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Author: Andreas Zweifel Publisher: GRIN Verlag ISBN: 3640579380 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 88
Book Description
Bachelor Thesis from the year 2009 in the subject Economics - Other, grade: 5.0, University of Zurich (Sozialökonomisches Institut (SOI)), language: English, abstract: Matching is the part of economics that deals with the question of who gets what, e.g. who gets which jobs, who goes to which university, who receives which organ or who marries whom. During the second part of the last century, many markets have been discovered to have failed in providing the necessary conditions for efficient matches. These market failures have partly evolved on ethical or institutional grounds, but are more generally attributed to congestion or coordination problems caused by the inability of the market to make it safe for participants to act on their private information. For this reason, a variety of allocation mechanisms have been developed and subsequently tested in field and laboratory experiments for possible implementation in real-world applications. This work attempts at giving a condensed review of different matching mechanisms and the performance of algorithms that have been implemented for solving the problems in their respective environments. The theoretical properties of these mechanisms as described in the increasingly vast literature on matching design will be used as a benchmark to compare their relative performance in terms of overall efficiency. The results yield some basic insights in the varying success of the competing algorithms in practice, indicating that both the quality of theoretical predictions and the actual performance of the algorithms decrease with the complexity of market environments. In particular, they show that imperfections of markets such as information asymmetry and incentive problems can have far-reaching consequences with respect to the effective working of matching procedures.
Author: Andreas Zweifel Publisher: GRIN Verlag ISBN: 3640579380 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 88
Book Description
Bachelor Thesis from the year 2009 in the subject Economics - Other, grade: 5.0, University of Zurich (Sozialökonomisches Institut (SOI)), language: English, abstract: Matching is the part of economics that deals with the question of who gets what, e.g. who gets which jobs, who goes to which university, who receives which organ or who marries whom. During the second part of the last century, many markets have been discovered to have failed in providing the necessary conditions for efficient matches. These market failures have partly evolved on ethical or institutional grounds, but are more generally attributed to congestion or coordination problems caused by the inability of the market to make it safe for participants to act on their private information. For this reason, a variety of allocation mechanisms have been developed and subsequently tested in field and laboratory experiments for possible implementation in real-world applications. This work attempts at giving a condensed review of different matching mechanisms and the performance of algorithms that have been implemented for solving the problems in their respective environments. The theoretical properties of these mechanisms as described in the increasingly vast literature on matching design will be used as a benchmark to compare their relative performance in terms of overall efficiency. The results yield some basic insights in the varying success of the competing algorithms in practice, indicating that both the quality of theoretical predictions and the actual performance of the algorithms decrease with the complexity of market environments. In particular, they show that imperfections of markets such as information asymmetry and incentive problems can have far-reaching consequences with respect to the effective working of matching procedures.
Author: Alvin E. Roth Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 1107782430 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 288
Book Description
Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann
Author: Philipp Markus Leitner Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
While most college admission markets are decentralized, the United Kingdom, home to one of the most prestigious markets for higher education, operates a centralized system. The thesis at hand analyses the efficiency of the match this system generates and its main determinants. The efficiency is found to be surprisingly high given the fact that the system for matching student and colleges deviates greatly from what has been identified to be optimal in theory. While the matching mechanism does in theory exhibit substantial flaws, these do not substantially affect the outcome in practice as students and colleges act highly rational and hereby ensure the functioning of the market.
Author: László Lovász Publisher: North Holland ISBN: 9780444879165 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 544
Book Description
This study of matching theory deals with bipartite matching, network flows, and presents fundamental results for the non-bipartite case. It goes on to study elementary bipartite graphs and elementary graphs in general. Further discussed are 2-matchings, general matching problems as linear programs, the Edmonds Matching Algorithm (and other algorithmic approaches), f-factors and vertex packing.
Author: Joanna Drummond Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Matching markets are ubiquitous, including college admissions, school choice, reviewer paper matching, and various labour market matchings. Many of these matching markets run centralized matching schemes, using algorithms to determine the resulting match. An important property for the matches provided by the clearing house is stability. The notion of stability, where no one in the market has both the incentive and the ability to change their partner, has been empirically shown to be a very valuable property in real-world markets. However, the mechanisms used in practice make assumptions that do not hold in practice. In this thesis, we investigate problems in this gap between theory and practice. We focus on assumptions regarding participants' preferences: the standard algorithms for this problem assume participants are able and willing to provide a full preference list, sometimes over tens of thousands of alternatives. The standard algorithms also assume participants' preferences can be expressed by a simple ordered list over individual alternatives: a false assumption when a pair of participants, a couple, are looking for a job in the same city. We use a variety of techniques to address these issues, ranging from heuristic preference elicitation schemes, to equilibria analysis of participants' behaviour in the market as-is, to using SAT solvers to develop new matching mechanisms with couples. Our SAT encoding exhibits improved performance, and allows for more guarantees regarding participants' strategic behavior under certain circumstances. We find, under some settings, a common interviewing strategy is not an equilibrium. This provides further evidence for the need of elicitation schemes; ours find stable matches with much less information than traditional methods.
Author: Roberto Brunelli Publisher: John Wiley & Sons ISBN: 9780470744048 Category : Science Languages : en Pages : 348
Book Description
The detection and recognition of objects in images is a key research topic in the computer vision community. Within this area, face recognition and interpretation has attracted increasing attention owing to the possibility of unveiling human perception mechanisms, and for the development of practical biometric systems. This book and the accompanying website, focus on template matching, a subset of object recognition techniques of wide applicability, which has proved to be particularly effective for face recognition applications. Using examples from face processing tasks throughout the book to illustrate more general object recognition approaches, Roberto Brunelli: examines the basics of digital image formation, highlighting points critical to the task of template matching; presents basic and advanced template matching techniques, targeting grey-level images, shapes and point sets; discusses recent pattern classification paradigms from a template matching perspective; illustrates the development of a real face recognition system; explores the use of advanced computer graphics techniques in the development of computer vision algorithms. Template Matching Techniques in Computer Vision is primarily aimed at practitioners working on the development of systems for effective object recognition such as biometrics, robot navigation, multimedia retrieval and landmark detection. It is also of interest to graduate students undertaking studies in these areas.
Author: Siqi Pan Publisher: ISBN: Category : Economics Languages : en Pages : 112
Book Description
This dissertation focuses on the design and implementation of matching markets where transfers are not available, such as college admissions, school choice, and certain labor markets. The results contribute to the literature from both a theoretical and a behavioral perspective, and may have policy implications for the design of some real-life matching markets. Chapter 1, “Exploding Offers and Unraveling in Two-Sided Matching Markets,” studies the unraveling problem prevalent in many two-sided matching markets that occurs when transactions become inefficiently early. In a two-period decentralized model, I examine whether the use of exploding offers can affect agents' early moving incentives. The results show that when the culture of the market allows firms to make exploding offers, unraveling is more likely to occur, leading to a less socially desirable matching outcome. A market with an excess supply of labor is less vulnerable to the presence of exploding offers; yet the conclusion is ambiguous for a market with a greater degree of uncertainty in early stages, which depends on the specific information structure. While a policy banning exploding offers tends to be supported by high quality firms and workers, it can be opposed by those of lower quality. This explains the prevalence of exploding offers in practice. Chapter 2, “Constrained School Choice and Information Acquisition,” investigates a common practice of many school choice programs in the field, where the length of students' submitted preference lists are constrained. In an environment where students have incomplete information about others’ preferences, I theoretically study the effect of such a constraint under both a Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA) and a Boston mechanism (BOS). The result shows that ex-ante stability can only be ensured under an unconstrained DA, but not under a constrained DA, an unconstrained BOS, or a constrained BOS. In a lab experiment, I find that the constraint also affects students’ information acquisition behavior. Specifically, when faced with a constraint, students tend to acquire less wasteful information and distribute more efforts to acquire relevant information under DA; such an effect is not significant under BOS. Overall, the constraint has a negative effect on efficiency and stability under both mechanisms. Chapter 3, “Targeted Advertising on Competing Platforms,” is jointly written with Huanxing Yang. We investigate targeted advertising in two-sided markets. Each of the two competing platforms has single-homing consumers on one side and multi-homing advertising firms on the other. We focus on how asymmetry in platforms’ targeting abilities translates into asymmetric equilibrium outcomes, and how changes in targeting ability affect the price and volume of ads, consumer welfare, and advertising firms' profits. We also compare social incentives and equilibrium incentives in investing in targeting ability. Chapter 4, “The Instability of Matching with Overconfident Agents: Laboratory and Field Investigations,” focuses on centralized college admissions markets where students are evaluated and allocated based on their performance on a standardized exam. A single exam’s measurement error causes the exam-based priorities to deviate from colleges' aptitude-based preferences: a student who underperforms in one exam may lose her placement at a preferred college to someone with a lower aptitude. The previous literature proposes a solution of combining a Boston algorithm with pre-exam preference submission. Under the assumption that students have perfect knowledge of their relative aptitudes before taking the exam, the suggested mechanism intends to trigger a self-sorting process, with students of higher (lower) aptitudes targeting more (less) preferred colleges. However, in a laboratory experiment, I find that such a self-sorting process is skewed by overconfidence, which leads to a welfare loss larger than the purported benefits. Moreover, the mechanism introduces unfairness by rewarding overconfidence and punishing underconfidence, thus serving as a gender penalty for women. I also analyze field data from Chinese high schools; the results suggest similar conclusions as in the lab.
Author: He, Xi Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 144
Book Description
Traditional methods such as gravity models and general equilibrium theory for two-sided network analysis focus mainly on characterizing the aggregate and macro-level outcomes of twosided interactions that commonly occur in a wide range of applications such as trade market, transportation, and migration. As customer-oriented service and human-centered design become more feasible in the information age, theories and models that capture and represent individual behaviors are crucial and essential for the studies on two-sided networks, i.e. in understanding the observations of two-sided interactions, forecasting future activities, and designing policies, platforms, markets and mechanisms to achieve desirable outcomes. For example, in international trade analysis, we need advanced agent-based theories and models to explain two-sided phenomena observed in trade, forecast trade levels, and design rules and platforms to promote fair and efficient market operations. Matching theory, one of the most exciting intellectual endeavors of human minds, promises, in the author's view, suitable methodologies and powerful analytical tools for the study of how the agents in a network or market make decisions and interact, hence how to formulate matching mechanisms for desirable outcomes. This dissertation aims to contribute to the matching literature by proposing and studying generalized matching, which expands the existing matching theory to multi-unit many-to-many matching with quota constraints. This is a more general and realistic framework for matching that happens in real world. First, models for two-sided and one-sided matching with newly defined preference relationships and solution concepts are developed to pave the theoretical foundation for analyzing multi-unit and multipartner matching with quota constraints. The corresponding new matching mechanisms are then designed to produce stable and favorable matching outcomes. Second, a hybrid model for generalized matching is established to encompass both one-sided and two-sided matching under the generalized framework. Again, the corresponding hybrid matching mechanism with desired properties is proposed and discussed. Next, linking the newly proposed theoretical work to empirical application, a novel bi-level estimation model is proposed for generalized matching to make inferences of agents' matching behaviors/decisions. Last but not least, the dissertation also points out the remaining challenges and offers opinions on directions and topics for future research.
Author: Andreas Zweifel
Author: Andreas Zweifel
Author: Alvin E. Roth
Author: 
Author: Philipp Markus Leitner
Author: Jian Liu
Author: László Lovász
Author: Joanna Drummond
Author: Roberto Brunelli
Author: Siqi Pan![Bilateral Interactions in Two-sided Networks [electronic Resource] PDF](https://books.google.com/books/content/images/frontcover/YupDAQAACAAJ?fife=w80-h100)
Author: He, Xi