Author: Steven A. LippmanPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Research, Industrial
Languages : en
Pages : 20
Book Description
Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly
Author: Steven A. LippmanPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Research, Industrial
Languages : en
Pages : 20
Book Description
Persistence of Monopoly, Innovation, and R&D Spillovers
Author: Eugen KováčPublisher:
ISBN: 9788073441029
Category :
Languages : cs
Pages : 62
Book Description
Process Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly with Labour-Managed Firms
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
The issue of the persistence of monopoly when at least one labour-managed firm takes part in an auction for a cost-reducing innovation is tackled in this paper. It is shown that (i) when the incumbent is a profit-maximizing firm while the entrant is a labour-managed firm, monopoly persists; (ii) when both firms are labour-managed, monopoly persists only if the technology initially employed by the incumbent is highly ine¢cient as compared to the new one; and, finally, (iii) when the incumbent is labour-managed while the outsider is a profit seeking agent, then entry always occurs and monopoly changes hands.
Process Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly with Labour Managed Firms
Author: Luca LambertiniProduct Innovation Under Vertical Differentiation and the Persistence of Monopoly
Author: Luca LambertiniProduct Innovation Under Vertical Differentiation and the Persistence of Monopoly
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
The incentives to innovate for the incumbent and the entrant in a vertically differentiated market are analised, in the absence of uncertainty. It turns out that if consumers marginal willingness to pay for quality is sufficiently low, the efficiency effect observationally works so as to favour innovation by the entrant, i.e., competition. Otherwise, it operates to the advantage of the incumbent who acquire the right to innovate, preempting thus the rival.
Persistence of Monopoly and Research Specialization
Author: Philipp WeinschenkPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 25
Book Description
We examine the persistence of monopolies in markets with innovations when the outcome of research is uncertain. We show that for low success probabilities of research, the incumbent can seldom preempt the potential entrant. Then the efficiency effect outweighs the replacement effect. It is vice versa for high probabilities. Moreover, the incumbent specializes in quot;safequot; research and the potential entrant in quot;riskyquot; research. We also show that the probability of entry has an inverted U-shape in the success probability. Since even at the peak entry is rather unlikely, the persistence of the monopoly is high.
Comment on Gilbert and Newberry's "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly"
Author: Stephen W. SalantPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Monopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 18
Book Description
Persistence of Monopoly, Innovation, and R&D Spillovers
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
When, on the other hand, strategic predation is the optimal strategy, the time profile of R&D is reversed: that is, the shorter the target time, T , at which Firm 2 is forced to exit, the higher the "predatory" level of R&D investment has to be. [...] In this case, the adjustment becomes instantaneous, and the speed of convergence (as measured by the absolute value of the exponent in (27), (28)) monotonically increases.17 The rationale is that a higher rate of transformation of R&D inputs into lower unit costs (higher μ) decreases the time gap between the R&D investment and its benefits expressed in terms of future profits. [...] Furthermore, observe that viability of duopoly implies the existence of the optimal control (but not vice versa) and that the range of parameters in which dynamic duopoly is viable is broader than in its static counterpart due to the fact, that the difference in unit cost of the two firms does not occur immediately, and due to the fact that the discount rate is in general positive. [...] The shorter the desired time for the elimination of the competitor is, the larger the R&D investment should be. [...] The second inequality states that the quicker the speed at which the R&D investment materializes in the unit cost reduction, the lower are the predatory ex- penditures that lead to expulsion of Firm 2.
Innovation, Industrial Dynamics and Structural Transformation
Author: Uwe CantnerPublisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540494650
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 412
Book Description
This book provides an account of work in the Schumpeterian and evolutionary tradition of industrial dynamics and the evolution of industries. It is shown that over time industries evolve and change their structure. In this dynamic process, change is affected and sometimes constraint by many factors, including knowledge and technologies, the capabilities and incentives of actors, new products and processes, and institutions.