Author: Vera Tilson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Monopoly Production and Pricing of Finitely Durable Goods with Strategic Consumers' Fluctuating Willingness to Pay
Monopolistic profit maximization and consumers' durable goods
Author: Kenneth Wertz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Durable Goods Monopoly with a Finite But Uncertain Number of Consumers
Author: David W. Majerus
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Durable goods, Consumer
Languages : en
Pages : 15
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Durable goods, Consumer
Languages : en
Pages : 15
Book Description
Durable Goods Monopoly with Entry of New Consumers
Durable Goods Monopoly with Uninformed Consumers
Author: Joseph Emmett Harrington
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Durable goods, Consumer
Languages : en
Pages : 34
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Durable goods, Consumer
Languages : en
Pages : 34
Book Description
Durable Goods Monopoly, Buyer Uncertainty, and Concurrent Selling and Renting
Author: Gregory E. Goering
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Stylized durable goods monopoly models typically conclude that monopolists prefer to rent their output due to commitment problems associated with sales. However, we commonly observe monopolistic firms in durable goods industries simultaneously selling and renting output. To address this apparent discrepancy a simple two-period asymmetric information model is constructed where buyers are uncertain of the good's durability and the firm's manufacturing costs. This is a natural asymmetric information specification since the firm typically has more precise knowledge of product durability and production costs than buyers do. The analysis indicates that a monopolist may wish to concurrently sell and rent output when buyers do not have perfect knowledge. If, for example, consumers believe that product durability and manufacturing costs are higher than they truly are, the firm may wish to simultaneously sell and rent output. Thus buyers' expectations about firm costs and product durability are of critical importance in durable goods models, particularly in terms of explaining concurrent rentals and sales.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Stylized durable goods monopoly models typically conclude that monopolists prefer to rent their output due to commitment problems associated with sales. However, we commonly observe monopolistic firms in durable goods industries simultaneously selling and renting output. To address this apparent discrepancy a simple two-period asymmetric information model is constructed where buyers are uncertain of the good's durability and the firm's manufacturing costs. This is a natural asymmetric information specification since the firm typically has more precise knowledge of product durability and production costs than buyers do. The analysis indicates that a monopolist may wish to concurrently sell and rent output when buyers do not have perfect knowledge. If, for example, consumers believe that product durability and manufacturing costs are higher than they truly are, the firm may wish to simultaneously sell and rent output. Thus buyers' expectations about firm costs and product durability are of critical importance in durable goods models, particularly in terms of explaining concurrent rentals and sales.
Product Equilibrium Under Monopolistic Competition
Author: Hans Brems
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 272
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 272
Book Description
Pacman Refutes the Coase Conjecture
Author: Mark Bagnoli
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 18
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 18
Book Description
Management Science
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Industrial management
Languages : en
Pages : 616
Book Description
Issues for Feb. 1965-Aug. 1967 include Bulletin of the Institute of Management Sciences.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Industrial management
Languages : en
Pages : 616
Book Description
Issues for Feb. 1965-Aug. 1967 include Bulletin of the Institute of Management Sciences.
Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization
Author: Victor J. Tremblay
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 178471898X
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 483
Book Description
The Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization integrates behavioral economics into industrial organization. Chapters cover concepts such as relative thinking, salience, shrouded attributes, cognitive dissonance, motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, overconfidence, status quo bias, social cooperation and identity. Additional chapters consider industry issues, such as sports and gambling industries, neuroeconomic studies of brands and advertising, and behavioral antitrust law. The Handbook features a wide array of methods (literature surveys, experimental and econometric research, and theoretical modelling), facilitating accessibility to a wide audience.
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 178471898X
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 483
Book Description
The Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization integrates behavioral economics into industrial organization. Chapters cover concepts such as relative thinking, salience, shrouded attributes, cognitive dissonance, motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, overconfidence, status quo bias, social cooperation and identity. Additional chapters consider industry issues, such as sports and gambling industries, neuroeconomic studies of brands and advertising, and behavioral antitrust law. The Handbook features a wide array of methods (literature surveys, experimental and econometric research, and theoretical modelling), facilitating accessibility to a wide audience.