Monetary Policy, Credibility and Central Bank Constitutions PDF Download

Author: Olga Arratibel San Miguel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 446

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Author: MissEva Gutierrez
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451847408
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 31

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This paper explores the relationship between the constitutional entrenchment of central bank independence and inflation performance. Empirical studies for developing countries have not found a relationship between central bank independence, proxied by the "de jure" independence established in the central bank law, and inflation. We argue that the constitution is likely to be better enforced than ordinary statutes owing to its higher legal rank. Our empirical analysis finds that in a sample of Latin American and Caribbean countries, those countries that entrench the independence of the central bank in the constitution have a better inflation performance.

Author: Francesco Lippi
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781782542971
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 180

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This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence. The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided. This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policy makers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy.

Author: Philip Keefer
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Anti-inflationary policies
Languages : en
Pages : 46

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In economically volatile conditions in which it is more difficult for the public to distinguish inflation deliberately generated by government from inflation created by unanticipated economic shocks, the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence will be unchanged but the effectiveness of exchange rate pegs will be significantly improved. Keefer and Stasavage develop and test several new hypotheses about the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of different institutions and different degrees of citizen information about government policies.

Author: Ignacio Mas
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 7071614172
Category : Banks and banking, Central
Languages : en
Pages : 48

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Author: Alex Cukierman
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262031981
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 532

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This book brings together a large body of Cukierman's research and integrates it with recent developments in the political economy of monetary policy.

Author: Philip Keefer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic books
Languages : en
Pages :

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February 2001 In economically volatile conditions in which it is more difficult for the public to distinguish inflation deliberately generated by government from inflation created by unanticipated economic shocks, the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence will be unchanged but the effectiveness of exchange rate pegs will be significantly improved. Keefer and Stasavage develop and test several new hypotheses about the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of different institutions and different degrees of citizen information about government policies. Theory provides strong reason to believe that while central bank independence will prove more effective as a commitment mechanism in countries where multiple players in government have veto power (checks and balances), the number of veto players will have no effect on the credibility of exchange rate pegs. Conversely, Keefer and Stasavage argue that central bank independence does not solve problems of commitment that arise when citizens are imperfectly informed about the contribution of government policy to inflation. Exchange rate pegs, however, mitigate these problems. The authors present extensive evidence from cross-country tests using newly developed data that provide strong support for their propositions. This paper--a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the institutional conditions for policy reform and success. The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].

Author: Mr.Timo Valila
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451841744
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 17

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The specific role of central bank independence in determining the overall credibility of monetary policy is addressed in this paper. It is argued that the credibility of delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank is endogenous to the credibility of the inflation target because a “conservative” inflation target may not be compatible with the fiscal policy stance. Also, lack of transparency in designing the institutional set-up is shown to be welfare-reducing.

Author: David Begg
Publisher: Centre for Economic Policy Research
ISBN: 9781898128052
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 148

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This Report examines the monetary unification of Europe and the creation of a European Central Bank. It deals first with the macroeconomics of monetary union and highlights four issues. What monetary constitution is required to deliver price stability, and do the draft statutes of the European Central Bank (ECB) meet these conditions? Are fiscal rules a necessary adjunct to such a constitution? Is convergence of inflation rates a precondition for embarking on monetary union? Finally, how should the transition be managed?

Author: Otmar Issing
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 70

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Book Description
Central bank independence is now in vogue because of previous experience of politicisation of monetary policy. But can the central bankers be trusted more than the politicians? In this Occasional Paper, Professor Otmar Issing, the leading monetary economist and one of Europe's most influential central bankers, argues that price stability is a 'common good' and that it is better in the hands of an independent central bank with a clear price stability mandate. The independent central bank with such a manadate, in effect, represents a set of rules which impose constraints on the abuse of power either by politicians or by central bankers. Central bankers operate best in institutions which have a clear objective and are held accountable to the public. Professor Geoffrey Wood adds a commentary which puts Issing's paper in the context of the 'rules versus discretion' debate and deals with three related issues: the meaning of 'price stability', the importance of stable money to the functioning of a market economy and the central bank's role in maintaining financial stability.