Institutional Investment, Corporate Earnings and Managerial Incentives PDF Download

Author: Mark Lang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate profits
Languages : en
Pages : 28

View

Book Description

Author: Brian J. Bushee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 44

View

Book Description
This paper examines the influence of institutional investors on the incentives of corporate managers to alter long-term investment for earnings management purposes. Many critics argue that the short-term focus of institutional investors encourages managers to sacrifice long-term investment to meet current earnings targets. Others argue that the large stockholdings and sophistication of institutions allow them to fulfill a monitoring role in preventing such myopic investment behavior. I examine these competing views by testing whether institutional ownership affects Ramp;D spending for firms that could reverse a decline in earnings with a reduction in Ramp;D. The results indicate that managers are less likely to cut Ramp;D to reverse an earnings decline when institutional ownership is high, implying that institutions typically serve a monitoring role relative to individual investors. However, I find that a high proportion of ownership by institutions exhibiting ?transient? ownership behavior (i.e., high portfolio turnover and momentum trading) significantly increases the probability that managers reduce Ramp;D to boost earnings. These results indicate that high turnover and momentum trading by institutional investors can encourage myopic investment behavior when such institutional investors have extremely high levels of ownership in a firm; otherwise, institutional ownership serves to reduce pressures on managers for myopic investment behavior.

Author: Li Li Eng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 202

View

Book Description

Author: Hursit S Celil
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

View

Book Description
In this dissertation, I study the influence of monitoring by institutional investors on corporate behavior within the context of CEO compensation-based incentives. I find that institutional investors provide an executive with higher levels of compensation sensitivity with respect to a firm0́9s equity price (Delta). In contrast to prior literature, however, once I control the dynamic nature of the data, institutional investors do not affect compensation sensitivity with respect to a firm0́9s equity risk (Vega). Instead, I find that institutional investors appear to influence the risk profile of firm through the firm0́9s investment, financing and diversification policy choices even after I control for the CEO's compensation structure. The results suggest that compensation-related incentives to increase risk (i.e. vega) and monitoring by institutional investors are substitutes of each other in that both can offset the managerial incentives to reduce risk that stem from greater levels of compensation delta. These results are robust to potential endogeneity problems that may arise due to the dynamic nature of panel data. The electronic version of this dissertation is accessible from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/149301

Author: Roderick Martin
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191607053
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 238

View

Book Description
The growth of shareholder value has been a major change in Western economies since the 1980s. This growth has reignited debates concerning relations between investors and managers. This book argues that investors are more than passive providers of finance, on whose behalf managers seek to maximize shareholder returns. Instead, many investors directly influence management practice, through investor engagement. The book examines the role of institutional investors and private equity firms, two types of investors with overlapping but different reasons for engagement. Questions addressed include: What are the incentives, and disincentives, for investment engagement? How is investor engagement organized? What areas of management practice are of particular concern to investors? The discussion shows in detail how private equity firms play a major role in developing new companies, beyond the provision of finance, especially in the IT, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical sectors. The discussion is primarily based on British and US research. The debate has wider international relevance, because there are strong pressures for establishing shareholder value as the international 'norm' for systems of corporate governance. Following a detailed discussion of Germany, the authors conclude that there is no inevitable trend to shareholder value: shareholder value depends upon complementary institutional arrangements in national business systems, which are far from universal. The book concludes with a critical analysis of the justifications for shareholder value and investor engagement, highlighting the weaknesses of both efficiency and equity justifications.

Author: Gopala K. Vasudevan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

View

Book Description

Author: Stuart L. Gillan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate governance
Languages : en
Pages : 34

View

Book Description

Author: Ping-Sheng Koh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

View

Book Description
This study examines the association between institutional ownership and Australian firms' aggressive earnings management strategies. In contrast to similar studies, this study does not assume that the two views on how institutional ownership associates with firms' earnings management behaviour are mutually exclusive. The association between institutional ownership and firms' income increasing discretionary accruals is expected to vary as the level of institutional ownership increases. The results support the predicted non-linear association between institutional ownership and income increasing discretionary accruals. In particular, a positive association is found at the lower institutional ownership levels, consistent with the view that transient (short-term oriented) institutional investors create incentives for managers to manage earnings upwards. On the other hand, a negative association is found at the higher institutional ownership levels, consistent with the view that long-term oriented institutional investors' monitoring limits managerial accruals discretion. These findings suggest that institutional investors can act as a complementary corporate governance mechanism in mitigating myopic aggressive earnings management by corporations when they have a sufficiently high ownership level.

Author: James Ah Chip
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 160

View

Book Description

Author: Mahmoud Agha
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

View

Book Description
We combine the incentive schemes offered to managers in practice into a single incentive package and construct a governance index to analyze the role of governance and the incentive package in addressing the agency costs of free cash flow. Using US based data, we find empirical evidence that managers in practice do not consume perks but make a tradeoff when they allocate the cash flows of the firm between investment and dividends. In general, managers in practice underinvest and overpay dividends; an increase in their incentive package would retract both investment and dividends toward the optimal levels; hence, firm performance would improve. We also find that governance is used as a control mechanism rather than as a substitute for the incentive package. Principals employ governance to slow down investment and increase dividends when there is a high informational asymmetry between the manager and the investors, and set these variables close to the optimal levels otherwise. Moreover, we find that firms in practice do not use dividends as a substitute for governance. Furthermore, we find monotone relations between investment, firm performance and dividends on the one hand, and governance and the incentive package on the other hand.