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Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 7
Book Description
As part of the World War II effort to develop the atomic bomb, reprocessing technology was developed to chemically separate and recover fissionable plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel. In the early stage of commercial nuclear power, reprocessing was thought essential to supplying nuclear fuel. Federally sponsored breeder reactor development included research into advanced reprocessing technology. Several commercial interests in reprocessing foundered due to economic, technical, and regulatory issues. President Carter terminated federal support for reprocessing in an attempt to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons material. Reprocessing for nuclear weapons production ceased shortly after the Cold War ended. The Department of Energy now proposes a new generation of "proliferation-resistant" reactor and reprocessing technology.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 7
Book Description
As part of the World War II effort to develop the atomic bomb, reprocessing technology was developed to chemically separate and recover fissionable plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel. In the early stage of commercial nuclear power, reprocessing was thought essential to supplying nuclear fuel. Federally sponsored breeder reactor development included research into advanced reprocessing technology. Several commercial interests in reprocessing foundered due to economic, technical, and regulatory issues. President Carter terminated federal support for reprocessing in an attempt to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons material. Reprocessing for nuclear weapons production ceased shortly after the Cold War ended. The Department of Energy now proposes a new generation of "proliferation-resistant" reactor and reprocessing technology.
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development Publisher: ISBN: Category : Nuclear disarmament Languages : en Pages : 226
Author: United States. General Accounting Office Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 65
Book Description
GAO undertook a review to determine the relationship between commercial spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and worldwide weapons proliferation and the adequacy of safeguards technology to detect diversions of weapons-usable material. In 1977, the President decided to indefinitely defer commercial nuclear spent fuel reprocessing in the United States because of the risks of nuclear technology and/or materials being diverted from such plants. This decision was justified on the basis that the United States can sustain its nuclear power program for the foreseeable future without reprocessing and that premature commercialization of reprocessing in the United States could encourage other nations to expand reprocessing activities. Despite the U.S. policy, many other countries continue to expand their reprocessing programs. Reprocessing, the chemical separation of usable uranium and plutonium from spent nuclear power reactor fuel, produces plutonium which can be used to construct a nuclear weapon. Safeguard systems used at federal reprocessing plants cannot assure that diversions of weapons-usable material for unauthorized purposes can be detected in a timely manner. Material control and accountability systems cannot accurately measure and account for weapons-usable material in spent fuel rods and in the process and waste streams. Instruments needed to measure the precise quantity of this material in spent nuclear reactor fuel have not been developed and current accountability systems cannot determine precisely the quantity being processed. Accurate measurements are also lacking in the radioactive waste portions of reprocessing operations. Since material control and accountability systems do not provide timely information on quantities or locations of weapons-usable material, it is doubtful that a diversion could be discovered before the material could be converted into a suitable form for weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE) relies on physical security to ensure the integrity of its material control and accountability systems. While DOE recognizes the limitations of its systems, it has not comprehensively identified these limitations or developed an approach to provide for as much safeguard protection as may be necessary. To date, effective worldwide systems and controls are nonexistent partly because the United States is not fully supporting a proposed international plutonium management and storage regime. U.S. research and development efforts fall short of providing the needed framework to solve reprocessing safeguards problems.
Author: United States. Congress Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform ISBN: 9781985207301 Category : Languages : en Pages : 156
Book Description
Nuclear fuel reprocessing : hearing before the Subcommittee on Energy, Committee on Science, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, first session, June 16, 2005.
Author: National Research Council Publisher: National Academies Press ISBN: 0309168198 Category : Science Languages : en Pages : 153
Book Description
End Points for spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste in Russian and the United States provides an analysis of the management of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in Russia and the United States, describing inventories, comparing approaches, and assessing the end-point options for storage and disposal of materials and wastes. The authoring committee finds that despite differences in philosophy about nuclear fuel cycles, Russia and the United States need similar kinds of facilities and face similar challenges, although in Russia many of the problems are worse and funding is less available. This book contains recommendations for immediate and near-term actions, for example, protecting and stabilizing materials that are security and safety hazards, actions for the longer term, such as developing more interim storage capacity and studying effects of deep injection, and areas for collaboration.