Author: Stephen W. Salant
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Book Description
Losses from Horizontal Merger
Author: Stephen W. Salant
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Book Description
Losses from Horizontal Merger
Author: Ramon Fauli-Oller
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper generalizes the model of Salant et al. (1983; Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, pp. 185-199) to a successive oligopoly model with product differentiation. Upstream firms produce differentiated goods, retailers compete in quantities, and supply contracts are linear. We show that if retailers buy from all producers, downstream mergers do not affect wholesale prices. Our result replicates that of Salant's, where mergers are not profitable unless the size of the merged firm exceeds 80 per cent of the industry. This result is robust to the type of competition.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper generalizes the model of Salant et al. (1983; Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, pp. 185-199) to a successive oligopoly model with product differentiation. Upstream firms produce differentiated goods, retailers compete in quantities, and supply contracts are linear. We show that if retailers buy from all producers, downstream mergers do not affect wholesale prices. Our result replicates that of Salant's, where mergers are not profitable unless the size of the merged firm exceeds 80 per cent of the industry. This result is robust to the type of competition.
The Economic Assessment of Mergers Under European Competition Law
Author: Daniel Gore
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107007720
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 559
Book Description
Provides a clear, concise and practical overview of the key economic techniques and evidence employed in European merger control.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107007720
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 559
Book Description
Provides a clear, concise and practical overview of the key economic techniques and evidence employed in European merger control.
Horizontal Merger Guidelines
Author: United States. Department of Justice
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Book Description
Gains and Losses from Horizontal Mergers
Author: Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 7
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 7
Book Description
Simulation as an Alternative to Structural Merger Policy in Differentiated Products Industries
Author: Gregory Werden
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 42
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 42
Book Description
The Deterrence Effects of U.S. Merger Policy Instruments
Author: Joseph A. Clougherty
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We estimate the deterrence effects of U.S. merger policy instruments with respect to the composition and frequency of future merger notifications. Data from the Annual Reports by the U.S. DOJ and FTC allow industry based measures over the 1986-1999 period of the conditional probabilities for eliciting investigations, challenges, prohibitions, court-wins and court-losses: deterrence variables akin to the traditional conditional probabilities from the economics of crime literature. We find the challenge-rate to robustly deter future horizontal (both relative and absolute) merger activity; the investigation-rate to slightly deter relative-horizontal merger activity; the court-loss-rate to moderately affect absolute-horizontal merger activity; and the prohibition-rate and court-win-rate to not significantly deter future horizontal mergers. Accordingly, the conditional probability of eliciting an antitrust challenge (i.e., remedies and prohibitions) involves the strongest deterrence effect from amongst the different merger policy instruments.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We estimate the deterrence effects of U.S. merger policy instruments with respect to the composition and frequency of future merger notifications. Data from the Annual Reports by the U.S. DOJ and FTC allow industry based measures over the 1986-1999 period of the conditional probabilities for eliciting investigations, challenges, prohibitions, court-wins and court-losses: deterrence variables akin to the traditional conditional probabilities from the economics of crime literature. We find the challenge-rate to robustly deter future horizontal (both relative and absolute) merger activity; the investigation-rate to slightly deter relative-horizontal merger activity; the court-loss-rate to moderately affect absolute-horizontal merger activity; and the prohibition-rate and court-win-rate to not significantly deter future horizontal mergers. Accordingly, the conditional probability of eliciting an antitrust challenge (i.e., remedies and prohibitions) involves the strongest deterrence effect from amongst the different merger policy instruments.
Horizontal Merger Guidelines
Author: U. S. Department U.S. Department of Justice
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781544654577
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
These Guidelines outline the principal analytical techniques, practices, and the enforcement policy of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (the "Agencies") with respect to mergers and acquisitions involving actual or potential competitors ("horizontal mergers") under the federal antitrust laws. The relevant statutory provisions include Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. Most particularly, Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers if "in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." The Agencies seek to identify and challenge competitively harmful mergers while avoiding unnecessary interference with mergers that are either competitively beneficial or neutral. Most merger analysis is necessarily predictive, requiring an assessment of what will likely happen if a merger proceeds as compared to what will likely happen if it does not. Given this inherent need for prediction, these Guidelines reflect the congressional intent that merger enforcement should interdict competitive problems in their incipiency and that certainty about anticompetitive effect is seldom possible and not required for a merger to be illegal.
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781544654577
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
These Guidelines outline the principal analytical techniques, practices, and the enforcement policy of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (the "Agencies") with respect to mergers and acquisitions involving actual or potential competitors ("horizontal mergers") under the federal antitrust laws. The relevant statutory provisions include Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. Most particularly, Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers if "in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." The Agencies seek to identify and challenge competitively harmful mergers while avoiding unnecessary interference with mergers that are either competitively beneficial or neutral. Most merger analysis is necessarily predictive, requiring an assessment of what will likely happen if a merger proceeds as compared to what will likely happen if it does not. Given this inherent need for prediction, these Guidelines reflect the congressional intent that merger enforcement should interdict competitive problems in their incipiency and that certainty about anticompetitive effect is seldom possible and not required for a merger to be illegal.
An Evaluation of Horizontal Merger Enforcement
Author: David B. Audretsch
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 544
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 544
Book Description
1993 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
Author: National Association of Attorneys General
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description