Market Definition and Market Power in Payment Card Networks PDF Download

Author: Eric Emch
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Affinity credit cards
Languages : en
Pages : 48

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Author: Lawrence J. White
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 18

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Antitrust and regulatory concerns continue to swirl around the payment cards industry, for understandable reasons: The industry is clearly not atomistic in structure; it has substantial network characteristics and thus embodies network externalities; it involves two-sided markets; and its two most prominent members -- Visa and MasterCard -- are network joint ventures of the banks that issue credit and debit cards to individual cardholders and that enroll (acquire) and service the merchants who accept those cards.These characteristics raise the possibility that the industry may not be fully competitive that market power may currently be present and/or may prospectively be created or enhanced as a consequence of a merger and thus raise potential policy concerns. But these same characteristics also cloud the standard against which the performance of the industry should be judged. And they complicate the analysis that is necessary to form judgments.This essay attempts to clarify some of these issues while exploring the same themes as does Emch and Thompson (2006): market definition, market power, and payment card networks.

Author: Erich Emch
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Author: Jens-Uwe Franck
Publisher: Centre on Regulation in Europe asbl (CERRE)
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 96

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With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sides of a platform, as the former naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on the two sides of the platform. While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under rare circumstances. To fully appreciate business activities in platform markets from a competition law point of view, and to do justice to competition law’s purpose, which is to protect consumer welfare, the legal concept of a “market” should not be interpreted as requiring a price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the “unpaid side” of the platform only indirectly by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the “paid side” of the platform. Such an approach would exclude certain activities and ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognize straightforwardly that there can be “markets” for products offered free of charge, i.e. without monetary consideration by those who receive the product. ASSESSMENT The application of competition law often requires an assessment of market power. Using market shares as indicators of market power, in addition to all the difficulties in standard markets, raises further issues for two-sided platforms. When calculating revenue shares, the only reasonable option is to use the sum of revenues on all sides of the platform. Then, such shares should not be interpreted as market shares as they are aggregated over two interdependent markets. Large revenue shares appear to be a meaningful indicator of market power if all undertakings under consideration serve the same sides. However, they are often not meaningful if undertakings active in the relevant markets follow different business models. Given potentially strong cross-group external effects, market shares are less apt in the context of two-sided platforms to indicate market power (or the lack of it). Barriers to entry are at the core of persistent market power and, thus, the entrenchment of incumbent platforms. They deserve careful examination by competition authorities. Barriers to entry may arise due to users’ coordination failure in the presence of network effect. On two-sided platforms, users on both sides of the market have to coordinate their expectations. Barriers to entry are more likely to be present if an industry does not attract new users and if it does not undergo major technological change. Switching costs and network effects may go hand in hand: consumer switching costs sometimes depend on the number of platform users and, in this case, barriers to entry from consumer switching costs increase with platform size. Since market power is related to barriers to entry, the absence of entry attempts may be seen as an indication of market power. However, entry threats may arise from firms offering quite different services, as long as they provide a new home for users’ attention and needs.

Author: J. Gregory Sidak
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 11

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In September 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision that recognized and applied important economic principles concerning the antitrust analysis of single-firm conduct in two-sided markets. The Second Circuit reversed a February 2015 decision of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York that found Amex's “non-discriminatory provisions” (NDPs), which prohibited merchants from steering customers toward using other credit cards that charge lower merchant fees, unreasonably restrained trade and violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. Specifically, the district court found that the government had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Amex's use of NDPs created an environment in which credit-card networks had little incentive to lower merchant fees, which allegedly restricted interbrand competition among those networks. The Second Circuit, however, found that the district court's analysis focused erroneously on only the merchant side of the market. Consequently, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's conclusions that Amex possessed significant market power and that its NDPs had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole. In a two-sided market, network externalities exist between the two sides. The value that a consumer on one side of the market derives from her consumption of the good or service increases as the number of consumers on the other side of the market increases. Hence, the proper definition of a two-sided market must focus on how a hypothetical monopolist's small but significant and nontransitory increase in price (SSNIP) on one side of the market would affect demand on both sides of the market. Similarly, a two-sided market analysis is necessary to examine the effects that the challenged conduct has on market competition. Examining only one side of the market would necessarily distort the outcome of that analysis and could condemn legitimate business conduct that enhances, rather than decreases, consumer welfare.

Author: Robert S. Pindyck
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 26

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I discuss the antitrust suit brought by the U.S. Department of Justice against Visa and MasterCard in 1998. Banks that issue Visa cards are free to also issue MasterCard cards, and vice versa, and many banks issue the cards of both networks. However, both Visa and MasterCard had rules prohibiting member banks from also issuing the cards of other networks, in particular American Express and Discover. In addition, most banks are members of both the Visa and MasterCard networks, so governance is to some extent shared. The DOJ claimed that restrictions on issuance and shared governance were anticompetitive and should be prohibited. Visa and MasterCard argued that these practices were procompetitive. The case raised important questions: Given that many banks issue both Visa and MasterCard, and that most merchants that accept one also accept the other, do the two networks really compete, and if so, how? And do Visa and/or MasterCard have market power, if so, in what market, and how is it exercised?

Author: Bin Grace Li
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484399625
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 48

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Book Description
It takes many years for more efficient electronic payments to be widely used, and the fees that merchants (consumers) pay for using those services are increasing (decreasing) over time. We address these puzzles by studying payments system evolution with a dynamic model in a twosided market setting. We calibrate the model to the U.S. payment card data, and conduct welfare and policy analysis. Our analysis shows that the market power of electronic payment networks plays important roles in explaining the slow adoption and asymmetric price changes, and the welfare impact of regulations may vary significantly through the endogenous R&D channel.

Author: Louis Kaplow
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Market definition and market power are central features of competition law and practice but pose serious challenges. On one hand, market definition suffers decisive logical infirmities that render it infeasible, unnecessary, and counterproductive, and the practice of stating market power requirements as market share threshold tests is incoherent as a matter of empirics and policy. On the other hand, market power is often probative of the desirability of liability, yet the typically assumed functional relationship is unexplored and often implausible. These latter deficiencies are addressed through a ground-up analysis of the channels by which market power can be relevant. It is important to explicitly and simultaneously consider both anticompetitive and procompetitive explanations for challenged practices and to attend to the magnitudes of the social consequences of correct and mistaken imposition of liability in order to identify the various ways and senses in which market power bears on optimal decision-making.

Author: David S. Evans
Publisher: Harvard Business Review Press
ISBN: 163369173X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 271

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A different kind of matchmaker. Many of the most dynamic public companies, from Alibaba to Facebook to Visa, and the most valuable start-ups, such as Airbnb and Uber, are matchmakers that connect one group of customers with another group of customers. Economists call matchmakers multisided platforms because they provide physical or virtual platforms for multiple groups to get together. Dating sites connect people with potential matches, for example, and ride-sharing apps do the same for drivers and riders. Although matchmakers have been around for millennia, they’re becoming more and more popular—and profitable—due to dramatic advances in technology, and a lot of companies that have managed to crack the code of this business model have become today’s power brokers. Don’t let the flashy successes fool you, though. Starting a matchmaker is one of the toughest business challenges, and almost everyone who tries to build one, fails. In Matchmakers, David Evans and Richard Schmalensee, two economists who were among the first to analyze multisided platforms and discover their principles, and who’ve consulted for some of the most successful platform businesses in the world, explain how matchmakers work best in practice, why they do what they do, and how entrepreneurs can improve their chances for success. Whether you’re an entrepreneur, an investor, a consumer, or an executive, your future will involve more and more multisided platforms, and Matchmakers—rich with stories from platform winners and losers—is the one book you’ll need in order to navigate this appealing but confusing world.

Author: Ariel Ezrachi
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674545478
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 365

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“A fascinating book about how platform internet companies (Amazon, Facebook, and so on) are changing the norms of economic competition.” —Fast Company Shoppers with a bargain-hunting impulse and internet access can find a universe of products at their fingertips. But is there a dark side to internet commerce? This thought-provoking exposé invites us to explore how sophisticated algorithms and data-crunching are changing the nature of market competition, and not always for the better. Introducing into the policy lexicon terms such as algorithmic collusion, behavioral discrimination, and super-platforms, Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke explore the resulting impact on competition, our democratic ideals, our wallets, and our well-being. “We owe the authors our deep gratitude for anticipating and explaining the consequences of living in a world in which black boxes collude and leave no trails behind. They make it clear that in a world of big data and algorithmic pricing, consumers are outgunned and antitrust laws are outdated, especially in the United States.” —Science “A convincing argument that there can be a darker side to the growth of digital commerce. The replacement of the invisible hand of competition by the digitized hand of internet commerce can give rise to anticompetitive behavior that the competition authorities are ill equipped to deal with.” —Burton G. Malkiel, Wall Street Journal “A convincing case for the need to rethink competition law to cope with algorithmic capitalism’s potential for malfeasance.” —John Naughton, The Observer