Author: Lyndon BurfordPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Constructivism (Philosophy)
Languages : en
Pages : 297
Book Description
Nuclear disarmament dynamics are under-studied and under-theorised. Constructivists hold that identities determine interests and thus, policy preferences, but there has beNuclear disarmament dynamics are under-studied and under-theorised. Constructivists hold that identities determine interests and thus, policy preferences, but there has been virtually no investigation of national identity as a driver for nuclear disarmament policy. This thesis investigates the drivers of nuclear disarmament advocacy by Canada and New Zealand, focusing on the activation of anti-nuclear weapon national identities as a key explanatory factor. The thesis presents four comparative case studies—two each from Canada and New Zealand. Each case examines the dominant nuclear weapon-related national identity tropes of three constituencies—senior government ministers, bureaucrats and the public—and traces the processes through which various actors seek to have these identities expressed in policy. Since identities inform preferences but do not necessarily determine policy, the case studies also consider how contextual factors—alliance commitments, normative context, civil society activity and great power relations—affect the expression of anti-nuclear weapon identities. Canada’s decision not to acquire nuclear weapons, despite being able to, is a touchstone for a popular, pro-disarmament ‘peacemaker’ identity. However, security policymakers almost always prioritise the identity of Canada as a strong US ally and thus, supporter of nuclear deterrence. The Canadian cases represent attempts by two prominent norm entrepreneurs to break this pattern— the first, during a Cold War crisis in superpower relations, and the second, during the post-Cold War superpower rapprochement. In both cases, a ‘disarmament/deterrence conundrum’ was evident; that is, the activation of anti-nuclear weapon identities produced nuclear disarmament advocacy, but it was significantly constrained by conflicting, alliance-based identities and the related norms of solidarity and nuclear deterrence. In New Zealand, public and political norm entrepreneurship generated early nuclear disarmament advocacy, but again, this was bounded by alliance-based nuclear deterrence norms. During political upheaval in the 1980s, an identity crisis and civil society activism created an internalised ‘New Zealand nuclear taboo’ in the public, which was institutionalised in law. This delegitimised acquiescence to nuclear deterrence, including for alliance imperatives. Activation of internalised public anti-nuclear sentiment produced comprehensive nuclear disarmament advocacy from the government—initially for instrumental reasons, but later, due to bureaucratic socialisation towards anti-nuclear identities. The New Zealand cases support the hypothesis that norm institutionalisation facilitates identity transformation in officials through the iterative practice of norms.