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Author: Jayanthi Krishnan Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires firms to assess the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting and auditors to express an opinion on the effectiveness of such internal controls. We examine whether the first-time inclusion of additional audited information in Section 404 company filings were associated with higher earnings response coefficients (ERC) for accelerated filers. We find that the ERCs of companies with clean internal control reports were greater in the SOX 404 year of adoption than in the previous year. However, there is no difference in the ERCs in the two years for companies with material weaknesses. We interpret these results as indicating that even clean Section 404 reports - which form a majority of all internal control reports - contribute positively to investor perceptions about the quality of financial reporting.
Author: Jayanthi Krishnan Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires firms to assess the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting and auditors to express an opinion on the effectiveness of such internal controls. We examine whether the first-time inclusion of additional audited information in Section 404 company filings were associated with higher earnings response coefficients (ERC) for accelerated filers. We find that the ERCs of companies with clean internal control reports were greater in the SOX 404 year of adoption than in the previous year. However, there is no difference in the ERCs in the two years for companies with material weaknesses. We interpret these results as indicating that even clean Section 404 reports - which form a majority of all internal control reports - contribute positively to investor perceptions about the quality of financial reporting.
Author: Benjamin W. Hoffman Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 50
Book Description
We investigate the stock market's reaction to events leading up to the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) 2007 regulatory changes that reduced the scope of and documentation requirements for assessments of firms' internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR), as required by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The stated goal of these regulations was to reduce firms' and auditors' compliance costs with mandatory ICFR assessments, while maintaining the effectiveness of these assessments. We examine abnormal returns surrounding key dates leading to the passage of these regulations and offer two main findings. First, investors reacted negatively on key event dates, suggesting that investors viewed the regulations as likely to reduce financial reporting quality rather than to drive firm and audit efficiencies. Second, this negative market reaction is larger when ICFR effectiveness should matter most - when firms are more complex, have higher litigation risk, and greater fraud risk. In additional analysis, we find that restatements increase in the post-regulation time period, consistent with investors' concerns that the effect of the legislation would be a reduction in ICFR effectiveness. Overall, our results may imply that investors prefer stronger government regulation when it comes to the assessments of a firm's internal controls over financial reporting.
Author: Carolin Peters Publisher: Grin Publishing ISBN: 9783668594944 Category : Languages : en Pages : 28
Book Description
Seminar paper from the year 2017 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, grade: 1,7, University of Potsdam, language: English, abstract: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was introduced by President George W. Bush in the year 2002. This regulation changed disclosure and reporting requirements and aims to increase trust of the investors in capital markets again, after facing several balance and accounting scandals between the years 2000 and 2002, for example at Enron and WorldCom . The SOX affects companies with a registration at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). There are two sections that are considered having a high impact on the corporate governance of complying firms, Section 302 (SOX 302) and Section 404 (SOX 404). SOX 302 - "Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports"- demands the executives to assess whether firms' financial statements represent the financial situation and the results of the operations and the period. Executives should design, establish and maintain internal controls. An evaluation of the effectiveness, disclosures of deficiencies concerning internal controls, frauds et cetera is necessary (SOX, 2002, Section 302). SOX 404 - "Management Assessment of Internal Controls"- extends prior requirements and demands that the company's external auditor must report on the reliability of management's assessment of internal control every fiscal year. It also requires an annual attestation by the management that evaluates the reliability of financial statements (SOX, 2002, Section 404). Especially SOX 404 is considered a cost driver of the SOX and demands significant changes in financial reporting. Aim of SOX 302 and 404 is to improve internal controls, and to reduce opportunistic behaviour of executives. Prior studies show evidence that there seem to be differences between the perceived benefits and the target effects of the SOX, for example regarding audit quality after the SOX. Furthermore, there is a discussion question
Author: William R. Baber Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) proscribes so-called “affiliated hires” of financial executives. More specifically, SOX requires that firms wait at least one year before hiring an individual recently employed as a member of the firm's external audit team. The intent of the regulation is to reduce the perceived loss of auditor independence due to affiliated hiring. SOX provisions also require that firms establish fully independent audit committees and disclose the identity of directors with financial expertise. Using a sample of firms that employ new financial executives during the period leading up to SOX, we find that earnings response coefficients (ERCs) computed using quarterly data decline following hires of individuals recently employed by the firm's external auditor, but ERCs do not decline following hires of comparably qualified financial executives not recently employed by the external auditor. We also find that ERC declines following affiliated hires are statistically significant for firms with audit committee compositions inconsistent with SOX regulation, but not for firms with audit committees consistent with SOX regulation subsequently imposed. Further investigation using measures of earnings quality employed in prior studies suggests that the documented differences in ERC changes are attributable to perceived, rather than real, changes in earnings quality following affiliated hires.
Author: Benjamin P. Foster Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The auditor's internal control report format prescribed by the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) includes a limitations paragraph. This study examines the impact of a limitations paragraph on users' and auditors' perceptions about readability of the report, reliability provided by the report over financial reporting, and the auditors' exposure to liability. The study uses data obtained from a field experiment conducted (with 122 audit partners and managers, and 123 professionals from the financial community) in 1991 in connection with auditors' internal control reporting. This data set should provide input for regulators to evaluate the PCAOB prescribed internal control report format, because many of the expectations gap issues experienced in the 1970s and 1980s parallel those currently faced. Analyses indicate that the limitations paragraph may be perceived by users as providing less than a reasonable degree of assurance, and that the internal control report format without the limitations paragraph (structured along the lines of the SAS 58 auditors' standard report) would significantly enhance users' perceptions about the report's readability, without increasing the liability as perceived by auditors. Policy-making bodies may find the results and approach taken in this study useful to evaluate report formats for assurance services that will strike a balance between user needs and auditors' exposure to liability.
Author: Cory A. Cassell Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
We examine changes in the association between auditor type (Big 4, Second-Tier, and Other non-Big 4) and perceived financial reporting credibility in the wake of events (e.g., Andersen's failure, the implementation of SOX, creation of the PCAOB, etc.) which led to significant growth in Second-Tier client portfolios and increased scrutiny of Second-Tier audit practices. Our results reveal that financial reporting credibility of Second-Tier clients was lower than that of Big 4 clients and was indistinguishable from that of Other non-Big 4 clients pre-Andersen. However, post-Andersen, we find that financial reporting credibility of Second-Tier clients is higher than that of Other non-Big 4 clients and is indistinguishable from that of Big 4 clients. We expect that our results will be of interest to regulators, both in the United States and in the European Union, who have expressed concerns about the current state of competition in the audit market, management and boards of directors that are contemplating switching to a Second-Tier audit firm, and academics investigating quality differences among audit firm types.
Author: Kam C. Chan Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires firms to report on the effectiveness of their internal control over financial reporting. The Securities and Exchange Commission requires foreign large accelerated filers to provide both management and auditor Section 404 reports starting for fiscal years ending on or after July 15, 2006. This study examines the change in audit fees for foreign firms in their first year of providing auditor attestation reports for fiscal years ending between July 15, 2006 and July 14, 2007. During this time period, only foreign large accelerated filers have to provide both management and auditor Section 404 reports. Foreign accelerated filers only have to provide management Section 404 reports and non-accelerated filers do not have to provide any Section 404 report. We find that foreign large accelerated filers have an average of 74% increase in audit fees in this first year of Section 404 compliance, while the foreign accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers only have increases in audit fees of 33% and 42%, respectively. We also find that the increase in audit fees among foreign large accelerated filers is negatively associated with the strength of the legal environment in their home countries.
Author: Marcus Doxey Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 56
Book Description
Regulators worldwide have recently proposed expanding the auditor's report in a number of ways, with investors showing particular interest in additional information surrounding management estimates. This study uses an experiment to examine the effects of auditor-provided estimate disclosures on financial statement users' perceptions of auditor independence, management credibility, reporting quality, and investment decisions. I manipulate auditor agreement with management's estimates and whether the estimates are incentive-consistent for management. I find that estimate disclosures are value-relevant for users' investment decisions. Additionally, given an unqualified opinion, users view auditors as more (less) independent when auditors agree (disagree) with management and management as less (more) credible when estimates are incentive consistent (inconsistent). In turn, independence and credibility perceptions influence perceived misstatement probability, financial reporting quality, and investment. The findings empirically support investors' arguments that auditor disclosures regarding management estimates increase the transparency and value-relevance of the audit report.
Author: Jayanthi Krishnan
Author: Jayanthi Krishnan
Author: Benjamin W. Hoffman
Author: Carolin Peters
Author: William R. Baber
Author: Benjamin P. Foster
Author: 
Author: 
Author: Cory A. Cassell
Author: Kam C. Chan
Author: Marcus Doxey