Non-linear Pricing, Regulation and Competition PDF Download

Author: Maria Vagliasindi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 172

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Book Description

Author: Robert B. Wilson
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 9780195115826
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 446

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Book Description
What do phone rates, frequent flyer programs, and railroad tariffs all have in common? They are all examples of nonlinear pricing. Pricing is nonlinear when it is not strictly proportional to the quantity purchased. The Electric Power Research Institute has commissioned Robert Wilson to review the various facets of nonlinear pricing. The work starts with a general non-mathematical discussion, followed by a more technical presentation intended for readers with a fairly advanced background. Thorough and detailed, this study has ample examples of case studies from a variety of industries.

Author: Mario Epelbaum
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 46

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Author: Nicolas Curien
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
We analyze optimal pricing policies in local telecommunications subject to bypass for the access of long-distance carriers. We first consider the case of a regulated monopoly that operates the local network and has access to an additional technology (bypass) more efficient for large customers. We then study how competition in bypass affects the optimal nonlinear pricing policy and the resulting allocation. When transfers are allowed between the regulator and the network operator, bypass competition benefits consumers at the expense of the taxpayer, otherwise it benefits large consumers but hurts small ones.

Author: Maria Vagliasindi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 28

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Book Description

Author: Paul de Bijl
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139435779
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 290

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Book Description
This book analyses telecommunications markets from early to mature competition, filling the gap between the existing economic literature on competition and the real-life application of theory to policy. Paul De Bijl and Martin Peitz focus on both the transitory and the persistent asymmetries between telephone companies, investigating the extent to which access price and retail price regulation stimulate both short- and long-term competition. They explore and compare various settings, such as non-linear versus linear pricing, facilities-based versus unbundling-based or carrier-select-based competition, non-segmented versus segmented markets. On the basis of their analysis, De Bijl and Peitz then formulate guidelines for policy. This book is a valuable resource for academics, regulators and telecommunications professionals. It is accompanied by simulation programs devised by the authors both to establish and to illustrate their results.

Author: Daniel F. Spulber
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262192750
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 720

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Book Description
Regulation and Markets provides the up to date, integrated analysis of regulatory policies and the administrative process that is needed in today's field of regulation economics. The book takes a modern perspective, using the tools of industrial organization and game theory. It is the only unified treatment of the field and combines theoretical models with consideration of public policy issues in the areas of antitrust, price regulation, environmental regulation, product quality, and workplace safety. The discussion considers both the welfare effects of regulation and the institutional aspects of the administrative regulatory process. Developments in the fields of law and political science have been integrated in a rigorous manner into the economic framework.Sections of the book address administrative process and market allocation, competition and pricing under increasing returns to scale, administrative regulation of markets, and antitrust enforcement. The conclusion evaluates regulatory policy and deregulation. Extensive literature citations throughout enhance the books value as a reference.

Author: Wouter Dessein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
Previous research, assuming linear pricing, has argued that telecommunications networks may use a high access charge as an instrument of collusion. I show that this conclusion is difficult to maintain when operators compete in nonlinear pricing: (i) As long as subscription demand is inelastic, profits can remain independent of the access charge, even when customers are heterogeneous and networks engage in second-degree price discrimination. (ii) When demand for subscriptions is elastic, networks may increase profits by agreeing on an access charge below marginal cost (relative to cost-based access pricing). Welfare is typically increased by setting the access charge above marginal cost.

Author: Mark Armstrong
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 31

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Author: Andrea Attardi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Assets (Accounting)
Languages : en
Pages : 46

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Book Description
Many financial markets rely on a discriminatory limit-order book to balance supply and demand. We study these markets in a static model in which uninformed market makers compete in nonlinear tariffs to trade with an informed insider, as in Glosten (1994), Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2000), and Back and Baruch (2013). We analyze the case where tariffs are unconstrained and the case where tariffs are restricted to be convex. In both cases, we show that pure-strategy equilibrium tariffs must be linear and, moreover, that such equilibria only exist under exceptional circumstances. These results cast doubt on the stability of even well-organized financial markets.