Author: Lucian A. Bebchuk
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 9780674020634
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Pay Without Performance
Author: Lucian A. Bebchuk
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 9780674020634
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 9780674020634
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance
Author: Benjamin Hermalin
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0444635408
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 762
Book Description
The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. - Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on - Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces - Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field's substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0444635408
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 762
Book Description
The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. - Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on - Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces - Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field's substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward
Manipulation Effects of Managerial Discretion on Executive Compensation
Author: Changzheng Zhang
Publisher: Nova Science Publishers
ISBN: 9781634846806
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 225
Book Description
Facing with the ever increasing change of the business environment, the firms have recognized that their persistent competitive edge increasingly depends on whether or not they own the dedicated, experienced and capable CEOs. In the global practice, more and more firms have tried, or are trying, or will try to change their CEOs in order to get higher firm performance or just to get out of recession. Especially it is true in China. However, in theory, the literature in the related fields, such as the corporate governance, the strategic human resource management, the strategy management, the principal-agent theory and so on, has only addressed how to arrange managerial discretion and executive compensation reasonably under the normal circumstances, while ignoring the conditions of CEO change. Therefore, each stakeholder in the post-CEO change period has no clear theoretical guidances on how to reallocate managerial discretion and reset executive compensation for the fresh CEOs. Such a theoretical research gap has leaded to a large number of failures in the issue of CEO change. In order to make up this gap, this book tries to investigate the relationship between managerial discretion and executive compensation under the conditions of CEO change, which can not only practically guide the re-balancing of the corporate governance and further improve the success possibility of CEO change, but can theoretically enrich the contributions in managerial discretion approach and executive compensation theory. Based on the comparative study perspective, by drawing on the data from Chinese listed companies as the sample and adopting the Correlation Analysis, Multiple Linear Regression and Hierarchical Models as the statistical analysis methods, the book investigates how managerial discretion, respectively for the fresh CEOs and the senior CEOs, manipulates each dimension of executive compensation, i.e. executive compensation level, CEO pay-performance sensitivity, executive compensation gap and executive-employee compensation gap. The book makes two valuable new findings: First, the book confirms that both the fresh CEOs and the senior CEOs have the motives and capabilities to manipulate each dimension of executive compensation, but varying by intent and intention; Second, the book proves that the fresh CEOs show higher firm-serving motives when they manipulate each dimension of executive compensation by performing managerial discretion, while the senior CEOs show relatively higher self-serving motives. Based on the research results, the book builds the fresh-keeping mechanisms of firm-serving motives of the fresh CEOs during their whole CEO tenure, which are of great meanings for the government, the scholars and the practitioners and so on.
Publisher: Nova Science Publishers
ISBN: 9781634846806
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 225
Book Description
Facing with the ever increasing change of the business environment, the firms have recognized that their persistent competitive edge increasingly depends on whether or not they own the dedicated, experienced and capable CEOs. In the global practice, more and more firms have tried, or are trying, or will try to change their CEOs in order to get higher firm performance or just to get out of recession. Especially it is true in China. However, in theory, the literature in the related fields, such as the corporate governance, the strategic human resource management, the strategy management, the principal-agent theory and so on, has only addressed how to arrange managerial discretion and executive compensation reasonably under the normal circumstances, while ignoring the conditions of CEO change. Therefore, each stakeholder in the post-CEO change period has no clear theoretical guidances on how to reallocate managerial discretion and reset executive compensation for the fresh CEOs. Such a theoretical research gap has leaded to a large number of failures in the issue of CEO change. In order to make up this gap, this book tries to investigate the relationship between managerial discretion and executive compensation under the conditions of CEO change, which can not only practically guide the re-balancing of the corporate governance and further improve the success possibility of CEO change, but can theoretically enrich the contributions in managerial discretion approach and executive compensation theory. Based on the comparative study perspective, by drawing on the data from Chinese listed companies as the sample and adopting the Correlation Analysis, Multiple Linear Regression and Hierarchical Models as the statistical analysis methods, the book investigates how managerial discretion, respectively for the fresh CEOs and the senior CEOs, manipulates each dimension of executive compensation, i.e. executive compensation level, CEO pay-performance sensitivity, executive compensation gap and executive-employee compensation gap. The book makes two valuable new findings: First, the book confirms that both the fresh CEOs and the senior CEOs have the motives and capabilities to manipulate each dimension of executive compensation, but varying by intent and intention; Second, the book proves that the fresh CEOs show higher firm-serving motives when they manipulate each dimension of executive compensation by performing managerial discretion, while the senior CEOs show relatively higher self-serving motives. Based on the research results, the book builds the fresh-keeping mechanisms of firm-serving motives of the fresh CEOs during their whole CEO tenure, which are of great meanings for the government, the scholars and the practitioners and so on.
Evidence on the Tradeoff Between Real Manipulation and Accrual Manipulation: to 25; Pages:26 to 50; Pages:51 to 75; Pages:76 to 100; Pages:101 to 120
Author: Amy Yunzhi Zang
Publisher: ProQuest
ISBN: 9780549163251
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 120
Book Description
Publisher: ProQuest
ISBN: 9780549163251
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 120
Book Description
Manipulation Effect of Managerial Discretion on Managerial Compensation
Author: Changzheng Zhang
Publisher: Nova Science Pub Incorporated
ISBN: 9781608764600
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 213
Book Description
Recently, scholars and practitioners have focused on the inverse relationship between managerial payment and corporate performance, which shows how the principle-agent theory cannot adequately explain the decision mechanism of managerial payment. Based on the Managerial Power Approach, the book brings managerial discretion into the investigation on managerial pay. The book makes contributions such as: it constructs measurement index system of managerial discretion based on public reports. The classical ERIC questionnaire measures managerial discretion directly from CEO's by 63 items, while the book divides managerial discretion into resource co-operation power, structure-position power and expertise-reputation power, and then measures them by public report. The two methods have the similar results, and this method has the advantage of being low cost, and easily carried out. It confirms that managerial discretion can manipulate the managerial pay level by the regression analysis of managerial discretion and managerial pay level. It also confirms that the pay level goes beyond the reasonable level too much with the accretion of managerial discretion, which shows that the manipulation effect on pay level does exist. then the book describes the manipulation effect quantitatively. By curve estimation of monitoring intensity effect on manipulation effect, it also gives other relationship curves between them, which shows that the manipulation effect decreases significantly with the accretion of managerial discretion. The book constructs pay performance sensitivity model based managerial discretion. Based on Saltuk Model, the book brings managerial discretion and proves that managerial discretion and pay-performance sensitivity are negatively associated. Then the book confirms that pay performance sensitivity will decrease with an increase of managerial discretion by regressional analysis.
Publisher: Nova Science Pub Incorporated
ISBN: 9781608764600
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 213
Book Description
Recently, scholars and practitioners have focused on the inverse relationship between managerial payment and corporate performance, which shows how the principle-agent theory cannot adequately explain the decision mechanism of managerial payment. Based on the Managerial Power Approach, the book brings managerial discretion into the investigation on managerial pay. The book makes contributions such as: it constructs measurement index system of managerial discretion based on public reports. The classical ERIC questionnaire measures managerial discretion directly from CEO's by 63 items, while the book divides managerial discretion into resource co-operation power, structure-position power and expertise-reputation power, and then measures them by public report. The two methods have the similar results, and this method has the advantage of being low cost, and easily carried out. It confirms that managerial discretion can manipulate the managerial pay level by the regression analysis of managerial discretion and managerial pay level. It also confirms that the pay level goes beyond the reasonable level too much with the accretion of managerial discretion, which shows that the manipulation effect on pay level does exist. then the book describes the manipulation effect quantitatively. By curve estimation of monitoring intensity effect on manipulation effect, it also gives other relationship curves between them, which shows that the manipulation effect decreases significantly with the accretion of managerial discretion. The book constructs pay performance sensitivity model based managerial discretion. Based on Saltuk Model, the book brings managerial discretion and proves that managerial discretion and pay-performance sensitivity are negatively associated. Then the book confirms that pay performance sensitivity will decrease with an increase of managerial discretion by regressional analysis.
Compensation and Organizational Performance
Author: Luis R. Gomez-Mejia
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317473965
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 405
Book Description
This up-to-date, research-oriented textbook focuses on the relationship between compensation systems and firm overall performance. In contrast to more traditional compensation texts, it provides a strategic perspective to compensation administration rather than a functional viewpoint. The text emphasizes the role of managerial pay, its importance, determinants, and impact on organizations. It analyzes recent topics in executive compensation, such as pay in high technology firms, managerial risk taking, rewards in family companies, and the link between compensation and social responsibility and ethical issues, among others. The authors provide a thorough and comprehensive review of the vast literatures relevant to compensation and revisit debates grounded in different theoretical perspectives. They provide insights from disciplines as diverse as management, economics, sociology, and psychology, and amplify previous discussions with the latest empirical findings on compensation, its dynamics, and its contribution to firm overall performance.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317473965
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 405
Book Description
This up-to-date, research-oriented textbook focuses on the relationship between compensation systems and firm overall performance. In contrast to more traditional compensation texts, it provides a strategic perspective to compensation administration rather than a functional viewpoint. The text emphasizes the role of managerial pay, its importance, determinants, and impact on organizations. It analyzes recent topics in executive compensation, such as pay in high technology firms, managerial risk taking, rewards in family companies, and the link between compensation and social responsibility and ethical issues, among others. The authors provide a thorough and comprehensive review of the vast literatures relevant to compensation and revisit debates grounded in different theoretical perspectives. They provide insights from disciplines as diverse as management, economics, sociology, and psychology, and amplify previous discussions with the latest empirical findings on compensation, its dynamics, and its contribution to firm overall performance.
Handbook Of Financial Econometrics, Mathematics, Statistics, And Machine Learning (In 4 Volumes)
Author: Cheng Few Lee
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9811202400
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 5053
Book Description
This four-volume handbook covers important concepts and tools used in the fields of financial econometrics, mathematics, statistics, and machine learning. Econometric methods have been applied in asset pricing, corporate finance, international finance, options and futures, risk management, and in stress testing for financial institutions. This handbook discusses a variety of econometric methods, including single equation multiple regression, simultaneous equation regression, and panel data analysis, among others. It also covers statistical distributions, such as the binomial and log normal distributions, in light of their applications to portfolio theory and asset management in addition to their use in research regarding options and futures contracts.In both theory and methodology, we need to rely upon mathematics, which includes linear algebra, geometry, differential equations, Stochastic differential equation (Ito calculus), optimization, constrained optimization, and others. These forms of mathematics have been used to derive capital market line, security market line (capital asset pricing model), option pricing model, portfolio analysis, and others.In recent times, an increased importance has been given to computer technology in financial research. Different computer languages and programming techniques are important tools for empirical research in finance. Hence, simulation, machine learning, big data, and financial payments are explored in this handbook.Led by Distinguished Professor Cheng Few Lee from Rutgers University, this multi-volume work integrates theoretical, methodological, and practical issues based on his years of academic and industry experience.
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9811202400
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 5053
Book Description
This four-volume handbook covers important concepts and tools used in the fields of financial econometrics, mathematics, statistics, and machine learning. Econometric methods have been applied in asset pricing, corporate finance, international finance, options and futures, risk management, and in stress testing for financial institutions. This handbook discusses a variety of econometric methods, including single equation multiple regression, simultaneous equation regression, and panel data analysis, among others. It also covers statistical distributions, such as the binomial and log normal distributions, in light of their applications to portfolio theory and asset management in addition to their use in research regarding options and futures contracts.In both theory and methodology, we need to rely upon mathematics, which includes linear algebra, geometry, differential equations, Stochastic differential equation (Ito calculus), optimization, constrained optimization, and others. These forms of mathematics have been used to derive capital market line, security market line (capital asset pricing model), option pricing model, portfolio analysis, and others.In recent times, an increased importance has been given to computer technology in financial research. Different computer languages and programming techniques are important tools for empirical research in finance. Hence, simulation, machine learning, big data, and financial payments are explored in this handbook.Led by Distinguished Professor Cheng Few Lee from Rutgers University, this multi-volume work integrates theoretical, methodological, and practical issues based on his years of academic and industry experience.
Working Beyond 60
Author: G. Reday-Mulvey
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230504981
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 234
Book Description
While the question to why work beyond sixty has now become obvious, the how and for whom questions are the real topic of this new study by one of the best European specialists in the area. Work after sixty - if it is to be feasible and widespread - has to be on a part-time basis to meet the wishes and needs of workers and companies. This book provides an in-depth analysis of the growing importance of work beyond sixty and a comparative discussion of new policies in several EU Member States as well as of company practice.
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230504981
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 234
Book Description
While the question to why work beyond sixty has now become obvious, the how and for whom questions are the real topic of this new study by one of the best European specialists in the area. Work after sixty - if it is to be feasible and widespread - has to be on a part-time basis to meet the wishes and needs of workers and companies. This book provides an in-depth analysis of the growing importance of work beyond sixty and a comparative discussion of new policies in several EU Member States as well as of company practice.
Advances in Management Accounting
Author: Marc J. Epstein
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 1849507546
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 265
Book Description
A management accounting research journal. It features articles on a variety of topics in management accounting that are relevant to researchers in both practice and academe. It intends to meet the needs of management accounting scholars.
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 1849507546
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 265
Book Description
A management accounting research journal. It features articles on a variety of topics in management accounting that are relevant to researchers in both practice and academe. It intends to meet the needs of management accounting scholars.
Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law
Author: Andrew S. Gold
Publisher:
ISBN: 0198701721
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 449
Book Description
Fiduciary law is one of the most important areas of law, governing a wide range of relationships that affect people in their daily lives. These new and innovative essays explore the foundations of fiduciary relationships and the duties of loyalty fiduciaries owe to their beneficiaries.
Publisher:
ISBN: 0198701721
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 449
Book Description
Fiduciary law is one of the most important areas of law, governing a wide range of relationships that affect people in their daily lives. These new and innovative essays explore the foundations of fiduciary relationships and the duties of loyalty fiduciaries owe to their beneficiaries.