Author: Anastasia Antsygina Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We study optimal information disclosure in static contests where players do not know their own values of winning but can learn them, publicly or privately, from the designer. The designer chooses a disclosure policy that maximizes the total expected effort, and commits to it before observing the realized value profile. A distinct feature of our model is that conditional on receiving private information from the designer, contestants are allowed to communicate with each other by sending informative (truthful) or uninformative (empty) messages. As our results show, the contestants have incentives to share their private information with each other if and only if the values of winning are positively correlated. At the same time, learning is rarely perfect because mixing between the two types of messages leads to higher expected payoff in the communication game. Since with a positive probability communication results in an asymmetric contest associated with lower expected effort, the designer prefers concealment to any other disclosure policy available. This result is in a stark contrast with the no communication benchmark where private disclosure is best when the values of winning are sufficiently positively correlated.
Author: Jun Zhang Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 31
Book Description
We examine optimal information disclosure through Bayesian persuasion in a two-player contest. One contestant's valuation is commonly known and the other's is his private information. The contest organiser can precommit to a signal to in uence the uninformed contestant's belief about the informed contestant. We show that to search for the optimal signal when the informed contestant's valuation follows a binary distribution, it is without loss of generality to compare no disclosure with full disclosure; otherwise, such a restriction causes loss of generality. We propose a simple method to compute the optimal signal, which yields explicit solutions in some situations.
Author: Xin Feng Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We study optimal information disclosure via an ambiguous persuasion approach in a two-player contest. The designer can precommit to an ambiguous device to influence the uninformed contestant's belief about his opponent's private type. We fully characterize the optimal ambiguous information structures when players are maxmin expected utility (MMEU) maximizers. Depending on the prior, it is optimal to either induce maximal ambiguity or simply use deterministic information policies. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which an effort-maximizing organizer can benefit strictly more from using ambiguous persuasion than from using the optimal Bayesian device.
Author: Gunhaeng Lee Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Communication is a process of sending and receiving information among people and it plays a significant role in a value creation process in organizations as it facilitates the spread of information. In an organization where agents have different preference and information, communication oftentimes incorporates non-trivial strategic aspects of agents. The research provides theoretical contributions to the study of communication and information disclosure among those agents with different objectives.The first essay models communications in platforms. Platforms not only mediate matches but work as information gatekeepers. When users who have private taste participate in a matching platform to find their partner, the platform asks them to provide matching-relevant information and, subsequently, aggregates and distributes the collected data back to each user to facilitate effective coordination of matches. How can a platform design information flow by which users form matches in a manner that is desirable to that platform? In this paper, I characterize a two-way communication approach that employs both verifiable and non-verifiable messages, and delineate the conditions under which a platform can (or cannot) achieve a socially optimal matching outcome using this communication protocol. In the platform that achieves such an outcome, users fully reveal their private taste, but the platform returns personalized and only filtered information back to each user in the form of a Recommendation. I identify three key factors that enable such communication. I also demonstrate that a stable match can arise under certain conditions when the platform does not intervene in the communication between users, and users communicate with each other using verifiable messages. I then study the optimal customized pricing schedules of the platform. When the platform can fully customize its prices to each user, I show that full extraction of user surplus is possible if messages are verifiable and communications take place only through the platform. Lastly, as an application, I also study a two-way communication protocol with non-verifiable messages and demonstrate that communication strictly improves efficiency in any circumstances. In the second essay, I consider a sender-receiver game in a continuous time framework, in which the biased sender, who has private information, can send a cheap-talk message anytime to the receiver. The receiver also can choose to stop and make a decision anytime. Time is assumed to be costly. In the study, I characterize a particular class of equilibrium which explains suspicion grows from silence phenomenon. In equilibrium, the sender gradually reveals his type, and the receiver learns the type over time. However, I show that a full revelation from all types of the sender is not possible because of the cost of time.In essay three, I consider a sender-receiver game where the private information of the sender evolves over time following a two-state Markov process. To influence the receivers decision, the sender sends cheap-talk messages every period. The receiver has an option to wait, and the game ends as soon as the receiver makes a non-waiting decision. I demonstrate that unless the senders preference is extreme, in the sense that the senders utility is type independent, truthtelling equilibrium exists if players are patient enough and utility function is separable. In case of extreme preference of the sender, the study shows that there still exists an equilibrium in which informative messages are sent in every period with strictly positive probabilities.
Author: Tamara Afifi Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1135890560 Category : Language Arts & Disciplines Languages : en Pages : 449
Book Description
This volume provides an in-depth exploration of two key processes in communication research: uncertainty and information regulation. It integrates scholarly work on disclosure and uncertainty with cutting edge research, theories, and applications. Offering contributions from renowned scholars, this volume is a unique and timely resource for advanced study in interpersonal, health, and family communication, and it will also appeal to scholars interested in applied research.
Author: Anton Kolotilin Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 48
Book Description
A sender chooses ex ante how her information will be disclosed to a privately informed receiver who then takes one of two actions. The sender wishes to maximize the probability that the receiver takes the desired action. The sender faces an ex ante quantity-quality tradeoff: sending positive messages more often (in terms of the sender's information) makes it less likely that the receiver will take the desired action (in terms of the receiver's information). Interestingly, the sender's and receiver's welfare is not monotonic in the precision of the receiver's private information: the sender may find it easier to influence a more informed receiver, and the receiver may suffer from having more precise private information. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for full and no information revelation to be optimal.
Author: Bo Chen Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 45
Book Description
We study the design of information disclosure in a dynamic multi-agent research contest, where each agent privately searches for innovations and submits his best to compete for a winner-takes-all prize. We find that although submission is a onetime event for each agent, different disclosure policies on the agents' submissions induce different equilibrium behavior, making the design of disclosure a useful instrument for the contest sponsor. We characterize equilibrium behavior in a public contest where submissions are immediately revealed and in a hidden contest where no submission information is revealed to the agents. In addition, for contests with indefinite duration, the public disclosure policy is an optimal policy among a natural set of disclosure policies.
Author: Myria Allen Publisher: Springer ISBN: 3319180053 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 325
Book Description
This is a seminal book for anyone who wants to understand, shape or study the communication surrounding sustainability in their interactions with colleagues, employees, supply chain partners and external stakeholders. It develops essential insights on the basis of an extensive review of relevant theories and research drawn from multiple disciplines. Interview data gathered from organization members who are currently communicating about sustainability in their cities, universities, nongovernmental organizations, small businesses and large for-profit organizations provide valuable insights from a practitioner’s perspective. The interviewees represent organizations such as the Portland Trailblazers, Tyson Foods, the City and County of Denver and the Natural Resources Defense Council. Theory, research and interview comments combine in a reader-friendly way to provide practical insights and stimulate future research.
Author: Jong-Cheon Lee Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The purpose of this dissertation is to extend the communication model to a situation where the agent searches for pre-decision information with effort in his own self-interest. We first introduce the agency model that involves the agent's information-searching behavior, the choice of information system, in the economic setting of pure asymmetric information where the principal cannot observe either the agent's information system or information-searching effort. We investigate the value of communication in this economic setting with a different approach from the previous literature. The first result develops sufficient conditions for the agent's truthful communication of information system. We characterize the conditions for the valuable communication by separating the impacts on the principal's welfare of the communication itself and the agency problem related to communication. We apply these results to the issues of management accounting. First, through numerical examples, we provide the economic rationale for the agent's participation (communication). Second, we also explain the simultaneous existence of different types of contracts within one firm. Finally, we apply the framework of our analysis to the issues of the previous literature. We then explain why communication can be valuable and clarify an ambiguous interpretation of results in the previous communication literature.
Author: Anastasia Antsygina
Author: Jun Zhang
Author: Xin Feng
Author: Gunhaeng Lee
Author: Tamara Afifi
Author: United States. Federal Communications Commission
Author: Anton Kolotilin
Author: Bo Chen
Author: Myria Allen
Author: Jong-Cheon Lee