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Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Over the years, various proposals have been made to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear cases regarding particular areas of constitutional law such as busing, abortion, prayer in school, and most recently, reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. Several such proposals passed the House in the 108th Congress, including an amendment to H.R. 2799 to limit the use of funds to enforce a federal court decision regarding the Pledge of Allegiance; H.R. 2028, to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear cases regarding the Pledge of Allegiance; and H.R. 3313, to limit federal court jurisdiction over questions regarding the Defense of Marriage Act. Generally, proponents of these proposals are critical of specific decisions made by the federal courts in that particular substantive area, and the proposals are usually intended to express disagreement with cases in those areas and/or to influence the results or applications of such cases. Proposals of this type are often referred to as "court-stripping" legislation. The label arises from the fact that many of these proposals invoke the Congress's power to regulate federal court jurisdiction, i.e., the courts' power to consider cases of a particular class and in a particular procedural posture. It should be noted, however, that some proposals characterized as "courtstripping," rather than focusing on jurisdiction, address what remedies are available to litigants or what procedures must be followed to bring constitutional cases. Although the United States Congress has broad authority to regulate in all three of these areas of judicial power -- jurisdiction, procedure and remedies -- this authority is generally used to address broader issues of court efficiency and resource allocation. This report, however, is limited to proposals to allocate judicial power in a way that affects or influences the result in cases concerning specific constitutional issues. There are at least three different types of "court-stripping" proposals: (1) limiting the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts, (2) limiting the jurisdiction of all federal courts, and (3) limiting the jurisdiction of both state and federal courts together. While the Congress has broad authority under Article III of the Constitution to regulate the jurisdiction, procedures and remedies available in state and federal courts, this power is generally not used as a means to affect substantive law. Consequently, the federal courts have only rarely faced the question of what happens when the Congress acts under Article III to limit substantive litigation, and the Supreme Court has not squarely faced a modern law limiting jurisdiction to affect or influence litigation of constitutional questions. Thus, an analysis of these proposals relies to some extent on textual analysis and scholarly discussion. Congress's authority to limit the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts appears relatively broad, so that laws limiting the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts would appear to raise fewer constitutional issues. Significant constitutional questions arise, however, with regard to whether Congress could eliminate both inferior federal court and Supreme Court review of constitutional matters. Further, elimination of review of constitutional issues by any court -- state or federal court -- seems the least likely to survive constitutional scrutiny. Various commentators, however, have suggested that limiting jurisdiction for any court for a particular class of cases raises questions regarding both the separation of powers doctrine and the Equal Protection Clause.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Over the years, various proposals have been made to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear cases regarding particular areas of constitutional law such as busing, abortion, prayer in school, and most recently, reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. Several such proposals passed the House in the 108th Congress, including an amendment to H.R. 2799 to limit the use of funds to enforce a federal court decision regarding the Pledge of Allegiance; H.R. 2028, to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear cases regarding the Pledge of Allegiance; and H.R. 3313, to limit federal court jurisdiction over questions regarding the Defense of Marriage Act. Generally, proponents of these proposals are critical of specific decisions made by the federal courts in that particular substantive area, and the proposals are usually intended to express disagreement with cases in those areas and/or to influence the results or applications of such cases. Proposals of this type are often referred to as "court-stripping" legislation. The label arises from the fact that many of these proposals invoke the Congress's power to regulate federal court jurisdiction, i.e., the courts' power to consider cases of a particular class and in a particular procedural posture. It should be noted, however, that some proposals characterized as "courtstripping," rather than focusing on jurisdiction, address what remedies are available to litigants or what procedures must be followed to bring constitutional cases. Although the United States Congress has broad authority to regulate in all three of these areas of judicial power -- jurisdiction, procedure and remedies -- this authority is generally used to address broader issues of court efficiency and resource allocation. This report, however, is limited to proposals to allocate judicial power in a way that affects or influences the result in cases concerning specific constitutional issues. There are at least three different types of "court-stripping" proposals: (1) limiting the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts, (2) limiting the jurisdiction of all federal courts, and (3) limiting the jurisdiction of both state and federal courts together. While the Congress has broad authority under Article III of the Constitution to regulate the jurisdiction, procedures and remedies available in state and federal courts, this power is generally not used as a means to affect substantive law. Consequently, the federal courts have only rarely faced the question of what happens when the Congress acts under Article III to limit substantive litigation, and the Supreme Court has not squarely faced a modern law limiting jurisdiction to affect or influence litigation of constitutional questions. Thus, an analysis of these proposals relies to some extent on textual analysis and scholarly discussion. Congress's authority to limit the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts appears relatively broad, so that laws limiting the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts would appear to raise fewer constitutional issues. Significant constitutional questions arise, however, with regard to whether Congress could eliminate both inferior federal court and Supreme Court review of constitutional matters. Further, elimination of review of constitutional issues by any court -- state or federal court -- seems the least likely to survive constitutional scrutiny. Various commentators, however, have suggested that limiting jurisdiction for any court for a particular class of cases raises questions regarding both the separation of powers doctrine and the Equal Protection Clause.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on the Constitution Publisher: ISBN: Category : Federal-state controversies Languages : en Pages : 160
Author: Howard P. Fink Publisher: Lexis Law Publishing (Va) ISBN: Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 1048
Book Description
This casebook is the first to discuss the 1996 legislation limiting habeas corpus & death-row appeals & the Supreme Court's decision interpreting this legislation. This is also the first casebook to discuss the Supreme Court's new view of the Eleventh Amendment & of Congress' power to waive a state's sovereign immunity. Thee authors discuss the latest cases interpreting Article III's case & controversy requirements as a limit on access to the federal courts. Further, this text treats the evolving role of the federal courts in limiting actions of state governments & state officials. It also provides substantial discussion of issues of federal venue, transfer & law applied in diversity & alienage cases, because of the continued importance of these areas & in recognition that these subjects more & more are being given short shift in curtailed civil procedure courses in the first year. Teacher's Manual 1999 Cumulative Supplement Casebook also available electronically.
Author: David P. Currie Publisher: ISBN: Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 292
Book Description
Congress, the Courts, and the Constitution; Appellate and Collateral Review; Federal-Question Cases; Admiralty; Diversity Cases; Miscellaneous Jurisdictional Problems; Jurisdictional Amount; Sovereign Immunity; Abstention and Related Doctrines; Injunctions Against Suit; Civil Rights Removal; Three-Judge Courts; Place of Trial; Law Applicable in Federal Courts.
Author: Edward Keynes Publisher: ISBN: Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 432
Book Description
Since the early 1960s the Supreme Court and its congressional critics have been locked in a continuing dispute over the issues of school prayer, busing, and abortion. Although for years the Court's congressional foes have introduced legislation designed to curb the powers of the federal courts in these areas, they have until now failed to enact such proposals. It is likely that these legislative efforts and the present confrontation with the Court will continue. Edward Keynes and Randall Miller argue that Congress lacks the constitutional power to legislate away the powers of the federal courts and to prevent individuals from seeking redress for presumed infringements of their constitutional rights in these areas. They demonstrate that neither the framers nor ratifiers of the Constitution intended the Congress to exercise plenary power over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Throughout its history the Court has never conceded unlimited powers to Congress; and until the late 1950s Congress had not attempted to gerrymander the Court's jurisdiction in response to specific decisions. But the authors contend this is just what the sponsors of recent legislative attacks on the Court intend, and they see such efforts as threatening the Court's independence and authority as defined in the separation of powers clauses of the Constitution.