Author: Luis C. Corchón
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 178536328X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 567
Book Description
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I
Author: Luis C. Corchón
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 178536328X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 567
Book Description
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 178536328X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 567
Book Description
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis
Author: Sanjit Dhami
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192574647
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 464
Book Description
Taken from the first definitive introduction to behavioral economics, The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis: Other-Regarding Preferences is an authoritative and cutting edge guide to this essential topic for advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students. It considers the evidence from experimental games on human sociality, and gives models and applications of inequity aversion, intention based reciprocity, conditional cooperation, human virtues, and social identity. This updated extract from Dhami's leading textbook allows the reader to pursue subsections of this vast and rapidly growing field and to tailor their reading to their specific interests in behavioural economics.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192574647
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 464
Book Description
Taken from the first definitive introduction to behavioral economics, The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis: Other-Regarding Preferences is an authoritative and cutting edge guide to this essential topic for advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students. It considers the evidence from experimental games on human sociality, and gives models and applications of inequity aversion, intention based reciprocity, conditional cooperation, human virtues, and social identity. This updated extract from Dhami's leading textbook allows the reader to pursue subsections of this vast and rapidly growing field and to tailor their reading to their specific interests in behavioural economics.
The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis
Author: Sanjit S. Dhami
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198715528
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1799
Book Description
It considers the evidence against the exponential discounted utility model and describes several behavioral models such as hyperbolic discounting, attribute based models and the reference time theory. Part IV describes the evidence on classical game theory and considers several models of behavioral game theory, including level-k and cognitive hierarchy models, quantal response equilibrium, and psychological game theory. Part V considers behavioral models of learning that include evolutionary game theory, classical models of learning, experience weighted attraction model, learning direction theory, and stochastic social dynamics. Part VI studies the role of emotions; among other topics it considers projection bias, temptation preferences, happiness economics, and interaction between emotions and cognition. Part VII considers bounded rationality. The three main topics considered are judgment heuristics and biases, mental accounting, and behavioral finance.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198715528
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1799
Book Description
It considers the evidence against the exponential discounted utility model and describes several behavioral models such as hyperbolic discounting, attribute based models and the reference time theory. Part IV describes the evidence on classical game theory and considers several models of behavioral game theory, including level-k and cognitive hierarchy models, quantal response equilibrium, and psychological game theory. Part V considers behavioral models of learning that include evolutionary game theory, classical models of learning, experience weighted attraction model, learning direction theory, and stochastic social dynamics. Part VI studies the role of emotions; among other topics it considers projection bias, temptation preferences, happiness economics, and interaction between emotions and cognition. Part VII considers bounded rationality. The three main topics considered are judgment heuristics and biases, mental accounting, and behavioral finance.
Human-Centered Services Computing for Smart Cities
Author: Yohei Murakami
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 981970779X
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 311
Book Description
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 981970779X
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 311
Book Description
The Economics of Contracts
Author: Bernard Salanié
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262195259
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 257
Book Description
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262195259
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 257
Book Description
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition.
Quarterly Review
Author: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Federal Reserve banks
Languages : en
Pages : 412
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Federal Reserve banks
Languages : en
Pages : 412
Book Description
The Economics of Contracts, second edition
Author: Bernard Salanie
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262257874
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 257
Book Description
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262257874
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 257
Book Description
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Financial Markets and Incomplete Information
Author: Sudipto Bhattacharya
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 384
Book Description
Major themes in theoretical financial economics since 1973 are presented through reprinted articles, each followed by a substantial essay by a leading scholar in the field. These original papers were written expressly for these volumes and provide a critical discussion and overview of the topic. The books thus present a broad spectrum of viewpoints with an emphasis on the work on valuation, economics of uncertainty, and taxation which pertains to the problems of financial markets and corporations.
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 384
Book Description
Major themes in theoretical financial economics since 1973 are presented through reprinted articles, each followed by a substantial essay by a leading scholar in the field. These original papers were written expressly for these volumes and provide a critical discussion and overview of the topic. The books thus present a broad spectrum of viewpoints with an emphasis on the work on valuation, economics of uncertainty, and taxation which pertains to the problems of financial markets and corporations.
Psychology, Rationality and Economic Behaviour
Author: B. Agarwal
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230522343
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 281
Book Description
Economics has paid little attention to the psychology of economic behaviour, leading to somewhat simplistic assumptions about human nature. The psychological aspects have typically been reduced to standard utility theory, based on a narrow conception of rationality and self-interest maximization. The contributions in this volume, some focused on analytical models and methodology, others on laboratory and field experiments, challenge these assumptions, and provide novel and complex understandings of human motivation and economic decision-making. With a pioneering introduction by the book's two editors, this volume brings together exciting contributions to a field that is rapidly growing in influence and reach.
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230522343
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 281
Book Description
Economics has paid little attention to the psychology of economic behaviour, leading to somewhat simplistic assumptions about human nature. The psychological aspects have typically been reduced to standard utility theory, based on a narrow conception of rationality and self-interest maximization. The contributions in this volume, some focused on analytical models and methodology, others on laboratory and field experiments, challenge these assumptions, and provide novel and complex understandings of human motivation and economic decision-making. With a pioneering introduction by the book's two editors, this volume brings together exciting contributions to a field that is rapidly growing in influence and reach.