonium form. Essential elements of the plant project (design, construction, facility activation, etc.) are described, but not developed in detail, to indicate how the D & T results tie into the overall plant project. Given the importance of repository acceptance, specific activities to be conducted by the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (RW) to incorporate the plutonium form in the repository licensing application are provided in this document, together with a summary of how immobilization D & T activities provide input to the license activity. The ultimate goal of the Immobilization Project is to develop, construct, and operate facilities that will immobilize from about 18 to 50 tonnes (MT) of U.S. surplus weapons usable plutonium materials in a manner that meets the ''spent fuel'' standard (Fissile Materials Storage and Disposition Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement Record of Decision, ''Storage and Disposition Final PEIS'', issued January 14, 1997, 62 Federal Register 3014) and is acceptable for disposal in a geologic repository. In the can-in-canister technology, this is accomplished by encapsulating the plutonium-containing ceramic forms within large canisters of high level waste (HLW) glass. Deployment of the immobilization capability should occur by 2006 and be completed within 10 years.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Safe Pu management is an important and urgent task with profound environmental, national, and international security implications. Presidential Policy Directive 13 and analyses by scientific, technical, and international policy organizations brought about a focused effort within the Department of Energy (DOE) to identify and implement long-term disposition paths for surplus Pu. The principal goal is to render surplus Pu as inaccessible and unattractive for reuse in nuclear weapons as Pu in spent reactor fuel. In the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons- Usable Fissile Materials (1997), DOE announced pursuit of two disposition technologies: (1) irradiation of Pu as MOX fuel in existing reactors and (2) immobilization of Pu into solid forms containing fission products as a radiation barrier. DOE chose an immobilization approach that includes use of the can-in-canister option. . for a portion of the surplus, non-pit Pu material. In the can-in-canister approach, cans of glass or ceramic forms containing Pu are encapsulated within canisters of HLW glass. In support of the selection process, a technical evaluation of retrievability and recoverability of Pu from glass and ceramic forms by a host nation and by rogue nations or subnational groups was completed. The evaluation involved determining processes and flowsheets for Pu recovery, comparing these processes against criteria and metrics established by the Fissile Materials Disposition Program and then comparing the recovery processes against each other and against SNF processes.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The Department of Energy (DOE) has declared approximately 38.2 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium to be excess to the needs of national security, 14.3 tonnes of fuel- and reactor-grade plutonium excess to DOE needs, and anticipates an additional 7 tonnes to be declared excess to national security needs. Of this 59.5 tonnes, DOE anticipates that (approximately) 7.5 tonnes will be dispositioned as spent fuel at the Geologic Repository and (approximately) 2 tonnes will be declared below the safeguards termination limit and be discard3ed as TRU waste at WIPP. The remaining 50 tonnes of excess plutonium exists in many forms and locations around the country, and is under the control of several DOE offices. In addition to the plutonium, the feed stock also contains about 17 tonnes of depleted uranium, about 600 kg of highly enriched uranium, and many kilograms of neptunium and thorium and about 8 to 10 tonnes of tramp impurities. The Materials Disposition Program (MD) will be received materials packaged by these other Programs to disposition in a manor that meets the spent fuel standard. To minimize the cost of characterization of the feedstock and to minimize purification processes, a blending strategy will be followed. The levelization of the impurities, the plutonium isotopics, and the actinide impurities will also provide some benefits in the area of proliferation resistance. The overall strategy will be outlined and the benefits of following a blending instead of a purification program will be discussed.
Author: Boris E. Burakov Publisher: World Scientific ISBN: 1848164181 Category : Science Languages : en Pages : 215
Book Description
This book summarises approaches and current practices in actinide immobilisation using chemically-durable crystalline materials e.g. ceramics and monocrystals. Durable actinide-containing materials including crystalline ceramics and single crystals are attractive for various applications such as nuclear fuel to burn excess Pu, chemically inert sources of irradiation for use in unmanned space vehicles or producing electricity for microelectronic devices, and nuclear waste disposal. Long-lived -emitting actinides such as Pu, Np, Am and Cm are currently of serious concern has a result of increased worldwide growth in the nuclear industry. Actinide-bearing wastes have also accumulated in different countries as a result of nuclear weapons production. Excess weapon and civil Pu from commercial spent fuel is waiting for environmentally-safe immobilisation. As actinides are chemical elements with unique features, they could be beneficially used in different areas of human life including medicine although currently there is no appropriate balance between safe actinide disposal and use. Both use and disposal of actinides require their immobilisation in a durable host material. The choice of an optimal actinide immobilisation route is often a great challenge for specialists. There is a wealth of information about actinide properties in many publications although little is published to summarise the currently accepted approaches and practices on actinide immobilisation. This book intends to provide such information based on the authors' experience and studies in nuclear material management and actinide immobilisation.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 8
Book Description
The safe management of surplus weapons plutonium is a very important and urgent task with profound environmental, national and international security implications. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Presidential Police Directive 13 and various analysis by renown scientific, technical and international policy organizations have brought about a focused effort within the Department of Energy to identify and implement paths forward for the long term disposition of surplus weapons usable plutonium. The central, overarching goal is to render surplus weapons plutonium as inaccessible and unattractive for reuse in nuclear weapons, as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium contained in civilian spent reactor fuel. One disposition alternative considered for surplus Pu is immobilization, in which plutonium would be emplaced in glass, ceramic or glass-bonded zeolite. This option, along with some of the progress over the last year is discussed.
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Author: United States. Department of Energy. Richland Operations Office
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Author: Abraham Clearfield
Author: Boris E. Burakov
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