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Author: Olivier Accominotti Publisher: ISBN: Category : Banks and banking, International Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
In May-July 1931, a series of financial panics shook Central Europe before spreading to the rest of the world. This paper explores how the 1931 Central European crisis propagated to the London and New York financial centers; it also examines the role of cross-border banking linkages in international crisis transmission. Using archival bank-level data, I document US and British banks' asset-side exposure to the crisis region. The Continental crisis disturbed few US banks but endangered several British financial institutions and triggered severe stress in the London money market. Central European credits were mostly held by large and diversified commercial banks in the United States and by small and geographically specialized financial institutions in Britain. Differences in the market structure of the trade finance industry explain why the 1931 Central European crisis infected London banks but not New York banks.
Author: Olivier Accominotti Publisher: ISBN: Category : Banks and banking, International Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
In May-July 1931, a series of financial panics shook Central Europe before spreading to the rest of the world. This paper explores how the 1931 Central European crisis propagated to the London and New York financial centers; it also examines the role of cross-border banking linkages in international crisis transmission. Using archival bank-level data, I document US and British banks' asset-side exposure to the crisis region. The Continental crisis disturbed few US banks but endangered several British financial institutions and triggered severe stress in the London money market. Central European credits were mostly held by large and diversified commercial banks in the United States and by small and geographically specialized financial institutions in Britain. Differences in the market structure of the trade finance industry explain why the 1931 Central European crisis infected London banks but not New York banks.
Author: Gary Richardson Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
In the summer of 1931, a financial crisis began in Austria, spread to Germany, forced Britain to abandon the gold standard, crossed the Atlantic, and afflicted financial institutions in the United States. This article describes how banks in New York City, the central money market of the United States, reacted to this trans-Atlantic trauma. New York's money-center banks anticipated the onset of a financial crisis, prepared for it by accumulating substantial reserves, and during the European crisis, continued business as usual. New York's leading bankers deliberately and collectively decided on the business-as-usual policy in order to minimize the impact of the panic in the United States. New York banks' behavior changed only after the Federal Reserve raised discount rates to stem gold outflows in the fall of 1931.
Author: Tobias Straumann Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0192548123 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 232
Book Description
Germany's financial collapse in the summer of 1931 was one of the biggest economic catastrophes of modern history. It led to a global panic, brought down the international monetary system, and turned a worldwide recession into a prolonged depression. The crisis also contributed decisively to the rise of Hitler. Within little more than a year of its onset, the Nazis were Germany's largest political party at both the regional and national level, paving the way for Hitler's eventual seizure of power in January 1933. The origins of the collapse lay in Germany's large pile of foreign debt denominated in gold-backed currencies, which condemned the German government to cut spending, raise taxes, and lower wages in the middle of a worldwide recession. As political resistance to this policy of austerity grew, the German government began to question its debt obligations, prompting foreign investors to panic and sell their German assets. The resulting currency crisis led to the failure of the already weakened banking system and a partial sovereign default. Hitler managed to profit from the crisis because he had been the most vocal critic of the reparation regime responsible for the lion's share of German debts. As the financial system collapsed, his relentless attacks against foreign creditors and the alleged complicity of the German government resonated more than ever with the electorate. The ruling parties that were responsible for the situation lost their credibility and became defenceless in the face of his onslaught against an establishment allegedly selling the country out to her foreign creditors. Meanwhile, these creditors hesitated too long to take the wind out of Hitler's sails by offering debt relief. In this way, a financial crisis soon developed into a political catastrophe for both Europe and the world.
Author: Olivier Accominotti Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This dissertation is a collection of three essays, all dealing with unexplored aspects of international financial instability during the 1920s and 1930s. The research included in these papers aims to provide a better understanding of the destabilizing monetary policies of the interwar years, and of the spread of financial crises, as well as to bring new historical perspectives to current policy issues in international finance. The first chapter revisits the French international reserves policy of the interwar years. Based on original data documenting the currency composition of the foreign reserves, the chapter identifies the motivations behind the Bank of France's disastrous policy of this period. The second chapter deals with the international transmission of the 1931 global financial crisis. Relying on bank balance sheet data collected in the archives, it explores the precise transmission channel through which the Central European crisis of the spring 1931 propagated to the most important financial center of the period, London, endangered the British banking system and eventually led to the sterling crisis of September. Last, the third chapter identifies the main factors of international financial crisis propagation during the 1930s, based on an extensive dataset documenting exchange markets, bond markets and stock markets. The statistical analysis in this chapter reveals that the 1931 crisis was the most global financial shock of the Great Depression and that net importers of capital were hit first.
Author: Gary Richardson Publisher: ISBN: Category : Banks and banking Languages : en Pages : 24
Book Description
In 1931, a financial crisis began in Austria, struck numerous European nations, forced Britain to abandon the gold standard, and spread across the Atlantic. This article describes how banks in New York City, the central money market of the United States, reacted to events in Europe. An array of data sources - including memos detailing private conversations between leading bankers the governors of the New York Federal Reserve, articles written by prominent commentators, and financial data drawn from the balance sheets of commercial banks - tell a consistent tale. Banks in New York anticipated events in Europe, prepared for them by accumulating substantial reserves, and during the crisis, continued business as usual. Leading international bankers deliberately and collectively decided on the business-as-usual policy in order to minimize the impact of the panic in the United States and Europe.
Author: R. Glenn Hubbard Publisher: University of Chicago Press ISBN: 9780226355887 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 420
Book Description
Warnings of the threat of an impending financial crisis are not new, but do we really know what constitutes an actual episode of crisis and how, once begun, it can be prevented from escalating into a full-blown economic collapse? Using both historical and contemporary episodes of breakdowns in financial trade, contributors to this volume draw insights from theory and empirical data, from the experience of closed and open economies worldwide, and from detailed case studies. They explore the susceptibility of American corporations to economic downturns; the origins of banking panics; and the behavior of financial markets during periods of crisis. Sever papers specifically address the current thrift crisis—including a detailed analysis of the over 500 FSLIC-insured thrifts in the southeast—and seriously challenge the value of recent measures aimed at preventing future collapse in that industry. Government economists and policy makers, scholars of industry and banking, and many in the business community will find these timely papers an invaluable reference.
Author: Olivier Accominotti
Author: Olivier Accominotti
Author: Albrecht Ritschl
Author: Gary Richardson
Author: Tobias Straumann
Author: Olivier Accominotti
Author: Gary Richardson
Author: Paul Anthony Volpe
Author: R. Glenn Hubbard
Author: Carmen M. Reinhart
Author: Martin Horn