On the Role of Bargaining Power in Nash-in-Nash Bargaining PDF Download

Author: Marc Escrihuela-Villar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Author: Peter Sanfey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate profits
Languages : en
Pages : 21

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Author: Alexander Raskovich
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cable television
Languages : en
Pages : 44

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Author: Jean-François Laslier
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030180506
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 507

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This collection of essays represents responses by over eighty scholars to an unusual request: give your high level assessment of the field of economic design, as broadly construed. Where do we come from? Where do we go from here? The book editors invited short, informal reflections expressing deeply felt but hard to demonstrate opinions, unsupported speculation, and controversial views of a kind one might not normally risk submitting for review. The contributors – both senior researchers who have shaped the field and promising, younger researchers – responded with a diverse collection of provocative pieces, including: retrospective assessments or surveys of the field; opinion papers; reflections on critical points for the development of the discipline; proposals for the immediate future; "science fiction"; and many more. The readers should have fun reading these unusual pieces – as much as the contributors enjoyed writing them.

Author: Annick Laruelle
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139474294
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 184

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Every day thousands of decisions are made by all kinds of committees, parliaments, councils and boards by a 'yes-no' voting process. Sometimes a committee can only accept or reject the proposals submitted to it for a decision. On other occasions, committee members have the possibility of modifying the proposal and bargaining an agreement prior to the vote. In either case, what rule should be used if each member acts on behalf of a different-sized group? It seems intuitively clear that if the groups are of different sizes then a symmetric rule (e.g. the simple majority or unanimity) is not suitable. The question then arises of what voting rule should be used. Voting and Collective Decision-Making addresses this and other issues through a study of the theory of bargaining and voting power, showing how it applies to real decision-making contexts.

Author: Carlo Carraro
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 5061610121
Category : Bargaining
Languages : en
Pages : 55

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Abstract: Bargaining is ubiquitous in real life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (such as climate change control). What factors determine the outcomes of such negotiations? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? The authors address these questions by focusing on a noncooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, noncooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, they try to identify the connections among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate progress toward a unified framework.

Author: Harold Houba
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1402071833
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 330

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The modern theory of threats in bargaining situations is presented in a unified and systematic treatment that puts the existing literature in a new perspective. Harold Houba and Wilko Bolt provide a masterful synthesis of the fundamental results obtained in the rapidly expanding game-theoretic literature. The relative impacts of the fundamental forces on the bargaining outcome are discussed and related to the visions expressed by Nobel-laureate John Nash. Many topics -such as robustness of the results with respect to the diversity of known bargaining procedures, the role of commitment and policy bargaining situations- receive their most extensive treatment to date. Credible Threats in Negotiations is suitable as a textbook for graduate students in economic theory and other social sciences and a necessity as a resource for scholars interested in bargaining situations.

Author: Paola Manzini
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 80

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Author: Carlo Carraro
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Common Property Resource Development
Languages : en
Pages : 47

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Abstract: The authors review the applications of noncooperative bargaining theory to water related issues-which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. They aim to identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge and their characteristics, to support policymakers in devising the " rules of the game " that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially trans-boundary allocation, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, the authors first discuss the noncooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Key findings include the important role noncooperative negotiations can play in cases where binding agreements cannot be signed; the value added of politically and socially acceptable compromises; and the need for a negotiated model that considers incomplete information over the negotiated resource.

Author: Dominik Seidemann
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3656933014
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 64

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Master's Thesis from the year 2014 in the subject Business economics - Business Management, Corporate Governance, grade: 1,7, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, language: English, abstract: Mit der vorliegenden Arbeit wurde die Verknüpfung von bekannten Verhandlungsmodellen der Spieltheorie mit verschiedenen Ansätzen zur Untersuchung des Einflusses von Emotionen auf den Verhandlungsausgang betrachtet. Zu Grunde liegt das Rubinsteinspiel, das im ersten Teil genauer erklärt wird. In der Literaturbetrachtung des zweiten Teils werden verschiedene Artikel zusammengefasst, die in der Motivation geschrieben wurden die tatsächliche Beobachtung von Emotionen in verhandlungstheoretischen Experimenten zu erklären und Modelle (weiter) zu entwickeln, die diesen Beobachtungen Rechnung tragen. Im dritten Teil wird am Beispiel einer spezifischen Verhandlungssituation – dem Verhandeln über den Lohn eines Berufseinsteigers– der Einfluss von Emotionen mit Inspiration aus der Literatur intersucht. Ebenfalls wird ein Modell vorgestellt, das den Ausgang von spezifischen Verhandlungssituationen genauer nachstellen kann. With the present work, the combination of well-known bargaining models of game theory with different approaches to study the influence of emotions on the outcome of negotiations was observed. Basis is the Rubinstein game that is explained in detail in the first part. The second part concludes various items which were written in the motivation to explain the observations of emotions made in actual bargaing-theoretical experiments, and to develop models that take those observations into account. In the third part a specific negotiation situation is exemplary represented- the bargaining over wages of a job applicant- to observe the influence of emotions, inspired by the methods of the literature investigated earlier. Moreover, a model is presented which can calculate the output of specific negotiation situations more accurately.