Author: Maria Joana Dantas Vaz PaisPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 88
Book Description
On decentralized two-sided matching markets
Author: Maria Joana Dantas Vaz PaisPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 88
Book Description
The Efficiency of A Dynamic Decentralized Two-Sided Matching Market
Author: Tracy LiuPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 45
Book Description
This paper empirically studies a decentralized dynamic peer-to-peer matching market. We use data from a leading ride-sharing platform in China to estimate a continuous-time dynamic model of search and match between drivers and passengers. We assess the efficiency of the decentralized market by how much centralized algorithms may improve welfare. We find that a centralized algorithm can increase the number of matches by making matches less frequently and matching agents more assortatively.
A Theory of Decentralized Matching Markets Without Transfers, with an Application to Surge Pricing
Author: Alfred GalichonPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
Most of the literature on two-sided matching markets without transfers focuses on the case where a central planner (often an algorithm) clears the market, like in the case of school assignments, or medical residents. In contrast, we focus on decentralized matching markets without transfers, where prices are regulated and thus cannot clear the market, as in the case of taxis. In these markets, time waited in line often plays the role of a numéraire. We investigate the properties of equilibrium in these markets (existence, uniqueness, and welfare). We use this analysis to study the problem of surge pricing: given beliefs on random demand and supply, how should a market designer set prices to minimize expected market inefficiency?
Decentralized Matching Markets with Endogenous Salaries
Author: Two Sided Matching Markets
Author: Thomas QuintDecentralized Matching Markets
Author: Joana PaisEssays on the Analysis and Implications of Two-sided Matching Markets
Author: James W. BoudreauTwo-sided Heterogeneity, Endogenous Sharing, and International Matching Markets
Author: Jaerim ChoiStability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two-sided Markets with Weak Preferences
Author: Radoslav S RaykovPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Capital market
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
"Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of acentral authority. A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker. I show that when agent tastes are independent, the random stable match in a large-enough market is asymptotically Pareto efficient even with weak preferences. In fact, even moderate-sized markets can attain good efficiency levels. The average fraction of agents who can Pareto improve is below 10% in a market of size n = 79 when one side of the market has weak preferences; when both sides have weak preferences, the inefficiency falls below 10% for n> 158. This implies that approximate Pareto efficiency is attainable in a decentralized market even in the absence of a central matchmaker"--Abstract, p. ii.
Congestion and Market Thickness in Decentralized Matching Markets
Author: Marius GrambPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We study congestion problems in decentralized, two-sided matching markets. The main focus is on the impact of market thickness on these congestion problems. We find that it is often not optimal to make an offer to the best observed agent when the likelihood of acceptance is very low. We derive the optimal offering strategies for firms depending on market thickness and analyze who benefits when the market becomes thicker. We also investigate which market participants would benefit from a centralized market with assortative matching.