Corporate Governance Strengthening Latin American Corporate Governance The Role of Institutional Investors PDF Download

Author: OECD
Publisher: OECD Publishing
ISBN: 9264116052
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 78

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Book Description
This report reflects long-term, in-depth discussion and debate by participants in the Latin American Roundtable on Corporate Governance.

Author: Geof P. Stapledon
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 376

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Book Description

Author: Theodor Baums
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter
ISBN: 311089338X
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 725

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Book Description
The volume contains 23 articles by international experts, both scholars and practioners dealing with the development of institutional investors (such as banks, insurances, investment companies, pension funds etc.), their investment and voting policies, the impact on managements of the companies concerned and related issues. The consequences of the international development on capital markets as well as policy implications for the respective national legislations are treated.

Author: OECD
Publisher: OECD Publishing
ISBN: 9264128751
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 139

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Book Description
Covering 26 jurisdictions including in-depth review of Australia, Chile and Germany, this report focuses the role of institutional investors in promoting good corporate governance practices including the incentives they face to promote such outcomes.

Author: Reena Aggarwal
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Foreign exchange
Languages : en
Pages : 47

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Book Description

Author: Malik M. Hafeez
Publisher: Universal-Publishers
ISBN: 1627340505
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 333

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Book Description
Corporate Governance and Institutional Investment focuses on corporate governance and the legal nature of institutional investors in the corporate system. Its aim is to expose the complexity of the relationships that exist between companies on one side, and their shareholders, stakeholders, and monitors on the other. Various types of investors, including trusts and companies, are discussed, including how they function under different legal guidelines. The role of investment managers acting on the behalf of institutional investors is examined, as well as why fund managers overlook the corporate governance problems of their investee’s companies when they are performing well financially. This complexity is one of the main reasons why corporate scandals still occur, despite the existence of an extensive academic literature on corporate governance and the sustained efforts by the corporate community around the world. An analysis of how the monitoring role of institutional investors became effective in the light of company law and trusts is presented by using a comparative model involving the U.K., the U.S.A., Pakistan, and continental Europe. Financial scandals of the last decade such as Enron, Northern Rock, and the banking crisis are also examined. Finally, a review of regulatory approaches which rely upon formal rules and institutions backed by the state legal system, and non-regulatory approaches emphasizing the market mechanism and contractual arrangements, is included.

Author: Roderick Martin
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191607053
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 238

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Book Description
The growth of shareholder value has been a major change in Western economies since the 1980s. This growth has reignited debates concerning relations between investors and managers. This book argues that investors are more than passive providers of finance, on whose behalf managers seek to maximize shareholder returns. Instead, many investors directly influence management practice, through investor engagement. The book examines the role of institutional investors and private equity firms, two types of investors with overlapping but different reasons for engagement. Questions addressed include: What are the incentives, and disincentives, for investment engagement? How is investor engagement organized? What areas of management practice are of particular concern to investors? The discussion shows in detail how private equity firms play a major role in developing new companies, beyond the provision of finance, especially in the IT, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical sectors. The discussion is primarily based on British and US research. The debate has wider international relevance, because there are strong pressures for establishing shareholder value as the international 'norm' for systems of corporate governance. Following a detailed discussion of Germany, the authors conclude that there is no inevitable trend to shareholder value: shareholder value depends upon complementary institutional arrangements in national business systems, which are far from universal. The book concludes with a critical analysis of the justifications for shareholder value and investor engagement, highlighting the weaknesses of both efficiency and equity justifications.

Author: Carolyn Kay Brancato
Publisher: Irwin Professional Publishing
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 272

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Book Description
This volume describes in detail the best practices being used to measure and enhance firm value while observing the rights of shareholders and managing the risks of dealing with them for long-term benefit of both companies and investors.

Author: James P. Hawley
Publisher: University of Pennsylvania Press
ISBN: 9780812235630
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 268

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Book Description
Traces the rise of public and private pension funds, which now control as much as 50 percent of the equity in American corporations, and argues that shareholders in those funds could use their power to make corporations more responsive to social needs.

Author: Sebastian Sturm
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3640311647
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 117

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Book Description
Diploma Thesis from the year 2008 in the subject Business economics - Law, grade: 1,3, Technical University of Chemnitz, language: English, abstract: Corporate management and corporate governance are becoming more and more crucial in today’s successful economies. With the increasing relevance of capital markets this subject comes more into the focus of the public. Particularly, the fast growing importance of institutional investors is a key factor which helps to explain the changing attitude of managers towards shareholders and corporate governance. In conjunction with the German capital market, a wide variety of mismanagement in German public limited companies has revealed shortfalls of German top-management and corporate control in the last decade. This development was of fundamental importance for the development of the German Corporate Governance Code. Hence, the basic underlying of corporate governance can be attributed to a conflict between the management of a listed corporation and its owners. More precisely, this conflict arises because the management does not adequately comprise the interests of shareholders. In Germany, assets under management of professional investors have increased at 92 percent from 1990 to 2001.1 In addition, a growing administration of private savings by professional fund managers as well as the intensified exercise of influence by institutional investors on corporate governance and corporate management respectively corporate strategy is observable. Similarly, a growing importance of institutional investors could be observed in the United Kingdom as well as in the United States. Within academic literature, the issue of activism by institutional investors in Germany is analyzed little, so far. Furthermore, there are only a few surveys on the outcome of the influence by institutional investors on corporate management. Therefore, this thesis aims to answer the following questions: 1. How was the development of shareholder activism in Germany and how can it be characterized and explained? 2. Is shareholder activism a superior tool in relation to the market of corporate control to solve the principal-agent problem? 3. What do institutional investors demand from German corporations and in particular from corporate management? 4. Which options do institutional investors have to influence corporate management? 5. How are these options for activism covered by the German Corporate Governance Code and the German legal framework? 6. What is the optimum corporate governance from an institutional investor’s angle? 7. What is the empirical outcome?