Author: Francisco Covas
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 118
Book Description
Managerial Incentives, Corporate Investment, and Economic Performance
Managerial Incentives, Corporate Investment, and Economic Preference
Author: Francisco Covas
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Decision making
Languages : en
Pages : 268
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Decision making
Languages : en
Pages : 268
Book Description
Symposium on Managerial Incentives and Corporate Performance: Effects of Executive Compensation, Organzational Structure, Takeovers, and Government Policy
Managing through Incentives
Author: Richard B. McKenzie
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198027990
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 348
Book Description
Incentives are the most powerful tools executives can use to improve worker performance. This is particularly true in today's empowered workplace, where incentives can ensure that workers apply their initiative toward company goals. Now, in this groundbreaking book, Richard McKenzie and Dwight Lee show how to select the right incentives and how to use them for best results. Generously illustrated with examples from business, industry, government, academia, and professional sports, this superb volume offers a comprehensive overview of incentives, both in theory and in practice, providing a wealth of ideas managers can use to get employees to work harder, smarter, and more cooperatively. Much of the book is quite eye-opening. For instance, while McKenzie and Lee recognize that money is the prime motivator, they urge managers not to overlook the power of non-monetary incentives, carefully evaluating such motivators as fringe benefits, psychological incentives, education, and training. And they examine a host of other issues, including how to take advantage of executive "overpayment" to increase profits; the limits of piece-rate and other pay-for-performance schemes; finding the right balance between current pay and a more generous pension plan; the value of tough bosses; and hostile takeovers as a form of managerial incentive. How workers are rewarded is often more important than how much they are rewarded, say the authors. The job of good managers is getting the incentives right. Managing Through Incentives shows managers how to apply proven motivators to help any size firm energize the work force, increase its profits, and meet the awesome challenges of today's fiercely competitive global economy.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198027990
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 348
Book Description
Incentives are the most powerful tools executives can use to improve worker performance. This is particularly true in today's empowered workplace, where incentives can ensure that workers apply their initiative toward company goals. Now, in this groundbreaking book, Richard McKenzie and Dwight Lee show how to select the right incentives and how to use them for best results. Generously illustrated with examples from business, industry, government, academia, and professional sports, this superb volume offers a comprehensive overview of incentives, both in theory and in practice, providing a wealth of ideas managers can use to get employees to work harder, smarter, and more cooperatively. Much of the book is quite eye-opening. For instance, while McKenzie and Lee recognize that money is the prime motivator, they urge managers not to overlook the power of non-monetary incentives, carefully evaluating such motivators as fringe benefits, psychological incentives, education, and training. And they examine a host of other issues, including how to take advantage of executive "overpayment" to increase profits; the limits of piece-rate and other pay-for-performance schemes; finding the right balance between current pay and a more generous pension plan; the value of tough bosses; and hostile takeovers as a form of managerial incentive. How workers are rewarded is often more important than how much they are rewarded, say the authors. The job of good managers is getting the incentives right. Managing Through Incentives shows managers how to apply proven motivators to help any size firm energize the work force, increase its profits, and meet the awesome challenges of today's fiercely competitive global economy.
Investment, Dividends, Firm Performance and Managerial Incentives
Author: Mahmoud Agha
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We combine the incentive schemes offered to managers in practice into a single incentive package and construct a governance index to analyze the role of governance and the incentive package in addressing the agency costs of free cash flow. Using US based data, we find empirical evidence that managers in practice do not consume perks but make a tradeoff when they allocate the cash flows of the firm between investment and dividends. In general, managers in practice underinvest and overpay dividends; an increase in their incentive package would retract both investment and dividends toward the optimal levels; hence, firm performance would improve. We also find that governance is used as a control mechanism rather than as a substitute for the incentive package. Principals employ governance to slow down investment and increase dividends when there is a high informational asymmetry between the manager and the investors, and set these variables close to the optimal levels otherwise. Moreover, we find that firms in practice do not use dividends as a substitute for governance. Furthermore, we find monotone relations between investment, firm performance and dividends on the one hand, and governance and the incentive package on the other hand.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We combine the incentive schemes offered to managers in practice into a single incentive package and construct a governance index to analyze the role of governance and the incentive package in addressing the agency costs of free cash flow. Using US based data, we find empirical evidence that managers in practice do not consume perks but make a tradeoff when they allocate the cash flows of the firm between investment and dividends. In general, managers in practice underinvest and overpay dividends; an increase in their incentive package would retract both investment and dividends toward the optimal levels; hence, firm performance would improve. We also find that governance is used as a control mechanism rather than as a substitute for the incentive package. Principals employ governance to slow down investment and increase dividends when there is a high informational asymmetry between the manager and the investors, and set these variables close to the optimal levels otherwise. Moreover, we find that firms in practice do not use dividends as a substitute for governance. Furthermore, we find monotone relations between investment, firm performance and dividends on the one hand, and governance and the incentive package on the other hand.
Pay without Performance
Author: Lucian Bebchuk
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 067426195X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 293
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 067426195X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 293
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Managerial Incentives and Corporate Performance
Agency Problems and Financial Contracting
Author: Amir Barnea
Publisher: Prentice Hall
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 184
Book Description
Publisher: Prentice Hall
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 184
Book Description
Managerial Incentives and Corporate Performance
Real Options and Investment Incentives
Author: Gunther Friedl
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540482687
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 129
Book Description
This work analyzes the problem of delegated decision-making within firms when investment projects are characterized by the possibility to make subsequent decisions after the initial investment decision has been made. By analyzing this question, the monograph combines and unifies two important lines of literature: on the one hand the literature on controlling investment decisions, on the other hand the investment valuation literature.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540482687
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 129
Book Description
This work analyzes the problem of delegated decision-making within firms when investment projects are characterized by the possibility to make subsequent decisions after the initial investment decision has been made. By analyzing this question, the monograph combines and unifies two important lines of literature: on the one hand the literature on controlling investment decisions, on the other hand the investment valuation literature.