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Author: A. I. Gribkov Publisher: Edition Q ISBN: Category : History Languages : en Pages : 286
Book Description
Top Soviet and U.S. military participants recount the Cuban missile crisis. Among the startling new facts revealed by adversaries Gribkov and Smith is that both sides made decisions based on false intelligence. This eye-opening book will be supported by joint author appearances on radio and TV.
Author: A. I. Gribkov Publisher: Edition Q ISBN: Category : History Languages : en Pages : 286
Book Description
Top Soviet and U.S. military participants recount the Cuban missile crisis. Among the startling new facts revealed by adversaries Gribkov and Smith is that both sides made decisions based on false intelligence. This eye-opening book will be supported by joint author appearances on radio and TV.
Author: Norman Polmar Publisher: Turner Publishing Company ISBN: 1620459612 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 254
Book Description
The closest we've ever come to the end of the world "DEFCON-2 is the best single volume on the Cuban Missile Crisis published and is an important contribution to the history of the Cold War. Beyond the military and political facts of the crisis, Polmar and Gresham sketch the personalities that created and coped with the crisis. They also show us how close we came to the edge without becoming sensationalistic."—Larry Bond, bestselling author of Dangerous Ground Spy-satellite and aerial-reconnaissance photos reveal that one of the United States's bitterest enemies may be acquiring weapons of mass destruction and the means to use them against the American homeland. Administration officials refuse to accept intelligence professionals' interpretation of these images and order an end to spy missions over the offending nation. More than a month later, after vicious infighting, the president orders the spy missions to resume. The new photos reveal an array of ballistic missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads and striking deep within U.S. territory. It appears that the missiles will be fully operational within one week. This is not a plot setup for a suspense novel; it is the true story of the most terrifying moment in the 45-year Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union: the Cuban Missile Crisis. DEFCON-2 tells this tale as it has never been told before—from both sides, with the help of hundreds of recently declassified U.S. and Soviet documents, as well as interviews with numerous former spies, military figures, and government officials who speak out here for the first time.
Author: U. S. Military Publisher: ISBN: 9781549542077 Category : Languages : en Pages : 50
Book Description
This report examines the use by the Soviets of denial and deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Moscow's surreptitious dispatch of nuclear-capable SS-4 and SS-5 surface-to-surface missiles to Cuba in 1962 upset the strategic balance in an alarming way. The resulting showdown--which the Russians call the "Caribbean Crisis" and the Cubans call the "October Crisis"-- brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. From its inception, the Soviet missile operation entailed elaborate denial and deception (D&D) efforts. The craft of denying the United States information on the deployment of the missiles and deceiving US policymakers about the Soviet Union's intent was the foundation of Nikita Khrushchev's audacious Cuban venture. Piecing together the deception activities from declassified US, Russian, and Cuban accounts yields insights that can help us anticipate and overcome the D&D efforts of a growing number of foreign adversaries today.Moscow has always had a flair for D&D, known in Russian as maskirovka. its central tenet is to prevent an adversary from discovering Russian intentions by deceiving him about the nature, scope, and timing of an operation. Maskirovka covers a broad range of concepts, from deception at the strategic planning level to camouflage at the troop level. Russian military texts indicate that maskirovka is treated as an operational art to be polished by professors of military science and officers who specialize in this area.DIA analysis preceding the missile crisis noted that the Soviet Army had probably employed large-scale battlefield deception "more frequently and with more consistent success than any other army.'" The Soviets practiced extensive maskirovka before their move into Czechoslovakia in 1968. Moscow also trained foreign forces to apply deception, including North Vietnamese units before the Tet offensive in 1968 and Egyptian forces before crossing the Suez Canal in 1973.
Author: James Philip Publisher: ISBN: 9781519056405 Category : Languages : en Pages : 169
Book Description
The Cuban Missiles Crisis didn't end peacefully and the 'swinging sixties' didn't happen. On Saturday 27th October 1962 American and Soviet geopolitical brinkmanship resulted in the most terrible war in human history. The forever changed world that remained when the thermonuclear fires had burned themselves out is the world of 'Timeline 10/27/62'.'Operation Anadyr' is Book 1 of the alternative history series Timeline 10/27/62.'Operation Anadyr' is about the first hours of that alternative history of the world. It is about living through the cataclysm, and wondering how it happened. How did the unthinkable happen? How could our leaders let it happen? How does one quantify the magnitude of the disaster? And what of the survivors living with the aftermath of a world gone mad? 'Operation Anadyr' confronts these questions. In 'Operation Anadyr' the anatomy of the disaster is writ plain and the men and women who survive it begin to find their voices.* * *Why Timeline 10/27/62? Because that date is a very significant date in my life and in the lives of everybody else in the world alive today because on Saturday 27th October 1962 World War III almost started. World War III probably wouldn't have lasted very long because one side would have been swiftly obliterated in the first 24 hours of a cataclysm that would have left vast tracts of the Northern Hemisphere uninhabited and uninhabitable for decades to come. Perhaps, a quarter of the world's population would have died in the firestorm or in the starvation and the plagues that would have ensued in the following weeks and months.In the October War of 1962 the hammer of the gods would have fallen upon the territories of the Soviet Union, central and Western Europe, and to a lesser extent, upon the extremities of continental North America. In the Soviet Union and in Europe from Paris to Warsaw, from Prague to Berlin, from the Alps to the Baltic, across the Low Countries and parts of the United Kingdom the thermonuclear fire would have burned with a merciless flame. Scandinavia might have escaped relatively untouched, likewise southern France, Italy, Spain and Portugal, Ireland and possibly parts of England, Wales and Scotland.The 'Cuban Missiles' War would have been a Man made global catastrophe like no other in human history. In the aftermath, the USA, mourning the dead in half-a-dozen wrecked cities would have been the last major industrial and military power left standing. That world could never, ever be the world we know today.How close did we actually come to the edge of the abyss? Much closer than most people like to contemplate. On Saturday 27th October 1962, north east of Cuba, the commander of Soviet submarine B-59 had to be talked out of firing a nuclear-tipped torpedo at the American destroyer USS Beale. That's how close we came to World War III!The Captain of the B-59 was a man called Valentin Grigorievitch Savitsky. He gave the order for a nuclear warhead to be fitted to a torpedo.In that era Soviet naval doctrine governing the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons onboard a warship at sea required the authorisation of three officers: the captain, the executive officer, and the vessel's political officer. B-59's political officer, Ivan Semonovich Maslennikov signed off on starting World War III but fortunately for us all, the submarine's second-in-command, Captain 2nd Rank Vasili Arkhipov, dissented and Armageddon was narrowly averted.Timeline 10/27/62 is an alternative history of the modern world in which nobody ever got to know the name of Vasili Arkhipov because he died in the first act of the most terrible war in history.Operation Anadyr is the first verse in the story of what happened after Vasili Arkhipov failed to prevail upon Valentin Grigorievitch Savitsky to see reason.Welcome to the Timeline 10/27/62.
Author: Blaine Pardoe Publisher: Fonthill Media ISBN: 1781553785 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 289
Book Description
It was the closest we ever came to unleashing the Third World War.... The image of that world was so horrible to contemplate that both sides stepped away from that precipice and opted for peace. Fires of October is the exhilarating military history of the Cuban Missile Crisis exploring in detail the strategic plans implemented by American Armed Forces as they headed towards a catastrophic nuclear collision with Cuba and the USSR. Using recently declassified material, Blaine Pardoe systematically recounts the origins of the crisis, from the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and Cuba s military metamorphosis, to the internal disorganization of the US military, which exacerbated tensions between the USA, Cuba, and the USSR. Pardoe reveals that the invasion plans were based on old intelligence, outdated maps, and misconceptions about the size, strength, and composition of the Soviet forces in Cuba; for the first time, and with harrowing results, he scrutinizes the potential fallout had the invasion gone ahead. Gripping and unnerving, Fires of October shows us just how close the world came to nuclear war.
Author: Len Scott Publisher: Pen and Sword History ISBN: 152677979X Category : History Languages : en Pages : 314
Book Description
It is sixty years since the events of October 1962 brought the world close to nuclear catastrophe. The Cuban missile crisis has long been recognized as the moment of greatest danger in the life (and near death) of humanity. In those sixty years, our knowledge and understanding of events have undergone significant change. There are some reasons to be encouraged, inasmuch as we have learned how both President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev sought to avoid nuclear war. More ominously, we have learned of incidents and events that suggest nuclear weapons might have been used by subordinate military commanders, in circumstances frequently unknown to their political leaders. Decisions whether to use nuclear weapons lay in the hands of often junior military commanders, some of whom were perilously close to crossing the nuclear threshold. This does not mean as often assumed that if some nuclear weapons were used, escalation to all-out war was inevitable. Yet the undoubted risk of thermonuclear war in these circumstances threatened the very survival of civilization. Hundreds, if not thousands, of millions of people would have died from immediate and short-term effects, while the longer-term prospect of a Nuclear Winter portended the virtual extinction of humanity. Drawing lessons from sixty years ago faces significant challenges. If we draw lessons only to discover our understanding was mistaken, we might well have drawn the wrong lessons. Many received wisdoms about the crisis have been shown to be misleading. What is striking is how after forty or fifty or even sixty years, new evidence has emerged to challenge previously accepted explanations. It is for the reader to reach their own verdicts on the history of the crisis, and how much we owe to political leaders who averted catastrophe (as well as how their words and deeds helped create the crisis in the first place). It is for the reader to conclude how close we came to nuclear war. Whatever conclusions are reached, one overriding lesson looms large. However we judge the actions of political and military leaders, one factor was crucial in why we avoided nuclear war in 1962. It was luck. In October 1962, humanity was very lucky. Will we be so lucky next time?
Author: Mark J. White Publisher: Ivan R. Dee ISBN: 1461713056 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 183
Book Description
For many years historians of the Cuban missile crisis have concentrated on those thirteen days in October 1962 when the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war. Mark White’s study adds an equally intense scrutiny of the causes and consequences of the crisis. Missiles in Cuba is based on up-to-date scholarship as well as Mr. White’s own findings in National Security Archive materials, Kennedy Library tapes of ExComm meetings, and correspondence between Soviet officials in Washington and Havana—all newly released. His more rounded picture gives us a much clearer understanding of the policy strategies pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union (and, to a lesser extent, Cuba) that brought on the crisis. His almost hour-by-hour account of the confrontation itself also destroys some venerable myths, such as the unique initiatives attributed to Robert Kennedy. And his assessment of the consequences of the crisis points to salutary effects on Soviet-American relation and on U.S. nuclear defense strategy, but questionable influences on Soviet defense spending and on Washington’s perception of its talents for "crisis management," later tested in Vietnam.
Author: Len Scott Publisher: Pen and Sword History ISBN: 1526779811 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 249
Book Description
It is sixty years since the events of October 1962 brought the world close to nuclear catastrophe. The Cuban missile crisis has long been recognized as the moment of greatest danger in the life (and near death) of humanity. In those sixty years, our knowledge and understanding of events have undergone significant change. There are some reasons to be encouraged, inasmuch as we have learned how both President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev sought to avoid nuclear war. More ominously, we have learned of incidents and events that suggest nuclear weapons might have been used by subordinate military commanders, in circumstances frequently unknown to their political leaders. Decisions whether to use nuclear weapons lay in the hands of often junior military commanders, some of whom were perilously close to crossing the nuclear threshold. This does not mean as often assumed that if some nuclear weapons were used, escalation to all-out war was inevitable. Yet the undoubted risk of thermonuclear war in these circumstances threatened the very survival of civilization. Hundreds, if not thousands, of millions of people would have died from immediate and short-term effects, while the longer-term prospect of a Nuclear Winter portended the virtual extinction of humanity. Drawing lessons from sixty years ago faces significant challenges. If we draw lessons only to discover our understanding was mistaken, we might well have drawn the wrong lessons. Many received wisdoms about the crisis have been shown to be misleading. What is striking is how after forty or fifty or even sixty years, new evidence has emerged to challenge previously accepted explanations. It is for the reader to reach their own verdicts on the history of the crisis, and how much we owe to political leaders who averted catastrophe (as well as how their words and deeds helped create the crisis in the first place). It is for the reader to conclude how close we came to nuclear war. Whatever conclusions are reached, one overriding lesson looms large. However we judge the actions of political and military leaders, one factor was crucial in why we avoided nuclear war in 1962. It was luck. In October 1962, humanity was very lucky. Will we be so lucky next time?
Author: Alan J. Levine Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield ISBN: 1793629501 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 255
Book Description
Adam J. Levine analyzes the origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis, with a particular focus on Nikita Khrushchev’s motives and the response of the Kennedy administration. Levine’s account presents a different portrayal of the events than popularly told, shedding light on John F. Kennedy’s decision-making practices and personal behavior while out of public eye.
Author: Norman Polmar Publisher: Trade Paper Press ISBN: Category : History Languages : en Pages : 424
Book Description
Presents a detailed description of the events, issues, and personalities involved in the lead-up to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the fateful thirteen days in October, offering an incisive analysis of one of the pivotal events of the Cold War.
Author: A. I. Gribkov
Author: A. I. Gribkov
Author: Norman Polmar
Author: U. S. Military
Author: James Philip
Author: Blaine Pardoe
Author: Len Scott
Author: Mark J. White
Author: Len Scott
Author: Alan J. Levine
Author: Norman Polmar