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Author: Jiang Cheng Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 51
Book Description
We investigate the role of organizational form and ownership structure in corporate governance by examining CEO turnover in the U.S. property-casualty insurance industry. The probability of non-routine turnover has a significant negative relationship with firm performance, and outside succession dominates when non-routine turnover occurs. Turnover probabilities vary significantly by organizational form and ownership structure. Closely-held stocks have lower non-routine turnover-performance sensitivity than publicly-traded stocks. The probability of non-routine CEO turnover is lower for mutuals than for closely held and publicly-traded non-family-owned stock firms. Family firms with family-member CEOs have the lowest turnover rate of any ownership type, and incoming successors in closely-held family firms mainly come from the controlling families.
Author: Jiang Cheng Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 51
Book Description
We investigate the role of organizational form and ownership structure in corporate governance by examining CEO turnover in the U.S. property-casualty insurance industry. The probability of non-routine turnover has a significant negative relationship with firm performance, and outside succession dominates when non-routine turnover occurs. Turnover probabilities vary significantly by organizational form and ownership structure. Closely-held stocks have lower non-routine turnover-performance sensitivity than publicly-traded stocks. The probability of non-routine CEO turnover is lower for mutuals than for closely held and publicly-traded non-family-owned stock firms. Family firms with family-member CEOs have the lowest turnover rate of any ownership type, and incoming successors in closely-held family firms mainly come from the controlling families.
Author: David J. Denis Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
We report a significant negative relation between the fractional equity ownership of top executives and the likelihood of top management turnover. In addition, the relation between prior firm performance and the likelihood of turnover is statistically insignificant for firms in which the top executive owns more than 1% of the firm's shares. These findings suggest that managers become entrenched at very low ownership levels. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that the stock price reaction to a management change is significantly greater in firms in which the departing manager owns more than 1% of the firm's shares. Moreover, in these firms, the incoming manager's fractional ownership is typically less than 1% and the firm is subject to a higher rate of post-turnover corporate control activity. We also examine the influence of other aspects of ownership structure and find that turnover rates are higher in firms with unaffiliated blockholders and lower in firms with blockholders that are affiliated with incumbent managers.
Author: Jay Dahya Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 24
Book Description
This article investigates the impact that successful hostile and friendly takeovers have on the rates of top management change for U.K. target firms. The results shows that hostile takeovers are associated with a greater degree of both top executive and top team forced departure rates compared to that of friendly takeovers. Furthermore, prior to takeover, hostile targets have lower abnormal returns, lower profitability, higher debt, lower managerial ownership and a high ownership stake held by external block holders relative to friendly targets. The results give further support to the disciplining role of the hostile takeover.
Author: Tatiana Dolgopyatova Publisher: Springer ISBN: 0230249493 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 336
Book Description
This book is designed to scrutinize the Russian business sector in transition with special attention to firm organization, business integration, corporate governance, and company management. Using a unique dataset of Russian joint-stock companies, the authors empirically analyze key issues for understanding the Russian corporate sector.
Author: Bang Dang Nguyen Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 32
Book Description
This paper investigates whether ownership structure and board characteristics determine CEO turnover in a sample of largest French-listed firms from 1994 to 2001. The results show that CEO turnover is negatively and significantly related to prior accounting and stock performance. Controlling for prior performance, ownership structure, and characteristics of boards of directors impacts the sensitivity of CEO turnover to prior performance. Firms with blockholders, high government ownership, two-tier boards, and larger boards are less likely to dismiss CEOs for poor performance. Institutional investors, and their co-existence with large blockholders, do not impact the sensitivity of CEO turnover to prior performance.
Author: Michael Useem Publisher: Harvard University Press ISBN: 9780674273986 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 322
Book Description
A quiet revolution came to corporate America during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Large shareholders - pension funds, insurance companies, money managers, and commercial banks - exercised new-found muscle, pressuring senior managers to improve disappointing financial results by reshaping their organizations. Michael Useem reveals how those investor pressures have transformed the inside structures of many corporations, better aligning them with shareholder interests. Useem draws on numerous sources, including interviews with senior managers and intensive studies of seven large corporations representing a range of restructuring experiences and industries - including pharmaceuticals, transportation, chemicals, retailing, and financial services. He shows that organizational changes have affected many areas of corporate life: headquarters staffs have been reduced, authority has filtered down to operating units, and compensation has become more closely tied to performance. Change also extends to corporate governance, where managers have fought back by seeking legal safeguards against takeovers and by staggering board terms. They've also put significant resources into building more effective relations with shareholders. As Useem demonstrates, this revolution has reached beyond the corporation, influencing American politics and law. As increasing ownership concentration has caused companies to focus more attention on shareholders, corporate political agendas have shifted from fighting government regulation to resisting shareholder intrusion. This book will be important reading for managers, economists, lawyers, financial analysts, and all observers of American business.
Author: Jiang Cheng
Author: Jiang Cheng
Author: Tzu Ting Lin
Author: David J. Denis
Author: Jay Dahya
Author: Eva M. Meyerson
Author: Tatiana Dolgopyatova
Author: Bang Dang Nguyen
Author: Michael Useem
Author: derek c. jones, panu kalmi and niels mygind
Author: Robert F. Freeland