Judicializing the Administrative State PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Judicializing the Administrative State PDF full book. Access full book title Judicializing the Administrative State by Hiroshi Okayama. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Hiroshi Okayama Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1351393332 Category : Social Science Languages : en Pages : 303
Book Description
A basic feature of the modern US administrative state taken for granted by legal scholars but neglected by political scientists and historians is its strong judiciality. Formal, or court-like, adjudication was the primary method of first-order agency policy making during the first half of the twentieth century. Even today, most US administrative agencies hire administrative law judges and other adjudicators conducting hearings using formal procedures autonomously from the agency head. No other industrialized democracy has even come close to experiencing the systematic state judicialization that took place in the United States. Why did the American administrative state become highly judicialized, rather than developing a more efficiency-oriented Weberian bureaucracy? Legal scholars argue that lawyers as a profession imposed the judicial procedures they were the most familiar with on agencies. But this explanation fails to show why the judicialization took place only in the United States at the time it did. Okayama demonstrates that the American institutional combination of common law and the presidential system favored policy implementation through formal procedures by autonomous agencies and that it induced the creation and development of independent regulatory commissions explicitly modeled after courts from the late nineteenth century. These commissions judicialized the state not only through their proliferation but also through the diffusion of their formal procedures to executive agencies over the next half century, which led to a highly fairness-oriented administrative state.
Author: Hiroshi Okayama Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1351393332 Category : Social Science Languages : en Pages : 303
Book Description
A basic feature of the modern US administrative state taken for granted by legal scholars but neglected by political scientists and historians is its strong judiciality. Formal, or court-like, adjudication was the primary method of first-order agency policy making during the first half of the twentieth century. Even today, most US administrative agencies hire administrative law judges and other adjudicators conducting hearings using formal procedures autonomously from the agency head. No other industrialized democracy has even come close to experiencing the systematic state judicialization that took place in the United States. Why did the American administrative state become highly judicialized, rather than developing a more efficiency-oriented Weberian bureaucracy? Legal scholars argue that lawyers as a profession imposed the judicial procedures they were the most familiar with on agencies. But this explanation fails to show why the judicialization took place only in the United States at the time it did. Okayama demonstrates that the American institutional combination of common law and the presidential system favored policy implementation through formal procedures by autonomous agencies and that it induced the creation and development of independent regulatory commissions explicitly modeled after courts from the late nineteenth century. These commissions judicialized the state not only through their proliferation but also through the diffusion of their formal procedures to executive agencies over the next half century, which led to a highly fairness-oriented administrative state.
Author: Peter J. Wallison Publisher: Encounter Books ISBN: 1641770090 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 190
Book Description
In this book, Peter J. Wallison argues that the administrative agencies of the executive branch have gradually taken over the legislative role of Congress, resulting in what many call the administrative state. The judiciary bears the major responsibility for this development because it has failed to carry out its primary constitutional responsibility: to enforce the constitutional separation of powers by ensuring that the elected branches of government—the legislative and the executive—remain independent and separate from one another. Since 1937, and especially with the Chevron deference adopted by the Supreme Court in 1984, the judiciary has abandoned this role. It has allowed Congress to delegate lawmaking authorities to the administrative agencies of the executive branch and given these agencies great latitude in interpreting their statutory authorities. Unelected officials of the administrative state have thus been enabled to make decisions for the American people that, in a democracy, should only be made by Congress. The consequences have been grave: unnecessary regulation has imposed major costs on the U.S. economy, the constitutional separation of powers has been compromised, and unabated agency rulemaking has created a significant threat that Americans will one day question the legitimacy of their own government. To address these concerns, Wallison argues that the courts must return to the role the Framers expected them to fulfill.
Author: Jurgen de Poorter Publisher: T.M.C. Asser Press ISBN: 9789462653092 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 198
Book Description
This book deals with one of the greatest challenges for the judiciary in the 21st century. It reflects on the judiciary’s role in reviewing administrative discretion in the administrative state; a role that can no longer solely be understood from the traditional doctrine of the Trias Politica. Traditionally, courts review acts of administrative bodies implying a degree of discretion with quite some restraint. Typically it is reviewed whether the decision is non-arbitrary or whether there is no manifest error of assessment. The question arises though as to whether the concern regarding ensuring the non-arbitrary character of the exercise of administrative power, which is frequently performed at a distance from political bodies, goes far enough to guarantee that the administration exercises its powers in a legitimate way. This publication searches for new modes of judicial review of administrative discretion exercised in the administrative state. It links state-of-the-art academic research on the role of courts in the administrative state with the daily practice of the higher and lower administrative courts struggling with their position in the evolving administrative state. The book concludes that with the changing role and forms of the administrative state, administrative courts across the world and across sectors are in the process of reconsidering their roles and the appropriate models of judicial review. Learning from the experiences in different sectors and jurisdictions, it provides theoretical and empirical foundations for reflecting on the advantages and disadvantages of different models of review, the constitutional consequences and the main questions that deserve further research and debate. Jurgen de Poorter is professor of administrative law at Tilburg University and deputy judge in the District Court of The Hague. Ernst Hirsch Ballin is distinguished university professor at Tilburg University, professor in human rights law at the University of Amsterdam, and president of the T.M.C. Asser Institute for International and European Law. He is also a member of the Scientific Council for Government policy (WRR). Saskia Lavrijssen is professor of Economic Regulation and Market Governance of Network Industries at Tilburg University.
Author: Jurgen C. A. Poorter Publisher: ISBN: 9789462653085 Category : Administrative law Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This book deals with one of the greatest challenges for the judiciary in the 21st century. It reflects on the judiciary's role in reviewing administrative discretion in the administrative state; a role that can no longer solely be understood from the traditional doctrine of the Trias Politica. Traditionally, courts review acts of administrative bodies implying a degree of discretion with quite some restraint. Typically it is reviewed whether the decision is non-arbitrary or whether there is no manifest error of assessment. The question arises though as to whether the concern regarding ensuring the non-arbitrary character of the exercise of administrative power, which is frequently performed at a distance from political bodies, goes far enough to guarantee that the administration exercises its powers in a legitimate way. This publication searches for new modes of judicial review of administrative discretion exercised in the administrative state. It links state-of-the-art academic research on the role of courts in the administrative state with the daily practice of the higher and lower administrative courts struggling with their position in the evolving administrative state. The book concludes that with the changing role and forms of the administrative state, administrative courts across the world and across sectors are in the process of reconsidering their roles and the appropriate models of judicial review. Learning from the experiences in different sectors and jurisdictions, it provides theoretical and empirical foundations for reflecting on the advantages and disadvantages of different models of review, the constitutional consequences and the main questions that deserve further research and debate. --
Author: Daniel R. Ernst Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA ISBN: 0199920869 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 241
Book Description
De Tocqueville once wrote that 'insufferable despotism' would prevail if America ever acquired a national administrative state. Between 1900 and 1940, radicals created vast bureaucracies that continue to trample on individual freedom. Ernst shows, to the contrary, that the nation's best corporate lawyers were among the creators of 'commission government'; that supporters were more interested in purging government of corruption than creating a socialist utopia; and that the principles of individual rights, limited government, and due process were designed into the administrative state.
Author: Louis Leventhal Jaffe Publisher: ISBN: Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 816
Book Description
Collection of articles on legal aspects and control of the administration of justice in the USA and examination of major aspects of the relationship between agencies of economic administration and other forms of public administration and courts of law - includes relevant jurisprudence.
Author: Guobin Zhu Publisher: ISBN: 9783030315405 Category : Administrative law Languages : en Pages : 445
Book Description
This book investigates judicial deference to the administration in judicial review, a concept and legal practice that can be found to a greater or lesser degree in every constitutional system. In each system, deference functions differently, because the positioning of the judiciary with regard to the separation of powers, the role of the courts as a mechanism of checks and balances, and the scope of judicial review differ. In addition, the way deference works within the constitutional system itself is complex, multi-faceted and often covert. Although judicial deference to the administration is a topical theme in comparative administrative law, a general examination of national systems is still lacking. As such, a theoretical and empirical review is called for. Accordingly, this book presents national reports from 15 jurisdictions, ranging from Argentina, Canada and the US, to the EU. Constituting the outcome of the 20th General Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, held in Fukuoka, Japan in July 2018, it offers a valuable and unique resource for the study of comparative administrative law.
Author: Joel Seligman Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The most substantial change in the United States Government has been the extraordinary growth and increased complexity of the United States Government itself. George Washington initially was President of a country with a population of four million, 11 States and three Cabinet Departments (State, Treasury and War). Washington's Government had no standing army, no Social Security, Medicare or Medicaid, no programs addressing the environment, labor, or health. In 1791, the Treasury Department had approximately 500 employees, the War Department had 12, the State Department, eight.
Author: Hiroshi Okayama
Author: Hiroshi Okayama
Author: Peter J. Wallison
Author: Jurgen de Poorter
Author: Jurgen C. A. Poorter
Author: Daniel R. Ernst
Author: Jonathan T. Molot
Author: John Dickinson
Author: Louis Leventhal Jaffe
Author: Guobin Zhu
Author: Joel Seligman