Author: Ray BallPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 380
Book Description
Symposium on Managerial Incentives and Corporate Performance: Effects of Executive Compensation, Organzational Structure, Takeovers, and Government Policy
Author: Ray BallManagerial Incentives and Corporate Performance
Author: Ray BallManagerial Incentives and Corporate Performance
Author: Managerial Incentives and Corporate Governance
Author: Musbau Kolawole KayodePublisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3668035822
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 18
Book Description
Research Paper (undergraduate) from the year 2015 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, grade: A, ( Atlantic International University ) (SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS), language: English, abstract: Corporate governance involves different checks and balances with the ability to influence the incentives and monitoring of a firm’s management. Sound corporate governance is predominantly essential when a firm’s management is different from its ownership. Randall (2009) argued that in the absence of appropriate corporate governance, managers who are separate from a company’s ownership may not be incentivized to work hard towards achieving shareholders’ goal of maximizing profits. Instead, non-owner managers might end up lavishly spending money and other resources in ways that directly benefits themselves, for example on perks, and living an expensive life. Surprisingly, some other managers may be tempted to spend firm’s money to accumulate personal wealth through frauds or theft.
Managerial Incentives and Firm Performance
Author: Amani Khaled BouresliPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 418
Book Description
Investment, Dividends, Firm Performance and Managerial Incentives
Author: Mahmoud AghaPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We combine the incentive schemes offered to managers in practice into a single incentive package and construct a governance index to analyze the role of governance and the incentive package in addressing the agency costs of free cash flow. Using US based data, we find empirical evidence that managers in practice do not consume perks but make a tradeoff when they allocate the cash flows of the firm between investment and dividends. In general, managers in practice underinvest and overpay dividends; an increase in their incentive package would retract both investment and dividends toward the optimal levels; hence, firm performance would improve. We also find that governance is used as a control mechanism rather than as a substitute for the incentive package. Principals employ governance to slow down investment and increase dividends when there is a high informational asymmetry between the manager and the investors, and set these variables close to the optimal levels otherwise. Moreover, we find that firms in practice do not use dividends as a substitute for governance. Furthermore, we find monotone relations between investment, firm performance and dividends on the one hand, and governance and the incentive package on the other hand.
Advances in Economic Theory
Author: Truman Fassett BewleyPublisher: CUP Archive
ISBN: 9780521389259
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 452
Book Description
These articles should be helpful to anyone with training in economics.
Managerial Incentives, Corporate Investment, and Economic Performance
Author: Francisco CovasManagerial Incentives, Corporate Investment, and Economic Preference
Author: Francisco CovasPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Decision making
Languages : en
Pages : 268
Book Description
Enhancing Managerial Incentives and Value Creation
Author: Unyong PyoPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 37
Book Description
I study changes in CEO compensation and pay-performance relations to examine how corporate spinoffs affect managerial incentive compensation and whether the changes in management compensation can explain the value enhancement and operating performance improvements that occur following spinoffs. Analyzing a sample of 124 non-taxable spinoffs during 1990-1997, I find that changes in managerial compensation are a significant motive for spinoffs. Changes in managerial incentives alone are consistent with the post-spinoff changes in operating performance, while changes in business focus are not. Spinoffs that are not accompanied by enhanced pay-performance relations do not improve operating performance even with increased business focus.