Global Financial Development Report 2019/2020 PDF Download

Author: Apanard Penny Prabha
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
This study analyzes the causes of the market discipline failure in the recent financial crisis. We argue that the most important market failure of informativeness was that large financial institutions had the incentive to remain opaque strategically so that outside investors could not assess their solvency. We also discuss how different debt-based and equity-based financial instruments provide more or less timely information by illustrating the behavior of different financial instruments (e.g., stock price indexes, credit default swaps and subordinated debt) around events associated with insolvency of some financial institutions during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Our paper concludes by laying out four “informativeness principles” for regulators and policy makers to follow with the objective to strengthen the incentives of market participants to acquire, analyze, disclose and signal information.

Author: World Bank
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 1464814961
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 281

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Book Description
Over a decade has passed since the collapse of the U.S. investment bank, Lehman Brothers, marked the onset of the largest global economic crisis since the Great Depression. The crisis revealed major shortcomings in market discipline, regulation and supervision, and reopened important policy debates on financial regulation. Since the onset of the crisis, emphasis has been placed on better regulation of banking systems and on enhancing the tools available to supervisory agencies to oversee banks and intervene speedily in case of distress. Drawing on ten years of data and analysis, Global Financial Development Report 2019/2020 provides evidence on the regulatory remedies adopted to prevent future financial troubles, and sheds light on important policy concerns. To what extent are regulatory reforms designed with high-income countries in mind appropriate for developing countries? What has been the impact of reforms on market discipline and bank capital? How should countries balance the political and social demands for a safety net for users of the financial system with potentially severe moral hazard consequences? Are higher capital requirements damaging to the flow of credit? How should capital regulation be designed to improve stability and access? The report provides a synthesis of what we know, as well as areas where more evidence is still needed. Global Financial Development Report 2019/2020 is the fifth in a World Bank series. The accompanying website tracks financial systems in more than 200 economies before, during, and after the global financial crisis (http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr) and provides information on how banking systems are regulated and supervised around the world (http://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/BRSS).

Author: C. E. V. Borio
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262025751
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 472

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Book Description
Leading academics and policymakers address the theory of market discipline and consider evidence across different industries and countries. The effectiveness of market discipline -- the strong built-in incentives that encourage banks and financial systems to operate soundly and efficiently -- commands much attention today, particularly in light of recent accounting scandals. As government discipline, in the form of regulation, seems to grows less effective as the banking industry and financial markets grow more complex, the role of market discipline becomes increasingly important. In this collection, which grew out of a conference cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, a diverse group of academics and policymakers address different aspects of the ability of market discipline to affect corporate behavior and performance. A major purpose of the book is to develop evidence on how market discipline operates across non-government regulated industries and in different countries, how successful it has been, and how it may transfer to a regulated industry. The chapters examine such topics as the theory of market discipline, evidence of market discipline in banking and other industries, evidence of market discipline for countries, the current state of corporate governance, and the interaction of market discipline and public policy.

Author: Mr.Timothy D. Lane
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451846150
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 50

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Book Description
Under what circumstances can market forces prevent unsustainable borrowing? Effective market discipline requires that capital markets be open, that; information on the borrower’s existing liabilities be readily available, that no bailout be anticipated, and that the borrower respond to market signals. This paper explores the implications of these conditions, and reviews some relevant empirical evidence.

Author: Daniel Bar Aharon
Publisher: BRILL
ISBN: 9004549072
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 71

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Book Description
In Financial Transparency & Information Asymmetry: A critical perspective of EU disclosure regime, Daniel Bar Aharon offers an interdisciplinary critical analysis addressing the inherent limitations mandated disclosure have on market discipline.

Author: Thorsten Beck
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Capital market
Languages : en
Pages : 43

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Book Description
Financial sector development fosters economic growth and reduces poverty by widening and broadening access to finance and allocating society's savings more efficiently. The author first discusses three pillars on which sound and efficient financial systems are built: macroeconomic stability and effective and reliable contractual and informational frameworks. He then describes three different approaches to government involvement in the financial sector: the laissez-faire view, the market-failure view and the market-enabling view. Finally, the author analyzes the sequencing of financial sector reforms and discusses the benefits and challenges that emerging markets face when opening their financial systems to international capital markets.

Author: Victoria Magdalena Vanasco
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 110

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Book Description
The stability of national and, increasingly more often, the global economy relies on well-functioning financial markets. Households' consumption and saving decisions, firms' investment choices, and governments' financing strategies critically depend on the stability of financial markets. These markets, however, are composed of individuals and institutions that may have different objectives, information sets, and beliefs, making them a very complex object that we do not fully comprehend. Motivated by this, my dissertation focuses on understanding how informational asymmetries and belief heterogeneity impact financial markets, and therefore, the macro economy. More specifically, this dissertation explores the sources of informational asymmetries among market participants. How do different financial market structures provide incentives for private information acquisition? Is information acquisition desirable? What types of policies can be implemented to increase liquidity and "discipline" in financial markets? Could business cycles be related to information or belief cycles? I tackle these questions from three separate angles. First, I study how alternative market designs bring forth different levels of private information generation, "market discipline," and liquidity. Second, I investigate how information sets of key market participants are determined. Finally, I focus on how information and belief fluctuations may affect key macroeconomic variables and economic fluctuations. In Chapter 1, ``Information Acquisition vs. Liquidity in Financial Markets," I propose a parsimonious framework to study markets for asset-backed securities (ABS). These markets play an important role in providing lending capacity to the banking industry by allowing banks to sell the cashflows of their loans and thus recycle capital and reduce the riskiness of their portfolios. In the financial crash of 2008, however, in which certain ABS played a substantial role, we witnessed a collapse in the issuance of all ABS classes. Given the importance of these markets for the real economy, policy makers in the US and Europe have geared their efforts towards reviving them. A good framework to think about these markets is imperative when thinking about financial regulation. The contribution of this chapter is to propose a model that captures the two main problems that have been shown to be present in the practice of securitization. First, the increase in securitization has led to a decline in lending standards, suggesting that liquid markets for ABS reduce incentives to issue good quality loans. Second, securitizers have used private information about loan quality when choosing which loans to securitize, indicating that a problem of asymmetric information is present in ABS markets. A natural question then arises: how should ABS be designed to provide incentives to issue good quality loans and, at the same time, to preserve liquidity and trade in these markets? To address this question, I propose a framework to study ABS where both incentives and liquidity issues are considered and linked through a loan issuer's information acquisition decision. Loan issuers acquire private information about potential borrowers, use this information to screen loans, and later design and sell securities backed by these loans when in need of funds. While information is beneficial ex-ante when used to screen loans, it becomes detrimental ex-post because it introduces a problem of adverse selection that hinders trade in ABS markets. The model matches key features of these markets, such as the issuance of senior and junior tranches, and it predicts that when gains from trade in ABS markets are `sufficiently' large, information acquisition and loan screening are inefficiently low. There are two channels that drive this inefficiency. First, when gains from trade are large, a loan issuer is tempted ex-post to sell a large portion of its cashflows and thus does not internalize that lower retention implements less information acquisition. Second, the presence of adverse selection in secondary markets creates informational rents for issuers holding low quality loans, reducing the value of loan screening. This suggests that incentives for loan screening not only depend on the portion of loans retained by issuers, but also on how the market prices the issued tranches. Turning to financial regulation, I characterize the optimal mechanism and show that it can be implemented with a simple tax scheme. The obtained results, therefore, contribute to the recent debate on how to regulate markets for ABS. In Chapter 2, I present joint work with Matthew Botsch, ``Learning by Lending, Do Banks Learn?" where we investigate how banks form their information sets about the quality of their borrowers. There is a vast empirical and theoretical literature that points to the importance of borrower-lender relationships for firms' access to credit. In this chapter, we investigate one particular mechanism through which long-term relationships might improve access to credit. We hypothesize that while lending to a firm, a bank receives signals that allow it to learn and better understand the firm's fundamentals; and that this learning is private; that is, it is information that is not fully reflected in publicly-observable variables. We test this hypothesis using a dataset for 7,618 syndicated loans made between 1987 and 2003. We construct a variable that proxies for firm quality and is unobservable by the bank, so it cannot be priced when the firm enters our sample. We show that the loading on this factor in the pricing equation increases with relationship time, hinting that banks are able to learn about firm quality when they are in an established relationship with the firm. Our finding is robust to controlling for market-wide learning about firm fundamentals. This suggests that a significant portion of bank learning is private and is not shared by all market participants. The results obtained in this study underpin one of the main assumptions of the model presented in Chapter 1: that banks have a special ability to privately acquire valuable information about potential borrowers. While the model is static, the data suggests that the process of lending and of information acquisition is a dynamic one. Consistent with this, the last chapter of this dissertation studies the macroeconomic implications of dynamic learning by financial intermediaries. Chapter 3 presents joint work with Vladimir Asriyan titled ``Informed Intermediation over the Cycle." In this paper, we construct a dynamic model of financial intermediation in which changes in the information held by financial intermediaries generate asymmetric credit cycles as the one observed in the data. We model financial intermediaries as ''expert'' agents who have a unique ability to acquire information about firm fundamentals. While the level of ''expertise'' in the economy grows in tandem with information that the ''experts'' possess, the gains from intermediation are hindered by informational asymmetries. We find the optimal financial contracts and show that the economy inherits not only the dynamic nature of information flow, but also the interaction of information with the contractual setting. We introduce a cyclical component to information by supposing that the fundamentals about which experts acquire information are stochastic. While persistence of fundamentals is essential for information to be valuable, their randomness acts as an opposing force and diminishes the value of expert learning. Our setting then features economic fluctuations due to waves of ``confidence'' in the intermediaries' ability to allocate funds profitably.

Author: George J. Benston
Publisher: American Enterprise Institute
ISBN: 9780844741246
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 156

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Book Description
Financial services regulation tends to be costly and unsympathetic to consumers. This book examines why that is the case and proposes and regulatory regime that would be more efficient and more responsive to consumer interests.

Author: Ferdinand Elfers
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : de
Pages :

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Author: H. Kent Baker
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118421485
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 758

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Book Description
A comprehensive guide to the dynamic area of finance known as market microstructure Interest in market microstructure has grown dramatically in recent years due largely in part to the rapid transformation of the financial market environment by technology, regulation, and globalization. Looking at market transactions at the most granular level—and taking into account market structure, price discovery, information flows, transaction costs, and the trading process—market microstructure also forms the basis of high-frequency trading strategies that can help professional investors generate profits and/or execute optimal transactions. Part of the Robert W. Kolb Series in Finance, Market Microstructure skillfully puts this discipline in perspective and examines how the working processes of markets impact transaction costs, prices, quotes, volume, and trading behavior. Along the way, it offers valuable insights on how specific features of the trading process like the existence of intermediaries or the environment in which trading takes place affect the price formation process. Explore issues including market structure and design, transaction costs, information flows, and disclosure Addresses market microstructure in emerging markets Covers the legal and regulatory issues impacting this area of finance Contains contributions from both experienced financial professionals and respected academics in this field If you're looking to gain a firm understanding of market microstructure, this book is the best place to start.