Author: Hideshi Itō
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentives in industry
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Book Description
This paper concerns moral hazard problems in multi-agent situations where cooperation is an issue. Each agent chooses his own effort, which improves stochastically the outcome of his own job. Agents also choose the amount of 'help' to extend to other agents, which improves the performance of other agents. By selecting appropriate compensation schemes, the principal can design the task structure of the firm: The principal may prefer an unambiguous division labor, where each agent is inclined not to help other agents and specializes in his own job. Or the principal may prefer teamwork where each agent is motivated to help other agents. The analysis identifies two important determinants in choosing the optimal task structure; the effect of 'interpersonal interaction' and the attitude of the agents in providing 'small' amounts of help.
On Incentives to Help in Multi-agent Situations
Author: Hideshi Itō
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentives in industry
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Book Description
This paper concerns moral hazard problems in multi-agent situations where cooperation is an issue. Each agent chooses his own effort, which improves stochastically the outcome of his own job. Agents also choose the amount of 'help' to extend to other agents, which improves the performance of other agents. By selecting appropriate compensation schemes, the principal can design the task structure of the firm: The principal may prefer an unambiguous division labor, where each agent is inclined not to help other agents and specializes in his own job. Or the principal may prefer teamwork where each agent is motivated to help other agents. The analysis identifies two important determinants in choosing the optimal task structure; the effect of 'interpersonal interaction' and the attitude of the agents in providing 'small' amounts of help.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentives in industry
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Book Description
This paper concerns moral hazard problems in multi-agent situations where cooperation is an issue. Each agent chooses his own effort, which improves stochastically the outcome of his own job. Agents also choose the amount of 'help' to extend to other agents, which improves the performance of other agents. By selecting appropriate compensation schemes, the principal can design the task structure of the firm: The principal may prefer an unambiguous division labor, where each agent is inclined not to help other agents and specializes in his own job. Or the principal may prefer teamwork where each agent is motivated to help other agents. The analysis identifies two important determinants in choosing the optimal task structure; the effect of 'interpersonal interaction' and the attitude of the agents in providing 'small' amounts of help.
The Handbook of Organizational Economics
Author: Robert Gibbons
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691132798
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1248
Book Description
(E-book available via MyiLibrary) In even the most market-oriented economies, most economic transactions occur not in markets but inside managed organizations, particularly business firms. Organizational economics seeks to understand the nature and workings of such organizations and their impact on economic performance. The Handbook of Organizational Economics surveys the major theories, evidence, and methods used in the field. It displays the breadth of topics in organizational economics, including the roles of individuals and groups in organizations, organizational structures and processes, the boundaries of the firm, contracts between and within firms, and more.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691132798
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1248
Book Description
(E-book available via MyiLibrary) In even the most market-oriented economies, most economic transactions occur not in markets but inside managed organizations, particularly business firms. Organizational economics seeks to understand the nature and workings of such organizations and their impact on economic performance. The Handbook of Organizational Economics surveys the major theories, evidence, and methods used in the field. It displays the breadth of topics in organizational economics, including the roles of individuals and groups in organizations, organizational structures and processes, the boundaries of the firm, contracts between and within firms, and more.
Performance Incentives
Author: Matthew G. Springer
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 0815701950
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 348
Book Description
The concept of pay for performance for public school teachers is growing in popularity and use, and it has resurged to once again occupy a central role in education policy. Performance Incentives: Their Growing Impact on American K-12 Education offers the most up-to-date and complete analysis of this promising—yet still controversial—policy innovation. Performance Incentives brings together an interdisciplinary team of experts, providing an unprecedented discussion and analysis of the pay-for-performance debate by • Identifying the potential strengths and weaknesses of tying pay to student outcomes; • Comparing different strategies for measuring teacher accomplishments; • Addressing key conceptual and implemen - tation issues; • Describing what teachers themselves think of merit pay; • Examining recent examples in Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, and Texas; • Studying the overall impact on student achievement.
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 0815701950
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 348
Book Description
The concept of pay for performance for public school teachers is growing in popularity and use, and it has resurged to once again occupy a central role in education policy. Performance Incentives: Their Growing Impact on American K-12 Education offers the most up-to-date and complete analysis of this promising—yet still controversial—policy innovation. Performance Incentives brings together an interdisciplinary team of experts, providing an unprecedented discussion and analysis of the pay-for-performance debate by • Identifying the potential strengths and weaknesses of tying pay to student outcomes; • Comparing different strategies for measuring teacher accomplishments; • Addressing key conceptual and implemen - tation issues; • Describing what teachers themselves think of merit pay; • Examining recent examples in Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, and Texas; • Studying the overall impact on student achievement.
Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms
Author: Jed DeVaro
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 0857247603
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 327
Book Description
Contains a stimulating collection of original papers spanning a variety of topics. This title contains three papers on the subject of job design and organizational performance, covering the determinants of multiskilling from a theoretical perspective and also the empirical effect of multiskilling and teams on financial performance.
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 0857247603
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 327
Book Description
Contains a stimulating collection of original papers spanning a variety of topics. This title contains three papers on the subject of job design and organizational performance, covering the determinants of multiskilling from a theoretical perspective and also the empirical effect of multiskilling and teams on financial performance.
A Course in Microeconomic Theory
Author: David M. Kreps
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 069121574X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 869
Book Description
David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and "user-friendly." The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory--one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. The book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. The work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 069121574X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 869
Book Description
David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and "user-friendly." The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory--one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. The book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. The work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Author: Oliver Hart
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 019160688X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 240
Book Description
This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 019160688X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 240
Book Description
This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.
The Theory of the Firm
Author: Nicolai J. Foss
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 9780415196390
Category : Business enterprises
Languages : en
Pages : 344
Book Description
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 9780415196390
Category : Business enterprises
Languages : en
Pages : 344
Book Description
Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management
Author: Jiuping Xu
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 364255122X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 782
Book Description
This is the Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management (ICMSEM) held from July 25 to 27, 2014 at Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal and organized by International Society of Management Science and Engineering Management (ISMSEM), Sichuan University (Chengdu, China) and Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Lisbon, Portugal). The goals of the conference are to foster international research collaborations in Management Science and Engineering Management as well as to provide a forum to present current findings. A total number of 138 papers from 14 countries are selected for the proceedings by the conference scientific committee through rigorous referee review. The selected papers in the second volume are focused on Computing and Engineering Management covering areas of Computing Methodology, Project Management, Industrial Engineering and Information Technology.
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 364255122X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 782
Book Description
This is the Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management (ICMSEM) held from July 25 to 27, 2014 at Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal and organized by International Society of Management Science and Engineering Management (ISMSEM), Sichuan University (Chengdu, China) and Universidade Nova de Lisboa (Lisbon, Portugal). The goals of the conference are to foster international research collaborations in Management Science and Engineering Management as well as to provide a forum to present current findings. A total number of 138 papers from 14 countries are selected for the proceedings by the conference scientific committee through rigorous referee review. The selected papers in the second volume are focused on Computing and Engineering Management covering areas of Computing Methodology, Project Management, Industrial Engineering and Information Technology.
The Economics of Contracts, second edition
Author: Bernard Salanie
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262257874
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 257
Book Description
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262257874
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 257
Book Description
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
ICM Millennium Lectures on Games
Author: Leon A. Petrosjan
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3662052199
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 410
Book Description
Since the first Congress in Zürich in 1897, the ICM has been an eagerly awaited event every four years. Many of these occasions are celebrated for historie developments and seminal contributions to mathematics. 2002 marks the year of the 24th ICM, the first of the new millennium. Also historie is the first ICM Satellite Conference devoted to game theory and applications. It is one of those rare occasions, in which masters of the field are able to meet under congenial surroundings to talk and share their gathered wisdom. As is usually the case in ICM meetings, participants of the ICM Satellite Conference on Game Theory and Applications (Qingdao, August 2(02) hailed from the four corners of the world. In addition to presentations of high qual ity research, the program also included twelve invited plenary sessions with distinguished speakers. This volume, which gathers together selected papers read at the conference, is divided into four sections: (I) Foundations, Concepts, and Structure. (II) Equilibrium Properties. (III) Applications to the Natural and Social Sciences. (IV) Computational Aspects of Games.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3662052199
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 410
Book Description
Since the first Congress in Zürich in 1897, the ICM has been an eagerly awaited event every four years. Many of these occasions are celebrated for historie developments and seminal contributions to mathematics. 2002 marks the year of the 24th ICM, the first of the new millennium. Also historie is the first ICM Satellite Conference devoted to game theory and applications. It is one of those rare occasions, in which masters of the field are able to meet under congenial surroundings to talk and share their gathered wisdom. As is usually the case in ICM meetings, participants of the ICM Satellite Conference on Game Theory and Applications (Qingdao, August 2(02) hailed from the four corners of the world. In addition to presentations of high qual ity research, the program also included twelve invited plenary sessions with distinguished speakers. This volume, which gathers together selected papers read at the conference, is divided into four sections: (I) Foundations, Concepts, and Structure. (II) Equilibrium Properties. (III) Applications to the Natural and Social Sciences. (IV) Computational Aspects of Games.