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Author: Rüdiger Fahlenbrach Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 49
Book Description
From 1988 to 2003, the average change in managerial ownership is significantly negative every year for American firms. We find that managers are more likely to significantly decrease their ownership when their firms are performing well and more likely to increase their ownership when their firms become financially constrained. When controlling for past stock returns, we find that large increases in managerial ownership increase q. This result is driven by increases in shares held by officers, while increases in shares held by directors appear unrelated to changes in firm value. There is no evidence that large decreases in ownership have an adverse impact on firm value. We rely on the dynamics of the managerial ownership/firm value relation to mitigate concerns in the literature about the endogeneity of managerial ownership.
Author: Rüdiger Fahlenbrach Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 49
Book Description
From 1988 to 2003, the average change in managerial ownership is significantly negative every year for American firms. We find that managers are more likely to significantly decrease their ownership when their firms are performing well and more likely to increase their ownership when their firms become financially constrained. When controlling for past stock returns, we find that large increases in managerial ownership increase q. This result is driven by increases in shares held by officers, while increases in shares held by directors appear unrelated to changes in firm value. There is no evidence that large decreases in ownership have an adverse impact on firm value. We rely on the dynamics of the managerial ownership/firm value relation to mitigate concerns in the literature about the endogeneity of managerial ownership.
Author: Moon H. Song Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This study explores the relation between managerial ownership and firm value by examining a sample of firms that announce dual class recapitalizations and the insider trading activity that precede these announcements. Insider trading activity, unlike the recapitalization, requires managers to commit their personal wealth and therefore serves as an indicator of the motivation behind the recapitalization. The recapitalization, in effect, allows managers to magnify the increase in vote ownership that results from insider buying and offsets the reduction in vote ownership that results from insider selling. This study adds to our understanding of dual class recapitalizations by linking the wealth effects and changes in ownership concentration with manager-shareholder agency issues that result from the recapitalization and insider trading activity. Results show a positive relation between the change in firm value and ownership for recapitalizations before the 1984 New York Stock Exchange moratorium on delisting dual class firms when ownership was high and control was firmly established. A negative relation exists for recapitalizations since 1984 when ownership levels were lower and voting control not assured. Results support the notion that more recent recapitalizations entrenched managers.
Author: Bradley W. Benson Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 40
Book Description
Whether equity-based compensation and equity ownership aligns the interests of managers with stockholders is an important question in finance. Early studies found an inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm value, but later studies using firm fixed effects found no relation. Managerial ownership levels change very slowly over time which may mask an ownership effect on firm value when using a fixed effect model. This is due to a much smaller within firm variation than between firm variation. We demonstrate that using pay-performance semi-elasticity, rather than pay-performance sensitivity as a measure of managerial ownership incentives, results in meaningful variation within firm over time. The greater within firm variation increases the power to detect a relation between managerial ownership and firm value with fixed effect regressions. As in the early research on this issue, we find a significant inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q in fixed effects regressions and after controlling for endogeneity with both two-stage and three-stage least squares regressions. Our results are consistent with incentive alignment at low levels and risk aversion at high levels of managerial ownership.
Author: Cheng-Few Lee Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 0387262849 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 861
Book Description
This is a major new reference work covering all aspects of finance. Coverage includes finance (financial management, security analysis, portfolio management, financial markets and instruments, insurance, real estate, options and futures, international finance) and statistical applications in finance (applications in portfolio analysis, option pricing models and financial research). The project is designed to attract both an academic and professional market. It also has an international approach to ensure its maximum appeal. The Editors' wish is that the readers will find the encyclopedia to be an invaluable resource.
Author: Bradley Warren Benson Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 452
Book Description
Managerial ownership levels change slowly over time. The slow change masks a significant ownership effect when testing the relation between managerial ownership and firm value using firm fixed effects to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity because of much smaller within variation than between variation. I demonstrate that using pay-performance semi-elasticity as a measure of managerial ownership incentives results in meaningful changes within firm over time. The greater within firm variation amplifies the effect size and increases the power to detect a relation between managerial ownership and firm value in firm fixed effects regressions. Using pay-performance semi-elasticity, I find a significant hump shaped relation between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q in firm fixed effects regressions and two-stage least squares regressions with firm fixed effects to control for endogeneity. My results contradict the results of previous studies which find no relation between managerial ownership and firm value in firm fixed effects regressions.
Author: Frank R. Lichtenberg Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 9780262121644 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 180
Book Description
In this revealing study Frank Lichtenberg uses Census Bureau and other data on hundreds of business transactions during the 1970s and 1980s to examine the effects of changes in corporate control on productivity. The 1980s saw explosive activity in the arena of corporate takeovers. In this revealing study Frank Lichtenberg uses Census Bureau and other data on hundreds of business transactions during the 1970s and 1980s to examine the effects of changes in corporate control on productivity. He concludes that the restructuring of the U.S. economy during the past decade has contributed to higher productivity and increased international competitiveness. Corporate Takeovers and Productivity examines the effects of mergers and acquisitions, in general, and leveraged buyouts, in particular on a number of important, interrelated variables: on the productivity and market share of manufacturing plants, on fixed and R&D investment, on the employment and wages of both blue- and white-collar workers, and on corporate diversification. Among Lichtenberg's findings are that the least productive plants are most likely to change owners - a change that tends to raise productivity performance; that takeovers significantly reduce the employment and wages of white-collar workers (except R&D personnel) but not of blue-collar workers; that industrial consolidation is one source of the productivity gains from takeovers; and that the U.S. LBOs and foreign mergers and acquisitions do not have the same effects as U.S. mergers and acquisitions.
Author: Rüdiger Fahlenbrach Publisher: ISBN: Category : Executives Languages : en Pages : 47
Book Description
From 1988 to 2003, the average change in managerial ownership is significantly negative every year for American firms. The probability of large decreases in ownership is strongly increasing in contemporaneous and past stock returns but the probability of large increases in ownership through managerial purchases of shares is not. The relation between changes in Tobin's q and past and contemporaneous changes in ownership depends critically on controlling for past stock returns. When controlling for past stock returns, past large decreases in managerial ownership are unrelated to current changes in Tobin's q but there is some evidence that past large increases in managerial ownership are positively related to current changes in Tobin's q. Because managers sell shares when a firm's stock is performing well, large contemporaneous decreases in managerial ownership are associated with increases in Tobin's q. We argue that our evidence is mostly inconsistent with existing theories and propose a managerial discretion theory of ownership consistent with our evidence.
Author: Paolo Saona Hoffmann Publisher: BoD – Books on Demand ISBN: 1789234948 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 151
Book Description
This edited volume aims to discuss the most contemporary state of the determinants of the firm value. This book presents theoretical works as well as empirical studies that contrast the arguments offered by the leading, ground-breaking theories on the firm value. What variables determine the firm value? Are these determinants controllable or uncontrollable by the managers of the companies? Is the impact of corporate governance systems on the firm value symmetrical between different institutional contexts? Do the financial reports affect the value of the firm? What role does corporate social responsibility play as a determinant of the firm value? These and other questions are analyzed and scrutinized step by step throughout this book.
Author: Zhenxu Tong Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 47
Book Description
The transaction cost theory on managerial ownership and firm value predicts that a deviation from optimal managerial ownership reduces firm value. This paper empirically tests the transaction cost theory by studying the relation between the deviations on both sides of optimal CEO ownership and firm value. We find that both above-optimal and below-optimal deviations reduce firm value. We find that the change in CEO ownership is associated with a higher abnormal return if it moves CEO ownership towards the optimal level, and that the change in CEO ownership is associated with a lower abnormal return if it moves CEO ownership away from the optimal level. These findings are consistent with the transaction cost theory on managerial ownership and firm value.
Author: Rüdiger Fahlenbrach
Author: Rüdiger Fahlenbrach
Author: Moon H. Song
Author: Bradley W. Benson
Author: Cheng-Few Lee
Author: Bradley Warren Benson
Author: Frank R. Lichtenberg
Author: Rüdiger Fahlenbrach
Author: Paolo Saona Hoffmann
Author: Zhenxu Tong
Author: Alon Brav