Author: Public Affairs Information Service
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 356
Book Description
PAIS Bulletin
Bulletin of the Public Affairs Information Service
Author: Public Affairs Information Service
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 356
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 356
Book Description
Public Affairs Information Service Bulletin
Newsletter
Author: American Association of Law Libraries
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law libraries
Languages : en
Pages : 732
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law libraries
Languages : en
Pages : 732
Book Description
Newsletter - Canadian Association of Law Libraries
Author: Canadian Association of Law Libraries
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 298
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 298
Book Description
Resources in education
Library Journal
California Librarian
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Librarians
Languages : en
Pages : 332
Book Description
Includes Handbook and proceedings of the annual meeting of the California Library Association.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Librarians
Languages : en
Pages : 332
Book Description
Includes Handbook and proceedings of the annual meeting of the California Library Association.
Library Hotline
Pay Without Performance
Author: Lucian A. Bebchuk
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 9780674020634
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 9780674020634
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.