Platform Price Parity Clauses and Segmentation PDF Download

Author: Joan Calzada
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40

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Book Description
We investigate how the adoption of price parity clauses (PPCs) by established platforms affects the listing decisions of suppliers. PPCs have been widely adopted by online travel agencies (OTAs) to force client hotels not to charge lower prices in alternative sales channels. We find that OTAs adopt PPCs when they are perceived as highly substitutable, and in order to prevent showrooming. PPCs allow OTAs to charge hotels higher commission fees. However, hotels can respond by delisting themselves from some OTAs. Hence, our analysis reveals that the removal of PPCs enables more hotels to resort to OTAs. This is beneficial for consumers, as prices decrease in absence of PPCs.

Author: Holger Löhr
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3668257450
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 78

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Book Description
Master's Thesis from the year 2014 in the subject Economics - Other, grade: 1,7, University of Marburg (Wirtschaftspolitik), course: Masterarbeit, language: English, abstract: Recent years have witnessed a remarkable increase in internet platform markets which have become the preferred venue of interaction amongst a growing number of buyers and sellers. The ability of the internet to enable sellers reach a greater number of consumers shows that there is a high potential for growth of the internet market, with effects on competition. Following a 2013 report by the German Antitrust Authority “Bundeskartellamt” on “Vertical Restraints on the Internet Economy”, it is clear that the internet significantly reduces transaction costs and thus increases competition to the benefit of consumers. The increase in competition among sellers, producers and retailers has led to an adoption of different forms of vertical restrictions on internet platforms which have come under the scrutiny of antitrust authorities. This thesis aims to analyze vertical restraints on internet platform markets based on the investigation of Amazon.com, Inc. by the “Bundeskartellamt” for its use of a price parity clause. This clause was introduced in Germany and in the United Kingdom in 2010 in the contract between Amazon and sellers using its platform and prohibited them from setting lower prices on other platforms, including their own websites, than the prices they set on Amazon.

Author: Chengsi Wang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32

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Book Description
Platforms use price parity clauses to prevent sellers charging lower prices when selling through other channels. Platforms justify these restraints by noting they are needed to prevent free-riding, which would undermine their incentives to invest in their platform. In this paper, we study the effect of price parity clauses on three different types of platform investment, and evaluate these restraints taking into account these investment effects. We find, that wide price parity clauses lead to excessive platform investment while without such price parity clauses there is insufficient platform investment. Even taking these investment effects into account, wide price parity clauses always lower consumer surplus and often lowers total welfare.

Author: José Ignacio Heresi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Author: Federico Navarra
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Author: Renato Gomes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic commerce
Languages : en
Pages : 34

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Book Description
Online marketplaces, such as Amazon, or online travel agencies, such as Booking.com, greatly expand consumer information about market offers, but also raise firms' marginal costs by charging high commissions. To prevent show-rooming, platforms adopted price parity clauses, which restrict sellers' ability to offer lower prices in alternative sales channels. Whether to uphold, reform, or ban price parity has been at the center of the policy debate, but so far little consensus has emerged. In this paper, we investigate a natural alternative to lifting price parity; namely, we study how to optimally cap platforms' commissions. The optimal cap reflects the Pigouvian precept according to which the platform should not charge fees greater than the externality that its presence generates on other market participants. Employing techniques from extreme-value theory, we are able to express the optimal cap in terms of observable quantities. In an application to online travel agencies, we find that current average fees are welfare increasing only if platforms at least double consumers' consideration sets (relative to alternative ways of gathering information online). This suggests that, in some markets, regulation capping commissions should bind if optimally set.

Author: Heiko Karle
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
For many products, platforms enable sellers to transact with buyers. We show that the competitive conditions among sellers shape the market structure in platform industries. If product market competition is tough, sellers avoid competitors by joining different platforms. This allows platforms to sustain high fees and explains why, for example, in some online markets, several homogeneous platforms segment the market. Instead, if product market competition is soft, agglomeration on a single platform emerges, and platforms fight for the dominant position. These insights give rise to novel predictions. For instance, market concentration and fees are negatively correlated in platform industries, which inverts the standard logic of competition.

Author: Simonetta Vezzoso
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38

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Book Description
A two-sided platform business is a new type of intermediary to be found in a growing number of economic sectors. As to the hospitability industry in particular, recent innovations in the field of digital technologies prompted the rise of so called Online Travel Agents (OTAs) and the demise of the traditional merchant model.Recently national competition authorities (NCAs) in the EU investigated so called rate parity clauses in the contracts between the three largest OTAs and their hotel partners. These are contract clauses laying down the hotelier's obligation to display the same room prices across sales channels. The parallel investigations conducted by the NCAs revealed an array of anticompetitive effects stemming from rate parity obligations. While the German NCA concluded that there was insufficient evidence of the efficiency gains of these clauses, and therefore decided to prohibit them, the French, Italian and Swedish NCAs implicitly recognised that some level of protection against free-riding was necessary, and accepted commitments to reduce the scope of the rate parity obligation.The hotel online booking cases were closely followed in the EU and beyond, since they could help clarify a number of key assessment issues concerning a category of commercial practices already widely spread in online markets. In-depth analyses of the NCAs' findings are now needed, especially in view of the promotion of an effective antitrust-based platform regulation. In particular, this article explores some of the challenges related to the application of the traditional free-riding defence to rate parity obligations.

Author: Robert M. Solow
Publisher: Yale University Press
ISBN: 0300249977
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 100

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Book Description
A unique and illuminating portrait of economists and their work Providing illuminating profiles of ninety of the world's most prominent economists--from Nobel Prize winners and former Federal Reserve chairs to young scholars charting the future of the field--this stunning volume pairs full-page portraits by acclaimed photographer Mariana Cook with short essays written by the sitters in response to questions posed by Nobel Laureate Robert M. Solow about their work. Together, the words and photographs offer a unique look into the world of economists and serve as an accessible entry point into the views shaping policy and research decisions by such luminaries as Ben Bernanke, Janet Yellen, Mario Draghi, Steven Levitt, Robert Shiller, Esther Duflo, Paul Krugman, and Susan Athey, among many others.

Author: A. K. von Moltke
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192873067
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 401

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Book Description
Large digital platforms have been in the doghouse of antitrust decision-makers worldwide in recent years. Antitrust regulators agree, urgent intervention is needed. Interestingly, it is the plight of victimized suppliers—of merchants, app developers, publishers, platform labourers, and the like, who are upstream in the value chain—that has topped the policy agenda, prompting scrutiny of an almost unprecedented intensity. Amid such anxieties, Antitrust and Upstream Platform Power Plays asks a somewhat provocative question: Are upstream platform power plays really 'competition problems', and ones for antitrust, at that? The apparently obvious answer—'yes'—is deceptively simple for a number of reasons. Firstly, it contradicts contemporary antitrust's single-minded focus on consumers, which has all but erased supplier exploitation in the brick-and-mortar economy from the policy's radar. Secondly, the wider antitrust community remains bitterly divided when it comes to judging platform practices. In addition, if any consensus could be had, it would almost certainly confirm the longstanding tenet that antitrust cannot be about supplier welfare, as such. These paradoxes call for a policy introspection-precisely what this book provides. The analysis offered in Antitrust and Upstream Platform Power Plays is altogether normative, theoretical, and practical. Normative because it engages in a supplier-mindful soul-searching exercise, which advances our understanding of antitrust's foundations; theoretical as it sheds multidisciplinary insights on upstream effects in the platform economy and develops new frameworks for rationalizing them; and practical since it takes a deep dive into the complex antitrust machinery whilst staying attuned to other available levers of public action. Answering a compelling question with an equally compelling answer, this work will appeal to scholars and policymakers worldwide with a particular interest in platform regulation, antitrust, and powerful digital platforms.