Lobbying, Political Uncertainty and Policy Outcomes PDF Download

Author: Sebastian Koehler
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319970550
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 173

View

Book Description
This book analyses interest group communication strategies in parliamentary political systems, and considers how political uncertainty, which emerges from the political process, shapes interest group communication strategies. It develops a formal model of lobbying in a bicameral legislature with strong party discipline, and discusses why interest groups choose public or private communication channels to influence political bargaining. The book tests its hypothesis in different policy contexts, including lobbying on major legislation in the field of labour and social policy.

Author: Pierre J. Jaffard
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 53

View

Book Description
I develop a three-period asset pricing model with heterogeneity in firms size and a government that introduces a policy distortion. I find that large firms can better hedge the political uncertainty associated with this policy change through lobbying, which leads them to earn lower expected returns. I provide two strands of empirical evidence consistent with the model predictions. The first one looks at the behavior of a blue versus red industries around the unexpected results of the 2016 US Presidential election. The second one uses portfolio sorting and double-sorting to reach consistent conclusions.

Author: Michel le Breton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

View

Book Description

Author: Huchen Liu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 183

View

Book Description
An increasing portion of lobbyists in American politics have a history of employment in government, a major facet of the wider "revolving door" phenomenon that connects government office and non-governmental sectors. An elite slice of these lobbyists held public office as elected or appointed officials, while former government staff make up the far more numerous category. How may revolving-door lobbyists help organized interests, which already enjoy important advantages over the disorganized, influence government decisions? Existing research argues that government experience gives revolvers advantages in political connections and knowledge about policy and processes. I advance a distinct theory: What distinguishes revolving-door lobbyists from conventional lobbyists without government experience is the ability to think like politicians, for which working in government provides the best training. In particular, government experience teaches one to claim credit effectively for policy outcomes--demonstrating that one's actions and efforts are responsible for good results--in order to survive the election cycle. When former government officials and staffers become lobbyists, they do not leave this intangible skill set behind. If effective credit claiming helps politicians win elections whereby they are evaluated by voters, it helps lobbyists survive their own hiring and firing cycles whereby they are evaluated by clients. In Chapter 2, I demonstrate that corporations prefer revolvers to conventional lobbyists in the face of policy uncertainty. Interest groups' need for revolvers to help manage uncertainty provides an ideal environment for their credit-claiming behavior. Revolvers claim credit by expending resources efficiently to achieve lobbying goals. I examine two concrete manifestations of this behavior in the following chapters. In Chapter 3, I show that revolvers make campaign contributions to political candidates more efficiently and succeed more in purchasing access to legislators. In Chapter 4, I show that revolvers exercise more restraint when lobbying on congressional appropriations and consequently hit their announced targets more often. These advantages help revolvers secure lobbying clients' satisfaction and make them loyal customers. To show this, in Chapter 5 I liken lobbying transactions to election results and demonstrate that revolvers are more likely to be "reelected" by clients than conventional lobbyists.

Author: Robin Phinney
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107170362
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 203

View

Book Description
This book develops a new theory of collaborative lobbying and influence to explain how antipoverty advocates gain influence in American social policymaking.

Author: Anthony J. Nownes
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139457861
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 7

View

Book Description
This book offers a scholarly yet accessible overview of the role of lobbying in American politics. It draws upon extant research as well as original data gathered from interviews with numerous lobbyists across the United States. It describes how lobbyists do their work within all branches of government, at the national, state, and local levels. It thus offers a substantially broader view of lobbying than is available in much of the research literature. Although tailored for students taking courses on interest group politics, Total Lobbying offers an indispensable survey of the field for scholars and others concerned with this important facet of American politics.

Author: Alexander Hertel-Fernandez
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190629894
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 361

View

Book Description
Politics at Work documents how and why U.S. employers are increasingly recruiting their own workers into politics-and what such recruitment means for American democracy and public policy.

Author: David Coen
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1800884710
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 515

View

Book Description
This uniquely comprehensive Handbook examines the complex relationship between lobbyists and public policy through an innovative multi-analytic lens. Emphasising the profound impact of the topic on modern government and contemporary societal issues, David Coen and Alexander Katsaitis bring together a wide range of experts to illuminate the contexts and processes involved in public policy, and how this interacts with the practice of lobbying.

Author: Timothy LaPira
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
ISBN: 0700624503
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 272

View

Book Description
In recent decades Washington has seen an alarming rise in the number of "revolving door lobbyists"—politicians and officials cashing in on their government experience to become influence peddlers on K Street. These lobbyists, popular wisdom suggests, sell access to the highest bidder. Revolving Door Lobbying tells a different, more nuanced story. As an insider interviewed in the book observes, where the general public has the "impression that lobbyists actually get things done, I would say 90 percent of what lobbyists do is prevent harm to their client from the government." Drawing on extensive new data on lobbyists’ biographies and interviews with dozens of experts, authors Timothy M. LaPira and Herschel F. Thomas establish the facts of the revolving door phenomenon—facts that suggest that, contrary to widespread assumptions about insider access, special interests hire these lobbyists as political insurance against an increasingly dysfunctional, unpredictable government. With their insider experience, revolving door lobbyists offer insight into the political process, irrespective of their connections to current policymakers. What they provide to their clients is useful and marketable political risk-reduction. Exploring this claim, LaPira and Thomas present a systematic analysis of who revolving door lobbyists are, how they differ from other lobbyists, what interests they represent, and how they seek to influence public policy. The first book to marshal comprehensive evidence of revolving door lobbying, LaPira and Thomas revise the notion that lobbyists are inherently and institutionally corrupt. Rather, the authors draw a complex and sobering picture of the revolving door as a consequence of the eroding capacity of government to solve the public’s problems.

Author: Christian Lahusen
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 1000861333
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 288

View

Book Description
Lobbying is an integral part of the political reality of the European Union and a highly competitive and dynamic field of interest groups. This book takes a systematic look at lobbyists in order to broaden our understanding of the staff entrusted with the responsibility of influencing European politics. Who are the European lobbyists? What are their professional backgrounds, career patterns, practices, and beliefs? The study uses a sociological framework to explore the professionalisation and professionalism of the field across national proveniences, policy fields and interest groups, and develops a systematic analysis that considers three different dimensions: occupational patterns, shared knowledge and common convictions. Based on original research that combines in- depth interviews with survey data, European Lobbying demonstrates that European lobbying is a firmly established and highly professionalised métier. In an organisational field characterised by growth, pluralisation and increasing competition, the professional staff contributes to the homogenisation of European lobbying and the marginalisation of other, non- professionalised forms of interest representation. It will therefore appeal to scholars and students of sociology and politics with interest in European studies, European Union politics and the sociology of the professions. The Open Access version of this book, available at http://www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons [Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND)] 4.0 license