Author: Pierre-André Chiappori
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691203504
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 262
Book Description
Over the past few decades, matching models, which use mathematical frameworks to analyze allocation mechanisms for heterogeneous products and individuals, have attracted renewed attention in both theoretical and applied economics. These models have been used in many contexts, from labor markets to organ donations, but recent work has tended to focus on "nontransferable" cases rather than matching models with transfers. In this important book, Pierre-André Chiappori fills a gap in the literature by presenting a clear and elegant overview of matching with transfers and provides a set of tools that enable the analysis of matching patterns in equilibrium, as well as a series of extensions. He then applies these tools to the field of family economics and shows how analysis of matching patterns and of the incentives thus generated can contribute to our understanding of long-term economic trends, including inequality and the demand for higher education.
Matching with Transfers
Author: Pierre-André Chiappori
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691203504
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 262
Book Description
Over the past few decades, matching models, which use mathematical frameworks to analyze allocation mechanisms for heterogeneous products and individuals, have attracted renewed attention in both theoretical and applied economics. These models have been used in many contexts, from labor markets to organ donations, but recent work has tended to focus on "nontransferable" cases rather than matching models with transfers. In this important book, Pierre-André Chiappori fills a gap in the literature by presenting a clear and elegant overview of matching with transfers and provides a set of tools that enable the analysis of matching patterns in equilibrium, as well as a series of extensions. He then applies these tools to the field of family economics and shows how analysis of matching patterns and of the incentives thus generated can contribute to our understanding of long-term economic trends, including inequality and the demand for higher education.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691203504
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 262
Book Description
Over the past few decades, matching models, which use mathematical frameworks to analyze allocation mechanisms for heterogeneous products and individuals, have attracted renewed attention in both theoretical and applied economics. These models have been used in many contexts, from labor markets to organ donations, but recent work has tended to focus on "nontransferable" cases rather than matching models with transfers. In this important book, Pierre-André Chiappori fills a gap in the literature by presenting a clear and elegant overview of matching with transfers and provides a set of tools that enable the analysis of matching patterns in equilibrium, as well as a series of extensions. He then applies these tools to the field of family economics and shows how analysis of matching patterns and of the incentives thus generated can contribute to our understanding of long-term economic trends, including inequality and the demand for higher education.
Estimating Matching with Transfers
Dynamic Matching with Transfers
Author: Tyler Maxey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
I study a two-sided market of dynamic matching with sequential arrivals. Agents trade off waiting to match with a more desirable agent with immediately matching with a less desirable agent. I study the consequences of transfer availability for two priority orders: first-in-first-out (FIFO) and last-in-first-out (LIFO). For FIFO, welfare is weakly greater with transfers than without. For LIFO, there is a range of waiting costs such that welfare is weakly lower with transfers than without. Even in the limit as waiting costs go to zero, the equilibrium welfare for FIFO with transfers remains strictly lower than that of the social optimum. Thus, unlike in a static matching setting, transfers in my dynamic matching setting do not generate utilitarian efficient outcomes.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
I study a two-sided market of dynamic matching with sequential arrivals. Agents trade off waiting to match with a more desirable agent with immediately matching with a less desirable agent. I study the consequences of transfer availability for two priority orders: first-in-first-out (FIFO) and last-in-first-out (LIFO). For FIFO, welfare is weakly greater with transfers than without. For LIFO, there is a range of waiting costs such that welfare is weakly lower with transfers than without. Even in the limit as waiting costs go to zero, the equilibrium welfare for FIFO with transfers remains strictly lower than that of the social optimum. Thus, unlike in a static matching setting, transfers in my dynamic matching setting do not generate utilitarian efficient outcomes.
Two-sided Matching Without Transfers
Estimating Matching Games with Transfers
Author: Jeremy T. Fox
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 73
Book Description
Economists wish to use data on matches to learn about the structural primitives that govern sorting. I show how to use equilibrium data on who matches with whom for nonparametric identification and semiparametric estimation of match production functions in many-to-many, two-sided matching games with transferable utility. Inequalities derived from equilibrium necessary conditions underlie a maximum score estimator of match production functions. The inequalities do not require data on transfers, quotas, or production levels. The estimator does not suffer from a computational or data curse of dimensionality in the number of agents in a matching market, as the estimator avoids solving for an equilibrium and estimating first-stage match probabilities. I present an empirical application to automotive suppliers and assemblers.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 73
Book Description
Economists wish to use data on matches to learn about the structural primitives that govern sorting. I show how to use equilibrium data on who matches with whom for nonparametric identification and semiparametric estimation of match production functions in many-to-many, two-sided matching games with transferable utility. Inequalities derived from equilibrium necessary conditions underlie a maximum score estimator of match production functions. The inequalities do not require data on transfers, quotas, or production levels. The estimator does not suffer from a computational or data curse of dimensionality in the number of agents in a matching market, as the estimator avoids solving for an equilibrium and estimating first-stage match probabilities. I present an empirical application to automotive suppliers and assemblers.
Rigidity of Transfers and Unraveling in Matching Markets
Author: Songzi Du
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 55
Book Description
We study the role of transfers in the timing of matching. In our model, some agents have the option of matching early and exiting in period 1, before others arrive in period 2; in period 2 there is a centralized institution that implements a stable matching after all agents arrive. We prove that without flexible transfers, as the market gets large, on average at least one quarter of all agents in period 1 have strict incentives to match early and skip the centralized matching, if they anticipate others are participating in the centralized matching of period 2. We define a minimal notion of sequential stability and prove that without flexible transfers the probability of sequential stability tends to 0 as the market gets large. We show that flexible transfers eliminate these timing problems.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 55
Book Description
We study the role of transfers in the timing of matching. In our model, some agents have the option of matching early and exiting in period 1, before others arrive in period 2; in period 2 there is a centralized institution that implements a stable matching after all agents arrive. We prove that without flexible transfers, as the market gets large, on average at least one quarter of all agents in period 1 have strict incentives to match early and skip the centralized matching, if they anticipate others are participating in the centralized matching of period 2. We define a minimal notion of sequential stability and prove that without flexible transfers the probability of sequential stability tends to 0 as the market gets large. We show that flexible transfers eliminate these timing problems.
Matching with Transfers Under Distributional Constraints
Author: Devansh Jalota
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In such markets, we establish the efficiency of equilibrium arrangements and study conditions on the distributional constraints and agent preferences under which equilibria exist and can be computed efficiently. We first consider the setting when the number of institutions (e.g., firms in a labor market) is one and show that equilibrium arrangements exist irrespective of the constraint structure or agents' preferences. However, equilibrium arrangements may not exist in markets with multiple institutions even when agents have linear preferences. Thus, for markets with linear preferences, we study sufficient conditions on the constraint structure that guarantee the existence of equilibria using linear programming, which not only generalizes that of Shapley and Shubik (1971) to the many-to-one matching setting under distributional constraints but also provides a method to compute market equilibria efficiently.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In such markets, we establish the efficiency of equilibrium arrangements and study conditions on the distributional constraints and agent preferences under which equilibria exist and can be computed efficiently. We first consider the setting when the number of institutions (e.g., firms in a labor market) is one and show that equilibrium arrangements exist irrespective of the constraint structure or agents' preferences. However, equilibrium arrangements may not exist in markets with multiple institutions even when agents have linear preferences. Thus, for markets with linear preferences, we study sufficient conditions on the constraint structure that guarantee the existence of equilibria using linear programming, which not only generalizes that of Shapley and Shubik (1971) to the many-to-one matching setting under distributional constraints but also provides a method to compute market equilibria efficiently.
Essays on One- and Two-sided Matching, with and Without Transfers
Author: Erik Anderson Stuart
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Matching theory
Languages : en
Pages : 344
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Matching theory
Languages : en
Pages : 344
Book Description
Handbook of the Economics of Matching
Author:
Publisher: North Holland
ISBN: 9780443314667
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Handbook in Economics of Matching highlights new advances in the field, with this new volume presenting interesting chapters. Each chapter is written by an international board of authors. Chapters in this new release include Matching without transfers, Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Theory, The large markets case, Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Applications, Allocating students to schools: theory and empirical methods, Matching with Transfers, Matching with Transfers: Theory, Matching with Transfers: Applications, Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility, Extensions, Pre-matching investments, Matching with contracts, Matching under asymmetric information, Matching with frictions, and Dynamic Matching.
Publisher: North Holland
ISBN: 9780443314667
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Handbook in Economics of Matching highlights new advances in the field, with this new volume presenting interesting chapters. Each chapter is written by an international board of authors. Chapters in this new release include Matching without transfers, Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Theory, The large markets case, Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Applications, Allocating students to schools: theory and empirical methods, Matching with Transfers, Matching with Transfers: Theory, Matching with Transfers: Applications, Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility, Extensions, Pre-matching investments, Matching with contracts, Matching under asymmetric information, Matching with frictions, and Dynamic Matching.