Institutional Holding and Trading Volume Reactions to Quarterly Earnings Announcements PDF Download

Author: Jason Lee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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This paper empirically examines the incremental relation between trading volume surrounding quarterly earnings announcements and institutional holdings. Consistent with Cready (1988) and Lee (1992), we find a significant positive relation between abnormal trading volume and the fraction of institutional ownership during the period immediatly following an earnings announcement, after controlling for the magnitude of the associated price reaction and the dispersion of analysts' EPS forecasts.

Author: Jeong-Bon Kim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 24

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Author: Krinsky, Itzhak
Publisher: Hamilton, Ont. : Program for Quantitative Studies in Economics and Population, McMaster University
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30

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Author: Benjamin Schmitt
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783656972426
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 56

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Bachelor Thesis from the year 2008 in the subject Business economics - Investment and Finance, grade: 1.1, EBS European Business School gGmbH (Finance), language: English, abstract: Many authors have already studied about stock price reactions after earnings announcements yet, which is because of the importance of earnings announcements, in particular quarterly earnings announcements, for many investors. However, all major studies concerning this topic deal with long-term scenarios, the stock's price performance is measured for a time period of at least three quarters. Due to the fact that there are many investors, especially institutional investors such as hedge funds that trade stocks much more frequently, the existing studies are not relevant for them. This paper studies stock price reactions around quarterly earnings announcements for companies listed in Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX) or Midcap DAX (MDAX) with respect to changes of the company's full-year outlook and of earnings surprise regarding analyst consensus forecast within ten days before and after the announcement date. Hence, this paper aims to analyse short-term reaction to quarterly earnings announcements, which are of relevance for all investors, whose investment strategy is, at least partially, focussing on the short-term performance. The main target group of this analysis are therefore hedge funds and investors that run short-term strategies. Due to the fact that the widespread Event Study Methodology is focused on the long-term, it is irrelevant for this analysis.

Author: Eli Bartov
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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This study tests whether the observed patterns in stock returns after quarterly earnings announcements are related to the proportion of firm shares held by institutional investors, a variable used by prior research to proxy for investor sophistication. Our findings show that the institutional holdings variable is negatively correlated with the observed post-announcement abnormal returns. Our findings also show that traditional proxies for transaction costs (i.e., trading volume, stock price) as well as firm size have little incremental power to explain post announcement abnormal returns when institutional holdings is an explanatory variable. If institutional ownership is a valid proxy for investor sophistication, these findings suggest that the trading activity of unsophisticated investors underlies the predictability of stock returns after earnings announcements. However, tests evaluating the validity of institutional holdings as a proxy for investor sophistication yield only mixed results. This calls for caution in interpreting our findings.

Author: John Y. Campbell
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate profits
Languages : en
Pages : 63

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Author: Silver Chung
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business enterprises
Languages : en
Pages : 79

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"Managers have substantial discretion in when to announce earnings during the day. While the prior literature has shown that the timing of announcements during the day can affect the stock market's reaction to earnings news, there is either mixed or weak empirical evidence on why a manager chooses a certain time of the day to announce earnings. In this paper, I examine whether institutional ownership affects firms' decisions to announce earnings after hours (AH). AH are largely dominated by institutional investors who better understand the implications of earnings news for firm value and stock prices. I argue that firms with greater institutional ownership announce earnings AH to promote institutional investors' trading, and therefore facilitate post-announcement price discovery and reduce price volatility. Using the annual reconstitution of the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes which provides plausibly exogenous variation in institutional ownership, I find that firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to announce earnings during an aftermarket session (i.e., AH after the market closes), but not during a premarket session (i.e., AH before the market opens). My analysis further shows that transient institutional ownership has a stronger influence on the likelihood of after-market announcements relative to quasi-indexer and dedicated institutional holdings, and that the effect of institutional ownership on the announcement timing is more pronounced when firms have bad earnings news or large transitory earnings components. Lastly, I find that announcing earnings during an after-market session indeed facilitates the post-announcement price discovery and reduces price volatility for firms with greater institutional ownership. Collectively, my findings suggest that institutional ownership influences firms' earnings announcement timing decisions"--Pages vii-viii.

Author: Richard A. Schneible Jr.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 43

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We document a change in the nature of trading volume reactions to quarterly earnings announcements over the time period 1976-2005. Consistent with Landsman and Maydew (2002), we find that the magnitude of abnormal trading volume around quarterly earnings announcements has increased over time and that this increase is greater for large firms than small firms. We show, however, that this trend has reversed the negative relation between firm size and trading volume documented by Bamber (1987). Applying insights from recent trading volume theory, we predict and provide evidence that the increase in abnormal trading volume across time and firm size is due to increases in pre-announcement private information. Specifically, we show that the component of abnormal trading volume associated with price change, which theory suggests reflects pre-announcement private information, is increasing across time and firm size. Our results suggest that investors are motivated to acquire private information prior to earnings announcements about firms that have relatively high quality information environments. Thus, our results have implications for policies aimed at reducing information asymmetry between investors by increasing public disclosure.

Author: Ashiq Ali
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
This study documents an association between changes in institutional ownership during a calendar quarter and abnormal returns at the time of subsequent announcements of quarterly earnings. The result is driven by the portfolio returns of the extreme deciles of changes in institutional ownership, suggesting that institutions trade based on information about future earnings, but that such trading is not widespread. We also find that the difference between earnings announcement returns of the extreme deciles of change in institutional ownership is much greater when change in institutional ownership of a stock is driven by relatively few institutions, measured using the skewness of the distribution of change in institutional ownership of the stock. This result suggests that when fewer differentially informed investors make disproportionately large purchases or sales of stocks, a greater amount of the information on which they base their trades is not impounded in prices until the subsequent earnings announcement. Finally, we show that our results obtain for institutional investors with short-term focus, such as independent advisors, investment companies and insurance companies, but not for institutional investors with long-term focus, such as internally managed pension funds, educational institutions, and private foundations. This result further supports our conclusions regarding informed trading by institutions based on information about forthcoming earnings.

Author: Qin Emma Wang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38

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Book Description
This paper investigates price discovery between control shares (the superior voting class) and public shares (the inferior voting class) issued by 62 dual-class firms around 148 quarterly earnings announcements from January 2002 to June 2008. We document substantial informed trading in both control and public shares. The average price discovery of control shares is 46.6% for positive events and 40.5% for negative events during the event periods. In addition, before the earnings announcements, abnormal trading volume and price discovery increase significantly in control shares relative to public shares. We find price discovery of control shares increases with relative volume of control shares to public shares and relative bid-ask spread but decreases with relative institutional ownership and relative volatility. Our results suggest that publicly traded superior voting class contributes to price discovery substantially, especially before earnings announcements when the information asymmetry is high. The listing of control shares not only enhances price efficiency, but also provides opportunities for outside sophisticated investors to get voting rights and engage in monitoring. Our study sheds new light on the issues of price discovery and corporate governance of dual-class firms.