Author: Kooyul JungPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Timing, Investment Opportunities, Managerial Discretion, and the Security Issue Decision
Author: Kooyul JungInvestment Opportunities, Managerial Discretion, and the Security Issue Decision
Author: Kooyul JungPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business enterprises
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Investment Opportunities, Managerial Decisions, and the Security Issue Decision
Author: Yong-Cheol KimPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 33
Book Description
With agency costs of managerial discretion, equity financing is advantageous for the shareholders of firms with valuable investment opportunities but not for the shareholders of other firms. Accordingly, we find that firms with good investment opportunities are more likely to issue equity than debt, have a smaller abnormal return in absolute value when the issue is announced, and experience substantial asset growth following the issue. Firms that issue equity even though they do not have good investment opportunities experience a larger abnormal return in absolute value when the issue is announced and invest more after the issue than comparable firms that issue debt.
Investment Opportunities, Managerial Decisions, and the Security Issue Decision
Author: Kooyul JungPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
With agency costs of managerial discretion, equity financing is advantageous for the shareholders of firms with valuable investment opportunities but not for the shareholders of other firms. Accordingly, we find that firms with good investment opportunities are more likely to issue equity than debt, have a smaller abnormal return in absolute value when the issue is announced, and experience substantial asset growth following the issue. Firms that issue equity even though they do not have good investment opportunities experience a larger abnormal return in absolute value when the issue is announced and invest more after the issue than comparable firms that issue debt.
Payout and Investment Decisions Under Managerial Discretion
Author: Bogdan StacescuPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41
Book Description
In traditional signalling models, high-quality firms can separate themselves from low-quality firms by using their payout policy. Standard agency theory suggests that shareholders will pressure managers to pay out all excess cash in order to avoid overinvestment.If firms have different investment opportunities, and these investment opportunities are imperfectly known to investors, signalling a la Miller and Rock (1985) does not work. Moreover, since the actual amount of excess cash is difficult to determine, attempting to induce management to disburse cash can leave the firm with either too much or too little cash available for investment.The paper examines a framework where managers' incentives are not necessarily aligned with those of the shareholders, and where the investment opportunities of various firms are different and not known by investors. As a result, dividends become an imperfect indicator of firm quality. Looking at payout policy from this angle allows us to explain and reconcile several empirical regularities found in the literature. The role of informed investors, active shareholders and repurchases is also discussed.
Investment Decisions, Managerial Discretion, and Optimal Capital Structure with Jump-Diffusion Process
Author: Managerial Discretion and Investment Decisions of State-owned Firms
Author: Elisabetta BerteroPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government business enterprises
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Investment Decisions, Managerial Discretion, and Optimal Capital Structure with Learning-Curve Technology
Author: Investment Decisions, Managerial Discretion, and Optimal Capital Structure with Convertible Debt
Author: Bidding Strategies, Financing and Control
Author: Bjørn Espen EckboPublisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 0123846900
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1088
Book Description
A selection of republished corporate finance articles and book chapters that can serve as an advanced corporate finance supplementary text for courses that use no textbooks. Combining convenience and an affordable price with retypeset pages and a high-quality index, the 600 pages of volume two, "Bidding Strategies, Financing, and Corporate Control", focus on a range of special topics, ranging from theories and evidence on strategic bidding behavior (offer premiums, toeholds, bidder competition, winner's curse adjustments, and managerial overconfidence), issues arising when bidding for targets in bankruptcy auctions, effects of deal protection devices (termination agreements, poison pills), role of large shareholder voting in promoting takeover gains, deal financing issues (such as raising the cash used to pay for the target), managerial incentive effects of takeovers, governance spillovers from cross-border mergers, and returns to merger arbitrage. Including an index and new introduction, this volume will simplify and facilitate students' interaction with new concepts and applications. - Provides a status report about modern scientific evidence on corporate takeovers - Exposes students to new methods and empirical evidence while reading high quality primary material - Offers a concise and cost-efficient package of journal and book articles for advanced corporate finance students