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Author: Eliot A. Cohen Publisher: Simon and Schuster ISBN: 1439135487 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 324
Book Description
Why do competent armies fail? Eliot Cohen and John Gooch explore answers to this question throughout this extensive analysis of unsuccessful military operations. Since it was first published in 1990, Military Misfortunes has become the classic analysis of the unexpected catastrophes that befall competent militaries. Now with a new Afterword discussing America's missteps in Iraq, Somalia, and the War on Terror, Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch's gripping battlefield narratives and groundbreaking explanations of the hidden factors that undermine armies are brought thoroughly up to date. As recent events prove, Military Misfortunes will be required reading for as long as armies go to war.
Author: Eliot A. Cohen Publisher: Simon and Schuster ISBN: 1439135487 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 324
Book Description
Why do competent armies fail? Eliot Cohen and John Gooch explore answers to this question throughout this extensive analysis of unsuccessful military operations. Since it was first published in 1990, Military Misfortunes has become the classic analysis of the unexpected catastrophes that befall competent militaries. Now with a new Afterword discussing America's missteps in Iraq, Somalia, and the War on Terror, Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch's gripping battlefield narratives and groundbreaking explanations of the hidden factors that undermine armies are brought thoroughly up to date. As recent events prove, Military Misfortunes will be required reading for as long as armies go to war.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 5
Book Description
"Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War," by Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch is an intriguing analysis of military misfortunes that have occurred during 20th-century wars. The authors offer some provocative theories about military misfortune while also providing brief analyses of five cases of well-known military failures: the British expedition to Gallipoli in 1915, the fall of France in 1940, the American anti-submarine campaign of 1942, the defeat of the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea by the Chinese in 1950, and the Israeli defense of the Suez and Golan fronts in 1973. To analyze military misfortune, the authors offer a method involving five steps: (1) identify the failure, (2) identify the "critical tasks" that went incomplete or unfulfilled and thus are at the root of the overall failure, (3) analyze the contributions of different layers of organization to the failure, (4) construct an "analytical matrix" that graphically presents the key failures leading to military misfortune, and (5) mark a "pathway" of misfortune through the "analytical matrix." The most important step within this method is the first step, the identification of the precise failure which led to the misfortune. Having identified their methodology, the authors state that there are three basic kinds of failure: failure to learn, failure to anticipate, and failure to adapt. They add that when two types of failure occur together, an "aggregate" failure will result, and when three types of failure occur together, a "catastrophic" failure will result. Despite the best efforts of the authors, the model they use for analyzing military misfortunes leads to an oversimplification of some very complex developments, and the analyses of the five cases offer little that is new. More cogent explanations for several of the misfortunes studied by Cohen and Gooch are to be found in specific studies on those subjects.
Author: Eliot A. Cohen Publisher: Simon and Schuster ISBN: 074324222X Category : History Languages : en Pages : 312
Book Description
“An excellent, vividly written” (The Washington Post) account of leadership in wartime that explores how four great democratic statesmen—Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion—worked with the military leaders who served them during warfare. The relationship between military leaders and political leaders has always been a complicated one, especially in times of war. When the chips are down, who should run the show—the politicians or the generals? In Supreme Command, Eliot A. Cohen expertly argues that great statesmen do not turn their wars over to their generals, and then stay out of their way. Great statesmen make better generals of their generals. They question and drive their military men, and at key times they overrule their advice. The generals may think they know how to win, but the statesmen are the ones who see the big picture. Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion led four very different kinds of democracy, under the most difficult circumstances imaginable. They came from four very different backgrounds—backwoods lawyer, dueling French doctor, rogue aristocrat, and impoverished Jewish socialist. Yet they faced similar challenges. Each exhibited mastery of detail and fascination with technology. All four were great learners, who studied war as if it were their own profession, and in many ways mastered it as well as did their generals. All found themselves locked in conflict with military men. All four triumphed. The powerful lessons of this “brilliant” (National Review) book will touch and inspire anyone who faces intense adversity and is the perfect gift for history buffs of all backgrounds.
Author: Martin Van Creveld Publisher: Harvard University Press ISBN: 9780674144415 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 356
Book Description
Many books have been written about strategy, tactics, and great commanders. This is the first book to deal exclusively with the nature of command itself, and to trace its development over two thousand years from ancient Greece to Vietnam. It treats historically the whole variety of problems involved in commanding armies, including staff organization and administration, communications methods and technologies, weaponry, and logistics. And it analyzes the relationship between these problems and military strategy. In vivid descriptions of key battles and campaigns—among others, Napoleon at Jena, Moltke’s Königgrätz campaign, the Arab–Israeli war of 1973, and the Americans in Vietnam—Martin van Creveld focuses on the means of command and shows how those means worked in practice. He finds that technological advances such as the railroad, breech-loading rifles, the telegraph and later the radio, tanks, and helicopters all brought commanders not only new tactical possibilities but also new limitations. Although vast changes have occurred in military thinking and technology, the one constant has been an endless search for certainty—certainty about the state and intentions of the enemy’s forces; certainty about the manifold factors that together constitute the environment in which war is fought, from the weather and terrain to radioactivity and the presence of chemical warfare agents; and certainty about the state, intentions, and activities of one’s own forces. The book concludes that progress in command has usually been achieved less by employing more advanced technologies than by finding ways to transcend the limitations of existing ones.
Author: James Oliver Goldsborough Publisher: ISBN: 9780977042999 Category : California Languages : en Pages : 308
Book Description
Where inherited wealth and family intersect--not always for the good.Explores one of American society¿s endlessly fascinating scenarios. Best of all, the story is true. The author takes the reader on a journey beginning with Revolutionary War heroes down through succeeding generations of Civil War notables, industrial titans, an improbable love story with an eleven-year courtship, a couple besotted and befuddled by all that is given them, and finally, a son who not only survives but thrives.The family tree is populated with such historical families as the Shields, Crittendens, Olivers, Nevilles, and Craigs; military, political, and industrial leaders of their time.The story is one of east and west, north and south: Western Pennsylvania, land of opportunity in the Republic¿s early years and later a seat of eastern high society; California immediately after World War II as the new land of opportunity; dreams of railroads and then an airline to open up vast territories of Mexico; brother-against-brother in war. El Chepe and Ramsa; exotic adventures and improbable schemes; lives fulfilled and lives wasted, it portrays the schizophrenia of people ricocheting between vast opportunity and the inability to make a life in the shadow of great wealth.The story is accompanied by astonishing first hand accounts and documentation kept by the author¿s family. Photographs, diaries, and letters give credence to accounts and give voice to the people who wrote them. These are not far-away characters in a fairy tale but real flesh-and-blood human beings speaking through the generations.
Author: Eliot A. Cohen Publisher: Basic Books ISBN: 0465096573 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 306
Book Description
"Speak softly and carry a big stick" Theodore Roosevelt famously said in 1901, when the United States was emerging as a great power. It was the right sentiment, perhaps, in an age of imperial rivalry but today many Americans doubt the utility of their global military presence, thinking it outdated, unnecessary or even dangerous. In The Big Stick, Eliot A. Cohen-a scholar and practitioner of international relations-disagrees. He argues that hard power remains essential for American foreign policy. While acknowledging that the US must be careful about why, when, and how it uses force, he insists that its international role is as critical as ever, and armed force is vital to that role. Cohen explains that American leaders must learn to use hard power in new ways and for new circumstances. The rise of a well-armed China, Russia's conquest of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, nuclear threats from North Korea and Iran, and the spread of radical Islamist movements like ISIS are some of the key threats to global peace. If the United States relinquishes its position as a strong but prudent military power, and fails to accept its role as the guardian of a stable world order we run the risk of unleashing disorder, violence and tyranny on a scale not seen since the 1930s. The US is still, as Madeleine Albright once dubbed it, "the indispensable nation."
Author: Lt. General David Barno Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0190672064 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 352
Book Description
Every military must prepare for future wars despite not really knowing the shape such wars will ultimately take. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates once noted: "We have a perfect record in predicting the next war. We have never once gotten it right." In the face of such great uncertainty, militaries must be able to adapt rapidly in order to win. Adaptation under Fire identifies the characteristics that make militaries more adaptable, illustrated through historical examples and the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Authors David Barno and Nora Bensahel argue that militaries facing unknown future conflicts must nevertheless make choices about the type of doctrine that their units will use, the weapons and equipment they will purchase, and the kind of leaders they will select and develop to guide the force to victory. Yet after a war begins, many of these choices will prove flawed in the unpredictable crucible of the battlefield. For a U.S. military facing diverse global threats, its ability to adapt quickly and effectively to those unforeseen circumstances may spell the difference between victory and defeat. Barno and Bensahel start by providing a framework for understanding adaptation and include historical cases of success and failure. Next, they examine U.S. military adaptation during the nation's recent wars, and explain why certain forms of adaptation have proven problematic. In the final section, Barno and Bensahel conclude that the U.S. military must become much more adaptable in order to address the fast-changing security challenges of the future, and they offer recommendations on how to do so before it is too late.
Author: Efraim Karsh Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA ISBN: 1632861194 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 257
Book Description
The continuing crisis in Syria has raised questions over the common perception of Middle Eastern affairs as an offshoot of global power politics. To Western intellectuals, foreign policy experts, and politicians, “empire” and “imperialism” are categories that apply exclusively to Europe and more recently to the United States of America. As they see it, Middle Eastern history is the product of its unhappy interaction with these powers. Forming the basis of President Obama's much ballyhooed “new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world,” this outlook is continuing to shape crucial foreign policy among Western governments, but in these pages, Efraim Karsh propounds a radically different interpretation of Middle Eastern experience. He argues that the Western view of Muslims and Arabs as hapless victims is absurd. On the contrary, modern Middle Eastern history has been the culmination of long-existing indigenous trends. Great power influences, however potent, have played a secondary role constituting neither the primary force behind the region's political development nor the main cause of its notorious volatility. Karsh argues it is only when Middle Eastern people disown their victimization mentality and take responsibility for their actions and their Western champions drop their condescending approach to Arabs and Muslims, that the region can at long last look forward to a real “spring.”
Author: Eliot A. Cohen
Author: Eliot A. Cohen
Author: 
Author: Eliot A. Cohen
Author: Martin Van Creveld
Author: James Oliver Goldsborough
Author: Eliot A. Cohen
Author: 
Author: Lt. General David Barno
Author: Efraim Karsh
Author: John Gooch