Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms PDF Download

Author: Theodore Groves
Publisher: U of Minnesota Press
ISBN: 1452908044
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 410

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Author: Donald E. Campbell
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107035244
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 699

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This book examines incentives at work to see how and how well coordination is achieved by motivating individual decision makers.

Author: Theodore Groves
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
ISBN: 9780631137986
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 399

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Author: Donald E. Campbell
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521478571
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 367

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This book investigates situations in which incentives, contracts or other economic devices can be employed in a wide range of settings to prevent the pursuit of self-interest from being institutionally- or self-defeating. Campbell's treatment of these issues in the economics of information, mechanism design, and game theory can be followed by anyone with a basic knowledge of single-variable calculus and microeconomic theory. Readers learn to grasp economic principles by working carefully through examples, rather than by following proofs of general theorems.

Author: Inés Macho-Stadler
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0191512079
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages :

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In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The book is written for a one-semester course for advanced undergraduates taking specialized course options, and for first-year postgraduate students of economics or business. After an introduction to the subject and the presentation of a benchmark model in which both parties share the same information throughout the relationship, chapters are devoted to the three main asymmetric information topics of Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Signalling. The wide range of economic situations where the conclusions are applied includes such areas as finance, regulation, insurance, labour economics, health economics, and even politics. Each chapter presents the basic theory before moving on to applications and advanced topics. The problems are presented in the same framework throughout to allow easy comparison of the different results. This new edition incorporates extended exercises to test the student's understanding of the material, and to develop the tools and skills provided by the main text to solve other, original problems.

Author: Leonid Hurwicz
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 113945434X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 321

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A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.

Author: Günter Bamberg
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642750605
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 538

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Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.

Author: Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400829453
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 436

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Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.

Author: David Martimort
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781785364433
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1904

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Book Description
This comprehensive two-volume research collection recaps major literary contributions to the economic theory of incentives. The carefully selected papers spanning forty years analyse and review collective decision problems in the context of asymmetric information, moral hazard and incomplete contracting. Together with an original introduction by the editor, this collection would be a valuable addition to the bookshelves of any serious scholar and student in the field.

Author: G. C. Archibald
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521330459
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 191

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Book Description
This 1992 book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning (such as information retrieval, computation of solutions, and separate implementation systems), or a vain reliance on sufficiently 'perfect' competition. All rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract.