Author: Winand EmonsPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Comparative advertising
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Book Description
Non-comparative Versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal
Author: Winand EmonsPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Comparative advertising
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Book Description
With a Little Help from My Enemy
Author: Non-comparative Versus Comparative Advertising of Quality
Author: Winand EmonsPractical Guide to Comparative Advertising
Author: Ruth M. CorbinPublisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 012809351X
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 192
Book Description
Practical Guide to Comparative Advertising: Dare to Compare is an authoritative, engaging handbook on comparative advertising for food and non-food consumer products. Claim substantiation is a common stakeholder interest among management, advertisers, lawyers and researchers. This handbook covers the corporate culture and strategic goals that encourage comparative advertising, laws and regulations, standards for research evidence, and examples that bring the concepts to life. Of particular value to corporate brand managers, the book includes a checklist of process steps and quality controls that allow managers to orchestrate comparative ad campaigns and manage the risk of complaints from indignant competitors. Alerts research, development and marketing professionals to potential competition issues and legal concerns Provides a reference source for courts of law with respect to accepted industry standards and practices Presents an authoritative perspective, in plain language, on laws and regulations governing comparative advertising, and on worldwide standards governing research evidence in support of advertising claims Covers food and beverage, nutritional supplements, cosmetics and other consumer advertised products
Strength of Claims in Comparative Advertising
Author: R. Dale WilsonPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Comparative advertising
Languages : en
Pages : 18
Book Description
Comparative Advertising
Author: Robert Thomas StackPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Advertising
Languages : en
Pages : 258
Book Description
The Relative Effect of Negative Comparative, Direct Comparative, and Non-comparative Advertising Under Varying Conditions of Argument Quality on Attitude-toward-the-ad, Brand-related Attitudes and Behavioral Intentions
Author: Karen E. JamesQuality Disclosure and Comparative Advertisement
Author: Yeolyong SungPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We study firms' voluntary disclosure in an oligopoly market for vertically differentiated products, where firms are allowed to advertise a rival's product as well as their own products. When consumers are uncertain of product qualities, Board (2009)1) and Hotz and Xiao (2011)2) show that price competition among firms alleviates firms' incentives to disclose the quality of their own product. Nonetheless, firms still have incentives to distinguish their own products from those of the competitors to attract more consumers. A comparative advertisement is a useful way to distinguish products and thus, a rival's advertisement can lead to a disclosure of a firm's product information. Comparative or negative advertisements are used in many industries and political campaigns. In 2010, for example in the United States, Verizon Wireless compared their service coverage with that of the competitor, AT&T, on the TV commercial and their Web site in order to advertise the 3G network service for mobile phones (See Figure 1). They had a broader service area than AT&T did and used a comparative advertisement to show that their service was superior.3) Through the negative advertisement by Verizon Wireless on the AT&T's service, the information on the AT&T's mobile phone service was revealed even though AT&T did not disclose their nation-wide service coverage in a picture. This is in contrast with the fact that AT&T themselves put the map showing their nation-wide 3G service coverage for iPads on their Web site.4) At that time AT&T was the only service provider for iPads. This paper allows firms to advertise a rival's product. We show that the qualities of all the products in an industry are fully revealed by a high quality firm's comparative advertisement and full revelation is the unique equilibrium outcome. Each firm's advertisement (message) can convey information on either its own product quality or a rival's or both. Differentiating from traditional models that consider advertisement as a signal of product qualities (Nelson, 19745); Schmalensee, 19786); Grossman and Shapiro, 19847); Kihlstrom and Riordan, 19848)), we consider it as a truthful claim about its qualities. In other words, we see the role of advertisement as conveying factual information directly to the consumers. The restriction of firms' messages to truthful claims can be justified by the argument that an untruthful claim, such as an overstatement on their own product or an understatement on their rival's product, could be challenged in a court of law. If the claim was found to be untruthful, the firm that sent the untrue message might have to pay a fine or more, and the true quality would be revealed as the result. In this model, full revelation occurs as the unique equilibrium outcome. If firms do not disclose any information and consumers do not distinguish the qualities among products, then the firms' profits are zero by price competition. By revealing some information and having consumers perceive that the product is differentiated from its rivals', a firm can increase the profit. In the competition between two firms, there exists an equilibrium in which full information on all products is revealed by the firm with a higher quality (henceforth, called a high quality firm) as in the above example of the mobile phone service industry. The high quality firm can increase the profit by advertising the rival's low quality product as negatively as possible because such an advertisement increases its demand by making more consumers switch from the low quality product to the high quality product. Since false claims are not allowed, the negative advertisements reveal the true quality of the rival's product. Meanwhile, the high quality firm reveals the true quality of its own product building grounds for a higher price. Since an advertisement that fully reveals both firms' product qualities is a dominant strategy for the high quality firm, full revelation is the unique outcome. In general, full revelation fails without advertisement on a rival's product. Such revelation, as many studies suggest, increases consumers' welfare, and thus the literature argues in favor of the introduction of mandatory disclosure laws (Fishman and Hagerty, 20039); Board, 2009; Hotz and Xiao, 2011). However, mandatory disclosure laws burden both private and public sectors with an enforcement cost and a deadweight loss. As an alternative to the costly legal solution, the results of this paper suggest that a market can lead to a full revelation with voluntary disclosure if negative advertisement on rivals' products is allowed. As a parallel example, in the domain of politics, negative advertisement exists in the form of negative campaigning. Amid ongoing debate and controversy, recent studies such as Polborn and Yi (2006)10) defend prevailing negative campaigning arguing that consequently revealed information on the candidates empowers the electorate to make more-informed decisions. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the related literature in Section 2, we present an oligopoly model with price competition between two firms in Section 3 and derive the firms' profit functions from the equilibrium pricing rules and the associated demand functions in Section 4. With the profit functions, in Section 5, we analyze the firms' advertisement strategies and show that there exists an equilibrium in which full information is revealed by the high quality firm. Section 6 concludes the findings and discusses extendible issues.
Recent Developments in Antitrust
Author: Jay Pil ChoiPublisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262033569
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 353
Book Description
In this volume, specialists from the United States and the European Union examine conceptual and empirical issues involved in antitrust policy in light of recent developments in the field.
Non-Comparative and Comparative Advertising in Oligopolistic Markets
Author: Maria AliprantiPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We study firms' advertising strategies in an oligopolistic market in which both non-comparative and comparative advertising are present. We show that in equilibrium firms mix over the two types of advertising, with the intensity of comparative advertising exceeding that of non-comparative advertising; moreover, that the intensity of comparative increases relatively to non-comparative advertising as market competition intensifies. Interestingly, the use of comparative advertising may lead to higher consumers' surplus and welfare in a mixed advertising market than in the absence of advertising or when either comparative or non-comparative advertising is not present.