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Author: Joseph M. Lynch Publisher: Cornell University Press ISBN: 1501728334 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 328
Book Description
No concept sparks more controversy in constitutional debate than "original intent." Offering a legal historian's approach to the subject, this book demonstrates that the framers deliberately obscured one of their more important decisions. Joseph M. Lynch argues that the Constitution was a product of political struggles involving regional interests, economic concerns, and ideology. The framers, he maintains, settled on enigmatic wording of the Necessary and Proper Clause and of the General Welfare provision in the Spending Clause as a compromise, leaving the extent of federal power to be determined by the political process. During ratification, however, attempts by dissident framers to undo the compromise were repelled in The Federalist: charges of overly broad congressional powers were met with protestations that in fact these powers were limited. Lynch describes how early lawmakers applied the Constitution to such issues as executive power and privilege, the deportation of aliens, and the prohibition of seditious speech. He follows the disputes over the interpretation of this document—focusing on James Madison's changing views—as the new government took shape and political parties were formed. Lynch points out that the first six Congresses and President George Washington disregarded the framers' intentions when they were deemed impractical to follow. In contrast, he warns that the version of original intent put forth in recent Supreme Court opinions regarding congressional power could hinder Congress in serving the nation.
Author: Joseph M. Lynch Publisher: Cornell University Press ISBN: 1501728334 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 328
Book Description
No concept sparks more controversy in constitutional debate than "original intent." Offering a legal historian's approach to the subject, this book demonstrates that the framers deliberately obscured one of their more important decisions. Joseph M. Lynch argues that the Constitution was a product of political struggles involving regional interests, economic concerns, and ideology. The framers, he maintains, settled on enigmatic wording of the Necessary and Proper Clause and of the General Welfare provision in the Spending Clause as a compromise, leaving the extent of federal power to be determined by the political process. During ratification, however, attempts by dissident framers to undo the compromise were repelled in The Federalist: charges of overly broad congressional powers were met with protestations that in fact these powers were limited. Lynch describes how early lawmakers applied the Constitution to such issues as executive power and privilege, the deportation of aliens, and the prohibition of seditious speech. He follows the disputes over the interpretation of this document—focusing on James Madison's changing views—as the new government took shape and political parties were formed. Lynch points out that the first six Congresses and President George Washington disregarded the framers' intentions when they were deemed impractical to follow. In contrast, he warns that the version of original intent put forth in recent Supreme Court opinions regarding congressional power could hinder Congress in serving the nation.
Author: Joseph Martin Lynch Publisher: ISBN: Category : History Languages : en Pages : 344
Book Description
Examining debates in the first six Congresses, Lynch describes how early lawmakers applied the Constitution to such issues as executive power and privilege, the creation of a national bank, the deportation of aliens, and the prohibition of seditious speech. He follows the disputes over the interpretation of this document - focusing on James Madison's changing views - as the new government took shape and political parties were formed.
Author: Carrie Menkel-Meadow Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This essay describes the multi-party, multi-issue negotiations of the American Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia (1787), using the lens of negotiation theory. Expert process leadership by George Washington, James Madison and Benjamin Franklin, with deliberation about process rules (e.g. speaking rules, confidentiality) and decision rules (voting and reconsideration, packaging) as well as the use of committees and task groups to facilitate both cross-geopolitical and issue coalitions and specialization, rather than Committee of the Whole (plenary) meetings for all of the deliberations, allowed the negotiation, drafting and (later!) ratification of a monumental political document, with dubious political (and moral) legitimacy at the time of its completion, but considerable robustness, with a large number of amendments (including the “afterthoughts” of the Bill of Rights) over time. While there has been much replication of the text of the US Constitution (in later enacted Constitutions by other countries), not enough consideration has been given to the importance of process choices in comparative political theory (cf. Jon Elster's work). This essay attempts to illustrate the use of “applied history” in understanding complex diplomatic and political negotiations, by using current theories to explore past behavior.
Author: Grégoire C. N. Webber Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 1139483730 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 241
Book Description
In matters of rights, constitutions tend to avoid settling controversies. With few exceptions, rights are formulated in open-ended language, seeking consensus on an abstraction without purporting to resolve the many moral-political questions implicated by rights. The resulting view has been that rights extend everywhere but are everywhere infringed by legislation seeking to resolve the very moral-political questions the constitution seeks to avoid. The Negotiable Constitution challenges this view. Arguing that underspecified rights call for greater specification, Grégoire C. N. Webber draws on limitation clauses common to most bills of rights to develop a new understanding of the relationship between rights and legislation. The legislature is situated as a key constitutional actor tasked with completing the specification of constitutional rights. In turn, because the constitutional project is incomplete with regards to rights, it is open to being re-negotiated by legislation struggling with the very moral-political questions left underdetermined at the constitutional level.
Author: Sumit Bisarya and Thibaut Noel Publisher: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) ISBN: 9176714144 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 14
Book Description
Countries often amend their constitutions or enact new ones following major political events, such as the founding of newly independent states, the fall of an authoritarian regime or the end of violent conflict. Significant constitutional reform at a crucial moment is often a high-stakes process because a constitution regulates access to public power and resources among different groups. While disagreements over divisive topics are likely and even inherent to constitution-making, they may also result in a serious deadlock when stakeholders are unable to reach agreement. A prolonged deadlock can delay or even derail the whole reform process. In this context, it may be advisable to create incentives that can help parties to the negotiations overcome divergence and resolve deadlocks should they occur. This Constitution Brief focuses on strategies and mechanisms for breaking a deadlock in constitutional negotiations conducted in an environment of competitive democratic politics.
Author: Aylin Koçunyan Publisher: ISBN: 9789042935068 Category : Constitutional history Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This book traces the transcultural and transnational dimension of the internal genesis of the Ottoman Constitution, which was promulgated on December 23, 1876. It shows that the constitutional process incorporated, from domestic authorities to foreign Powers, a plurality of formal and informal agents of different ethno-religious, cultural, and ideological backgrounds and that its investigation goes beyond the study of a national narrative.0Considering the issue of constitutional reforms from different angles (foreign influence and pressure, the agency of domestic actors and through discourse analysis of reform decrees), the book brings a critical approach to the existing historiographical narratives, which reduce Ottoman constitutional history to a simplistic process of transplanting western legal artefacts and regimes without measuring the selective control of dominant domestic groups over the process. Instead, the book shows the evolution of a continuous set of negotiations of various actors on the idea of constitution in the Ottoman Empire and thus sheds light on the social construction of the idea of justice and constitutional law. The draft constitutions studied throughout the book are the textual embodiment of these negotiations and unveil the ways in which concepts and issues such as legitimacy, the restriction of political power, lawful government, liberty, equality, the rule of people and the treatment of minorities reached the Ottoman context and the ways in which they acquired new meanings or equivalents during their adaptation to the imperial political culture.
Author: Joseph M. Lynch Publisher: Cornell University Press ISBN: 9780801472718 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 340
Book Description
No concept sparks more controversy in constitutional debate than "original intent." Offering a legal historian's approach to the subject, this book demonstrates that the framers deliberately obscured one of their more important decisions. Joseph M. Lynch argues that the Constitution was a product of political struggles involving regional interests, economic concerns, and ideology. The framers, he maintains, settled on enigmatic wording of the Necessary and Proper Clause and of the General Welfare provision in the Spending Clause as a compromise, leaving the extent of federal power to be determined by the political process. During ratification, however, attempts by dissident framers to undo the compromise were repelled in The Federalist: charges of overly broad congressional powers were met with protestations that in fact these powers were limited. Lynch describes how early lawmakers applied the Constitution to such issues as executive power and privilege, the deportation of aliens, and the prohibition of seditious speech. He follows the disputes over the interpretation of this document--focusing on James Madison's changing views--as the new government took shape and political parties were formed. Lynch points out that the first six Congresses and President George Washington disregarded the framers' intentions when they were deemed impractical to follow. In contrast, he warns that the version of original intent put forth in recent Supreme Court opinions regarding congressional power could hinder Congress in serving the nation.
Author: Sujit Choudhry Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 19
Book Description
Constitution making is a divisive process, and it must be so. In any healthy constitutional negotiation, issues will be brought to the table on which the interests of the negotiating parties diverge. Parties to constitutional negotiations are thus faced with the challenge of developing a final document in which each group within the nation can take pride and ownership, even though with respect to many divisive issues that group will not have obtained what it wanted. There can be no fool-proof algorithms for resolving divisive issues to achieve this end, but there are mechanisms with which every negotiation process should be equipped. This paper addresses mechanisms for resolving divisive issues in constitutional negotiations.
Author: Erin Ryan Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This essay explores the emerging literature on the negotiation of structural constitutional governance, to which Professor Aziz Huq has made an important contribution in The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1595 (2014). In the piece, Professor Huq reviews the negotiation of constitutional entitlements and challenges the conventional wisdom about the limits of political bargaining as a means of allocating authority among the three branches of government. He argues that constitutional ambiguities in the horizontal allocation of power are sometimes best resolved through legislative-executive negotiation, just as uncertain grants of constitutional authority are already negotiated between state and federal actors in the vertical-federalism context. Indeed, at the margins between state and federal authority, executive and legislative authority, and even judicial and political authority -- inevitable zones of overlap and spillover emerge, where interpretive choices must be made. The operative constitutional question then becomes who is best positioned to make these interpretive choices. Huq's analysis of institutional bargaining along the horizontal separation-of-powers dimension adds dimension to an emerging literature on negotiated structural governance more generally. Previously predominated by vertical separation-of-powers analyses in the federalism literature, this new wave of bargaining-literate scholarship emphasizes the usefulness and inevitability of multilateral bargaining as an alternative for allocating constitutional authority in circumstances where unilateral judicial or statutory allocation is suboptimal at best -- and counterproductive at worst. Thematic among these new works is the idea that the Constitution does not resolve every structural question, and that certain unresolved structural dilemmas are most capably resolved by negotiation among legislative and executive actors at the local, state, and national levels. Different authors provide different pieces of the new theoretical justification for judicial deference to politically negotiated governance, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's simultaneous revival of judicially enforceable constraints in many of the same contexts. This essay reviews the unfolding literature on the negotiation of structural governance, analyzing points of conversion and issues of ongoing debate. Overall, scholars of negotiated governance find that bargaining is inevitable because the text of the Constitution cannot account for every possible ambiguity. Moreover, they conclude that political bargaining to resolve ambiguity is valuable when the required decisionmaking does not match the circumscribed skillset of judicial interpreters. Most are skeptical about the value of judicial review as current Supreme Court doctrine prescribes it, but -- and in contrast with previous scholarship emphasizing political safeguards -- many allow for some judicial role to police the most foreseeable harms associated with political bargaining. The essay concludes with thoughts about structural governance issues warranting further scrutiny in the next iteration of the discourse.
Author: Joseph M. Lynch
Author: Joseph M. Lynch
Author: Joseph Martin Lynch
Author: Carrie Menkel-Meadow
Author: Grégoire C. N. Webber
Author: Sumit Bisarya and Thibaut Noel
Author: Rasmus C. Naeyé
Author: Aylin Koçunyan
Author: Joseph M. Lynch
Author: Sujit Choudhry
Author: Erin Ryan