Mandatory Vs. Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers PDF Download

Author: Michael J. Fishman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
Numerous rules mandate the disclosure of sellers' information. This article analyzes two questions regarding disclosure: (i) Why wouldn't sellers voluntarily disclose their information? and (ii) Who gains and who loses with mandatory disclosure? Previous analyses assume that all customers are knowledgeable enough to understand a seller's disclosure, and a key result is that there is no role for mandatory disclosure. Either voluntary disclosure is forthcoming, or if it is not, no one prefers mandatory disclosure. We generalize the standard model by considering the case in which not all customers understand a seller's disclosure. We show that if the fraction of customers who can understand a disclosure is too low, voluntary disclosure may not be forthcoming. If so, mandatory disclosure benefits informed customers, is neutral for uninformed customers, and harms the seller. Our results suggest that we should find mandatory disclosure in markets where product information is relatively difficult to understand.

Author: A. Mitchell Polinsky
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
We analyze a model in which firms are able to acquire information about product risks and may or may not be required to disclose this information. We initially study the effect of disclosure rules assuming that firms are not liable for the harm caused by their products. Although mandatory disclosure obviously is superior to voluntary disclosure given the information about product risks that firms possess - since such information has value to consumers - voluntary disclosure induces firms to acquire more information about product risks because they can keep silent if the information is unfavorable. The latter effect could lead to higher social welfare under voluntary disclosure. The same results hold if firms are liable for harm under the negligence standard of liability. Under strict liability, however, firms are indifferent about revealing information concerning product risk, and mandatory and voluntary disclosure rules are equivalent.

Author: Omri Ben-Shahar
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691161704
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 239

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Book Description
How mandated disclosure took over the regulatory landscape—and why it failed Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosure—requiring one party to a transaction to give the other information. It is the iTunes terms you assent to, the doctor's consent form you sign, the pile of papers you get with your mortgage. Reading the terms, the form, and the papers is supposed to equip you to choose your purchase, your treatment, and your loan well. More Than You Wanted to Know surveys the evidence and finds that mandated disclosure rarely works. But how could it? Who reads these disclosures? Who understands them? Who uses them to make better choices? Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider put the regulatory problem in human terms. Most people find disclosures complex, obscure, and dull. Most people make choices by stripping information away, not layering it on. Most people find they can safely ignore most disclosures and that they lack the literacy to analyze them anyway. And so many disclosures are mandated that nobody could heed them all. Nor can all this be changed by simpler forms in plainer English, since complex things cannot be made simple by better writing. Furthermore, disclosure is a lawmakers' panacea, so they keep issuing new mandates and expanding old ones, often instead of taking on the hard work of writing regulations with bite. Timely and provocative, More Than You Wanted to Know takes on the form of regulation we encounter daily and asks why we must encounter it at all.

Author: Yale Law Journal
Publisher: Quid Pro Books
ISBN: 1610279085
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 258

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Book Description
One of the world's leading law journals is available in quality ebook formats. This issue of The Yale Law Journal (the third of Volume 122, academic year 2012-2013) features new articles and essays on law and legal theory by internationally recognized scholars. Contents include: • John H. Langbein, "The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States" • Daniel E. Ho, "Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading" • Saul Levmore & Ariel Porat, "Asymmetries and Incentives in Plea Bargaining and Evidence Production" The issue also includes extensive student research on targeted killings of international outlaws, Confrontation Clause jurisprudence as implemented in lower courts, and the implied license doctrine of copyright law as applied to news aggregators. Ebook formatting includes linked footnotes and an active Table of Contents (including linked Tables of Contents for all individual articles and essays), as well as active URLs in notes and extensive tables, and properly presented figures and tables.

Author: Roberta Romano
Publisher: American Enterprise Institute
ISBN: 9780844741734
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 316

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Book Description
In this analysis of securities regulation, the author demonstrates that the current approach toward U.S. regulation - exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission - is misguided and should be revamped by implementing a regime of competitive federalism. Under such a system firms would select their regulator from among the states, the SEC, or other nations. The author asserts that competitive federalism harnesses the high-powered incentives of markets to the regulatory state to produce regulatory arrangements most compatible with investors' preferences. The author contends that the empirical evidence does not indicate that the SEC is effective in achieving its stated objectives. The commission's expansions of disclosure requirements over the years have not significantly enhanced investors' wealth. In addition, she asserts, evidence from institutional equity and debt markets and cross-country listing practices demonstrates that firms voluntarily disclose substantial information beyond mandatory requirements to provide the information investors demand. The author concludes that under competitive federalism, the aspects of the SEC's regime that are valuable to investors will be retained, those that are not will be discarded, and the resulting securities regime will better meet investors' needs than the present one.

Author: Moriki Hosoe
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 9811533008
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 201

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Book Description
This book examines interesting new topics in applied economics from the perspectives of the economics of information and risk, two fields of economics that address the consequences of asymmetric information, environmental risk and uncertainty for the nature and efficiency of interactions between individuals and organizations. In the economics of information, the essential task is to examine the condition of asymmetric information under which the information gap is exploited. For the economics of risk, it is important to investigate types of behavior including risk aversion, risk sharing, and risk prevention, and to reexamine the classical expected utility approach and the relationships among several types of the changes in risk. Few books have ever analyzed topics in applied economics with regard to information and risk. This book provides a comprehensive collection of applied analyses, while also revisiting certain basic concepts in the economics of information and risk. The book consists of two parts. In Part I, several aspects of applied economics are investigated, including public policy, labor economics, and political economics, from the standpoint of the economics of (asymmetric) information. First, several basic frameworks of the incentive mechanism with regard to transaction-specific investment are assessed, then various tools for market design and organization design are explored. In Part II, mathematical measures of risk and risk aversion are examined in more detail, and readers are introduced to stochastic selection rules governing choice behavior under uncertainty. Several types of change in the random variable for the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and probability distribution function (PDF) are discussed. In closing, the part investigates the comparative static results of these changes in CDF or PDF on the general decision model, incorporating uncertain situations in applied economics.

Author: Alexander Tabarrok
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199728097
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 329

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Book Description
This intriguing collection is designed to show how economists can play a more active role in designing and directing the nation's social institutions. By taking the task of political economy seriously, the contributors (including some of today's most distinguished economists) reveal the power of economic thought to offer innovative solutions to some of the most difficult problems facing society today. By creating markets where none existed before, the authors propose efficient, reliable, and profitable improvements to current systems of health insurance, financial markets, human organ distribution, judicial practice, bankruptcy and securities regulation, patenting, and transportation. Written in the entrepreneurial spirit, these essays show economics to be an ambitious, dynamic, and far-from-dismal science.

Author: Chandra Kanodia
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
ISBN: 1601980620
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 105

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Book Description
Kanodia presents a new approach to the study of accounting measurement that argues that how firms' economic transactions, earnings, and capital flows are measured and reported to the capital markets has substantial effects on the firms' real decisions and on the allocation of resources.

Author: Klaus J. Hopt
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 9780198268888
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1304

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Book Description
"This book goes back to a symposium held at the Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law in Hamburg on May 15-17 1997"--P. [v].

Author: Paul Latimer
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319094599
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 251

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Book Description
This book provides a unique comparative and global analysis of the regulation of disclosure in financial (securities) markets. It is written by two authors who represent both the new world (Australia) and the old world (Germany). The authors present their research in the global business context, with legal and regulatory perspectives including some references from Africa, Asia, the Middle East and South America. After every “boom” and “bust”, legislators pass new disclosure legislation, often in a heated environment fuelled by politics and the media. Little regard is paid to existing regulation or the lessons learned from earlier regulation. The result is the continuing enactment of redundant and overlapping disclosure laws. Since financial markets are often described as markets for information, the failure to ensure disclosure is at the heart of financial services regulation. This book argues that the solution to the failure of disclosure is a brief, easily understood, principles-based, plain English safety-net amendment to statute law such as “you must keep the financial market fully informed”, a measure that would support effective mandatory continuous disclosure of information to financial markets. This book examines the reasons for disclosure regulation, and how the efficient operation of financial markets is dependent on disclosure. It examines the adequacy of common law and civil law concerning broker/client disclosure, and concludes that industry licensing in itself fails to keep the market informed. While recognizing the failures of securities commissions to achieve good disclosure in financial markets, it confirms the effectiveness of coregulation of disclosure by a commission with the support of the financial markets (such as the stock exchange). Coregulation builds on financial market self-regulation, and is best described in the words of one-time SEC Chairman William O. Douglas, who, in the 1930s, described it as a shotgun behind the door.