Author: Randall E. WaldronPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 434
Book Description
Market Foreclosure and Strategic Vertical Integration in Successive Oligopolies
Author: Randall E. WaldronPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 434
Book Description
Three Essays on Successive Vertical Oligopolies
Author: Joon LimPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Oligopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 254
Book Description
Strategic Aspects of Oligopolistic Vertical Integration
Author: C. WuPublisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 1483296164
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 244
Book Description
In this text some fundamental issues concerning the strategic impact of vertical structures of firms are discussed in a successive oligopoly model. Vertical integration strategy has been identified as one of the key strategies which determine the success or failure of enterprises. Many studies on vertical integration are based on business experiences and interviews with managers. However, the extensive application of game theory in business economics allows this study on vertical integration to be based on sound theoretic ground. Moreover, the significance of public enterprises in some Western European economies and the trends of economic transition in Eastern Europe justify the efforts to analyse vertical integration issues in the mixed market, which is created by the participation of a public firm into an industry otherwise characterised as a successive oligopoly.
Market Size and Vertical Equilibrium in the Context of Successive Cournot Oligopolies
Author: Ivan DufeuPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 21
Book Description
This paper illustrates the effect of market size on the decision of whether or not firms should vertically integrate or disintegrate. We use a model of two successive stages of production with Cournot competition in each stage. In this model, firms choose to specialize (either upstream or downstream) or to integrate the two stages, before making their production decisions. The decision of whether or not to integrate or specialize depend on the trade-off between "escaping from" the double marginalization problem or the gain from specializing on the production stage in which the firm is more efficient. We show (using simulations) that more firms choose to be vertically integrated as the valuation of the final product or the number of consumers increase, unless the number of firms increases proportionately.
Vertical Integration, Foreclosure and Profits in the Presence of Double Marginalisation
Author: Gaudet, GérardPublisher: Montréal : CIRANO
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
Book Description
Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure
Author: Alexander SchraderPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Vertical Foreclosure, Tax Spinning and Oil Taxation in Oligopoly
Author: Alexander SchraderPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Oligopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Book Description
Vertical Ownership Without Control
Author: Patrick GreenleePublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition, Imperfect
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Book Description
Merge and Compete
Author: Filippo Vergara CaffarelliPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 52
Book Description
A Welfare Analysis of Market Foreclosure Due to Vertical Mergers by Oligopolists
Author: Michael Alvin SalingerPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Oligopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 23
Book Description